Institutional Vulnerability and Governance of Disaster Risk Reduction: Macro, Meso and Micro Scale Assessment : With Case Studies from Indonesia by Lassa, Jonatan A.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional Vulnerability and Governance of Disaster Risk Reduction: 
Macro, Meso and Micro Scale Assessment 
(With Case Studies from Indonesia) 
 
 Dissertation  
 
zur 
Erlangung des Grades 
 
Doktor Ingenieur 
(Dr.Ing.) 
 
der 
Hohen Landwirtschaftlichen Fakultät 
 
der 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 
 
zu Bonn 
 
Vorgelegt am 24 November 2010 
  
Jonatan A. Lassa 
 
aus  
 
West Timor, Indonesien 
 
ii 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Referent:  Prof. Dr. Ing. Janos J. Bogardi  
 
Korreferent:  PD. Dr. Peter P. Mollinga. 
 
Korreferent:  Prof. Dr.-Ing. Theo Kötter 
  
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 28-02- 2011 
 
Erscheinungsjahr: 2011
iii 
 
Abbreviations  
 
AIT:  Asian Institute of Technology  
AusAID: Australian Agency for International Development  
APBN: Annual National Development Budget 
APBD: Annual Local Development Budget 
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
Bakornas: National Coordination Agency for Disaster Management (old) in Indonesia  
BMG:   Indonesian Meteorological and Geophysics Agency Indonesia  
BNPB:  Indonesian National Disaster Management Agency   
BDPB  Indonesian Local Disaster Management Agency   
CDA:   Critical Discourse Analysis 
CBDM: Community-based Disaster Management 
CBDRM: Community-based Disaster Risk Management  
CRED: Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters  
CSO:  Civil Society Organizations  
DAAD:  German Academic Exchange Service 
DM:  Disaster Management 
DNPI:  National Council for Climate Change of Indonesia  
DPR:  National Legislation Council (Indonesian Parliament) 
DPRD:  Local Legislation Council (provincial/district parliament) 
DRG:  Disaster Risk Governance 
DRGF:  Disaster Risk Governance Framework 
DRM:  Disaster Risk Management 
DRR:  Disaster Risk Reduction  
ECLAC:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
ECHO: European Commission for Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection 
EID:  Encyclopedia of International Development  
EMDAT: Emergency Event Database  
ESDM: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resouce 
ESG:  Earth System Governance  
GAR:  Global Assessment Report  
GDP:  Gross Domestic Product 
GFDRR: Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery 
GEF:  Global Environmental Facility 
GITEWS: German-Indonesian Tsunami Early Warning System  
GR:  Government regulations 
GTZ:   German Agency for Technical Cooperation 
HFA:  Hyogo Framework for Action 
IBC:  International Building Codes 
ICC:   International Code of Councils 
ICM:  Indonesian Concrete Manuals 
IRCI:   Institutional Resilience and Capability Index  
ICT:  Information and Communication Technology  
IDNDR:  International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction 
IDR:  Indonesian Rupiah  
iv 
 
IDRL:  International Disaster Response Laws 
INGO:  International Non-governmental Organizations  
IFRC:   International Federation of the Red Cross 
IJMED:  International Journal of Mass Emergency and Disasters  
IDPs:  Internally Displaced Peoples 
IDRL:  International Disaster Response Laws 
ISO:  International Standard Organization  
IVI:   Institutional Vulnerability Index 
ITB:  Bandung Institute of Technology, Indonesia   
IVA:   Institutional Vulnerability Assessment  
KAM:  Knowledge Assessment Methodology 
Keppress: Presidential Decree  
Kepmen: Minister Decree  
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals 
MPBI:  Indonesian Disaster Management Society  
MRI:  Multi-risk Index 
MSR:  Multi-strategy Research  
NAP:  National Action Plan 
NGO:  Non Governmental Organizations  
NTT:   East Nusa Tenggara Province 
NU:   Nahdatul Ulama  
OFDA: Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 
PD:  Presidential decree  
Perda:  Local regulation   
Perkada: Head of region’s regulation  
Perpress: Presidential Regulation  
Permendagri: Interior Minister Regulation 
PermenPU: Minister of Public Work’s Regulation 
PP:  Government Regulation  
PMPB: Disaster Management Association Kupang 
PMB-ITB: Pusat Mitigas Bencana – Bandung Institute of Technology 
PMI:  Indonesian Red Cross 
PRA:  Participatory Risk Assessment  
RAN:  National Action Plan 
RAN PRB: National Action Plan for Disaster Reduction 
RENAS: National Planning  
RGF:  Risk Governance Framework 
RPJMD: Local Medium-Term Development Planning 
RPJMN: National Medium-Term Development Planning  
Satlak:  District Level Coordinating Agency for Disaster Management (old) 
Satkorlak: Provincial Level Coordinating Agency for Disaster Management (old) 
SC-DRR: Safer Community through Disaster Risk Reduction 
SKPD:  Local Government Working Units (province and district)  
UBC:   Uniform Building Codes 
UN:  United Nations 
UNDP: United Nations Development Program 
UNDP-ERA: United Nations Development Program Early Recovery Assistance  
v 
 
UNDRO: United Nations Disaster Relief Organization  
UNESCO: United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organization  
UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNISDR:  United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
UNOCHA:  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
UNU-EHS:  United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security  
UII:  Islamic University of Indonesia 
USAID: United States Agency for International Development  
WHO:  World Health Organization  
WCDR: World Conference of Disaster Reduction 
WGI:   World Governance Indicators  
ZEF:   Center for Development Research (University of Bonn) 
  
vi 
 
CONTENTS 
ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................................................. III 
LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................................................. X 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................................... XI 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................................................................................................................. XII 
DEDICATION .................................................................................................................................. XIV 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................ XV 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. Research Problems ......................................................................................................... 2 
1.3. Research Objectives ....................................................................................................... 4 
1.4. Research Questions ........................................................................................................ 5 
1.5. Research Outline ............................................................................................................ 5 
CHAPTER 2. THEORIES AND CONCEPTS OF INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE ............. 7 
2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 7 
2.2. Understanding Institutions of Disaster Risk Reduction ................................................... 9 
2.2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 9 
2.2.2. Rational Choice Critics on Institutions....................................................................... 9 
2.2.2.1. New Institutional Economics Theory .................................................................. 10 
2.2.3. Theory of Pathways ................................................................................................. 12 
2.2.4. Anthropological Approach to Institutions in Disaster Risk Reduction ...................... 13 
2.2.4.1. Religions as Informal Institutions........................................................................ 14 
2.2.5. Timelines of Institutions: Simplified Framework ..................................................... 16 
2.2.6. How Institutions Change ......................................................................................... 17 
2.2.7. Institutional Plurality and DRR................................................................................ 18 
2.2.8. Bureaucracy as Institutions and Governance ............................................................ 20 
2.3. Theories and Concept of Governance ........................................................................... 22 
2.3.1. Application of the Concept of Governance to Disaster and Risk Research ............... 25 
2.3.2. Decentralization and “Decentralized Governance”................................................... 30 
2.3.3. Scale of Disaster Risk Governance .......................................................................... 32 
2.3.4. Polycentric Nature of Disaster Risk Reduction ........................................................ 34 
2.4. Towards a New Concept of Institutional Vulnerability to Disaster Risk ....................... 36 
CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH FRAMEWORKS AND METHODS ...................................................... 39 
vii 
 
3.1 Research Frameworks .................................................................................................. 39 
3.1.1 Introduction to Overall Research Frameworks ......................................................... 39 
3.1.2 Disaster Risk Governance Indicators at National Scale ............................................ 42 
3.1.3 Country Level Institutional Vulnerability Assessment ............................................. 42 
3.2 Research Methods ........................................................................................................ 44 
3.2.1 Quantitative Methods .............................................................................................. 45 
3.2.1.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis ............................................................................... 45 
3.2.1.2 Correlation Tests and Multiple Regression .............................................................. 45 
3.2.1.3 Social Network Analysis ......................................................................................... 45 
3.2.2 Research Scales and Locations ................................................................................ 48 
3.2.2.1 Geography of Data Collection ................................................................................. 48 
3.3 Case Study Approach ................................................................................................... 49 
3.3.1 Ethnographic Research and Participant Observation ................................................ 49 
3.3.2 Unstructured Interviews .......................................................................................... 50 
3.3.3 Policy Documents as Sources of Data ...................................................................... 50 
3.3.4 Multi-Stakeholder Workshops/Conferences ............................................................. 51 
3.4 Software for Data Analysis .......................................................................................... 51 
CHAPTER 4. INTRODUCTION TO INSTITUTIONAL VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT ...... 53 
4.1. Introduction to Overall Framework .............................................................................. 53 
4.2. Data and Analytical Methods ....................................................................................... 54 
4.3. Results of Statistical Analysis ...................................................................................... 57 
4.3.1. Selected Statistical Results for HFA 1 ..................................................................... 62 
4.3.2. Selected Statistical Results for HFA 2 ..................................................................... 63 
4.3.3. Selected Statistical Results for HFA 3 ..................................................................... 64 
4.3.4. Selected Statistical Results for HFA 4 ..................................................................... 66 
4.3.5. Selected Statistical Results for HFA 5 ..................................................................... 67 
4.4. Discussion ................................................................................................................... 68 
4.4.1. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 70 
CHAPTER 5 INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT ............................................ 74 
5.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 74 
5.2. Data Source ................................................................................................................. 74 
5.3. Results ......................................................................................................................... 75 
5.3.1. Descriptive Analysis................................................................................................ 75 
5.3.2. Selected Correlation Tests ....................................................................................... 78 
5.4. Volatility in Governance .............................................................................................. 78 
5.4.1. Government Effectiveness and Disaster Risk Reduction .......................................... 79 
5.4.2. Corruption and Disaster Risk Reduction .................................................................. 82 
5.4.3. Rule of Law and Disaster Risk Reduction ................................................................ 83 
5.4.4. Voice and Accountability and Disaster Risk Reduction ........................................... 84 
5.4.5. Regulatory Quality and Disaster Risk Reduction ..................................................... 85 
5.5. Simple Regression Analysis for Institutional Vulnerability Index ................................. 87 
5.6. Discussion ................................................................................................................... 88 
viii 
 
CHAPTER 6. INSTITUTIONS AND DISASTER RISK GOVERNANCE IN INDONESIA ........... 92 
6.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 92 
6.1.1. Introduction to Hazard and Risk Context in Indonesia 1960-2009 ........................... 92 
6.1.2. Vulnerability Context in Indonesia .......................................................................... 94 
6.2. Phases of Indonesia Disaster Management Institutions ................................................. 97 
6.2.1. Disaster Management Institutions in Colonial Period ............................................... 99 
6.2.2. Indonesian Disaster Management Policy 1946-1960s ............................................ 101 
6.2.3. Indonesian Disaster Management Policy 1960s-1990 ............................................ 104 
6.2.4. Indonesian Disaster Management Policy 2000-2007 .............................................. 111 
6.3. Disaster Management Law 2007 ................................................................................ 117 
6.3.1. Disaster Risk Management Structure ..................................................................... 120 
6.4. Policy Flashback 1930-2010: Discontinuity and Continuity of Institutions ................. 122 
6.5. More Evidence of Governance and Institutional Change in Disaster Risk Reduction .. 125 
6.6. Discussion  and Conclusion ....................................................................................... 129 
CHAPTER 7 INSTITUTIONAL VULNERABILITY AND DECENTRALIZATION ................... 132 
7.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 132 
7.2. Volatility in Indonesian Institutions and Governance ................................................. 132 
7.3. Decentralization and Its Missing Links and Implications for DRR ............................. 134 
7.4. Disaster Risk Reduction Planning After Reform ........................................................ 139 
7.5. Recent Progress on DRM-Related Law Enforcement ................................................. 142 
7.5.1. Institutional Constraints at National and Local Levels: Recent Findings ................ 147 
7.6. Understanding Law Enforcement Using Institutional Network Analysis .................... 150 
7.6.1. Correlation Test ..................................................................................................... 155 
7.7. HFA Implementation in Indonesia ............................................................................. 156 
7.7.1. Overall Progress .................................................................................................... 156 
7.7.2. National Action Plan and Implementation 2007-2009 ............................................ 160 
7.7.3. National DM Plan 2010-2014 ................................................................................ 161 
7.7.4. National Action Plan 2010-2012 ............................................................................ 164 
7.8. Decentralization and HFA Priority 4: A Case Study on Mitigation in Indonesia ......... 165 
7.8.1. Decentralization and Mitigation in Flores .............................................................. 167 
7.9. Discussion and Conclusion ........................................................................................ 173 
7.9.1. Discussion ............................................................................................................. 173 
7.9.2. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 175 
CHAPTER 8. FINAL DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................ 178 
8.1. Final Discussion ........................................................................................................ 178 
8.1.1. Institutional vulnerability disaster risk governance ................................................ 178 
8.1.2. Institutional vulnerability disaster risk governance in Indonesia ............................ 180 
8.2. Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 184 
8.2.1. Answering the research questions .......................................................................... 184 
8.2.2. Reflection on mixed methodology ......................................................................... 187 
8.3. Recommendations ...................................................................................................... 189 
ix 
 
8.3.1. Recommendations for Global Actors and Institutions ............................................ 189 
8.3.2. Recommendations for Indonesian DRR Actors and Institutions ............................. 190 
8.3.3. Recommendations for Future Research.................................................................. 191 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................................. 192 
ANNEXES .......................................................................................................................................... 208 
Annex 1. Simple Linear Regression ..................................................................................... 208 
Annex 2. BNPB Structure .................................................................................................... 209 
Annex 3. Example of Pajek Analysis on Closeness Centrality Output .................................. 210 
Annex 4. Institutional Vulnerability Index ........................................................................... 211 
Annex 5. Perception on the Cause of Disasters in Sikka: Selected Variables ........................ 213 
Annex 6. Visited Areas in Indonesia .................................................................................... 214 
Annex 7. Selected List of DRR Regulations Local and National .......................................... 215 
 
  
x 
 
List of Figures 
FIGURE 1 PHD RESEARCH OUTLINE .................................................................................................................................. 6 
FIGURE 2 DISASTER RISK GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK FOR MACRO, MESO AND MICRO ANALYSIS. ................................................ 39 
FIGURE 3 OLD DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT VS. HFA DISASTER RISK GOVERNANCE SPIDER ....................................................... 40 
FIGURE 4 EXAMPLE OF SOCIAL NETWORK GRAPH OF “INSTITUTIONS” – DEGREE CENTRALITY TEST ................................................ 46 
FIGURE 5 INSTITUTIONAL VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK ..................................................................................... 54 
FIGURE 6 HFA BREAKDOWN OF INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS ON DRR ............................................................................... 55 
FIGURE 7 BOX PLOT HFA PRIORITIES BETWEEN REGIONS .................................................................................................... 58 
FIGURE 8 HISTOGRAM FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR HFA 1-5 ........................................................................................... 60 
FIGURE 9 SCATTER PLOT ANALYSES HFA 1 VS. HVA2-5 ..................................................................................................... 61 
FIGURE 10 SELECTED SCATTER PLOT ANALYSIS FOR HFA PRIORITY 1 ...................................................................................... 62 
FIGURE 11 SELECTED SCATTER PLOT ANALYSIS FOR HFA PRIORITY 2 ...................................................................................... 63 
FIGURE 12 SELECTED BOX PLOT ANALYSIS FOR HFA PRIORITY 3 ........................................................................................... 64 
FIGURE 13 SELECTED SCATTER PLOT ANALYSIS FOR HFA PRIORITY 3 ...................................................................................... 65 
FIGURE 14 SELECTED SCATTER PLOT ANALYSIS FOR HFA PRIORITY 4 ...................................................................................... 66 
FIGURE 15 SELECTED SCATTER PLOT ANALYSIS FOR HFA PRIORITY 5 ...................................................................................... 68 
FIGURE 16 FREQUENCY LEVEL AND HFA 22 INDICATOR AVERAGE (N=63) .............................................................................. 69 
FIGURE 17 AVERAGE PERCEIVED HFA IMPLEMENTATION VS. INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY (N=63) .................................................... 76 
FIGURE 18 FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNANCE INDICATORS ...................................................................................... 77 
FIGURE 19 SELECTED CASES OF VOLATILITY IN GOVERNANCE INDICATORS................................................................................ 79 
FIGURE 20 GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS PLOTS .............................................................................................................. 80 
FIGURE 21 GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS OVERTIME ......................................................................................................... 81 
FIGURE 22 DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS ................................................................................................ 81 
FIGURE 23 PLOT OF CORRUPTION AND HFA 4 .................................................................................................................. 83 
FIGURE 24 CONTROL OF CORRUPTION GLOBAL MAP.......................................................................................................... 83 
FIGURE 25 PLOT RULE OF LAW VS. DRR REGULATIONS ...................................................................................................... 84 
FIGURE 26 PLOT VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY VS. DRR GOVERNANCE ................................................................................... 85 
FIGURE 27 PLOT REGULATORY QUALITY VS. DRR REGULATIONS ........................................................................................... 86 
FIGURE 28 REGULATORY QUALITY – GLOBAL MAP ............................................................................................................ 86 
FIGURE 29  SCATTER PLOTS OF INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE, DRR QUALITY AND DRI .................................................................. 88 
FIGURE 30A MORTALITY RISK INDEX; B. RECORDED DEATHS 1960S-2009; C. WITHOUT TSUNAMI 2004 ......................................... 93 
FIGURE 31 SELECTED VULNERABILITY AND RESILIENCE INDICATORS ........................................................................................ 95 
FIGURE 32 ADMINISTRATIVE MAP OF INDONESIA .............................................................................................................. 97 
FIGURE 33 LAWS AND RISK-RELATED LAWS PRODUCED DURING 1945-2009 .........................................................................102 
FIGURE 34 DRM REGULATORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK 1979-2007 .......................................................................114 
FIGURE 35 SELECTED CENTRALITY TEST FOR ORGANIZATIONS/INSTITUTIONS 1979-2008 (N=28) ...............................................116 
FIGURE 36 INDONESIA DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ...................................................................................................121 
FIGURE 37 TRENDS IN INDONESIA DRR STAKEHOLDERS .....................................................................................................124 
FIGURE 38 DRR NETWORK IN INDONESIA 2006-2009 – BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY TEST ........................................................126 
FIGURE 39 CENTRALITY TEST – SELECTED TOP 25 FOR BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY ...................................................................127 
FIGURE 40 VISUALIZATION OF CLOSENESS CENTRALITY TEST DRR NETWORK 2006-2009 .........................................................128 
FIGURE 41 SELECTED GOVERNANCE INDICATORS FOR INDONESIA 1996-2008 ........................................................................133 
FIGURE 42 NUMBERS OF REGENCIES/CITIES IN INDONESIA 1950–2008 ...............................................................................135 
FIGURE 43 MULTIPLE HIERARCHIES OF STRUCTURE, FUNCTION, AND FISCAL AFFAIRS ................................................................137 
FIGURE 44 DRR INTEGRATION WITHIN DEVELOPMENT-RELATED PLANNING ...........................................................................139 
FIGURE 45 NETWORK ANALYSIS OF INDONESIAN DRR PLANNING SYSTEM: DEGREE CENTRALITY TEST ...........................................140 
FIGURE 46 STATISTICS OF PERKADA VERSUS PERDA FOR LOCAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT ...........................................................147 
FIGURE 47 PERCEPTION ON THE INSTITUTIONAL/ORGANIZATIONAL OBSTACLES .......................................................................149 
FIGURE 48 DEGREE CENTRALITY TEST OF LOCAL DISASTER REGULATIONS  (N-87) ....................................................................151 
FIGURE 49 BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY TEST OF LOCAL DISASTER REGULATIONS (N-87) ............................................................152 
FIGURE 50 SELECTED REGRESSION OF CENTRALITY ANALYSIS ...............................................................................................153 
xi 
 
FIGURE 51 EXTRACTED NETWORK BASED ON DEGREE CENTRALITY N=50...............................................................................154 
FIGURE 52 MULTI-STAKEHOLDER VIEWS ON PROGRESS (AVERAGE VALUE) ..............................................................................158 
FIGURE 53 MULTI-STAKEHOLDER VIEWS ON PROGRESS .....................................................................................................159 
FIGURE 54 NATIONAL ACTION PLAN 2006-2009: ACTUAL VS PLANNING ..............................................................................160 
FIGURE 55 PLANNING BUDGET 2010-2014 VS. RISKS ......................................................................................................162 
FIGURE 56  PLANNING BUDGET 2010-2014 BASED ON HFA PRIORITY .................................................................................163 
FIGURE 57 HFA PRIORITIES 1-5 AND NAP 2010-2012 ....................................................................................................163 
FIGURE 58 HFA 4 PRIORITIES IN NAP 2010-2012 ..........................................................................................................164 
FIGURE 59 TREND OF BUILT HOUSES - CITY OF ENDE.........................................................................................................167 
FIGURE 60 DAMAGE PATTERN ACCORDING TO HOUSE TYPE IN ENDE DISTRICT IN 1992 EARTHQUAKE ..........................................169 
FIGURE 61 BUILDING PERMITS ISSUED IN SIKKA AND ENDE 1995-2007 ................................................................................171 
FIGURE 62 TREND IN PERMITS FOR BUILT HOUSES AND LAND IN ENDE 1950-2004 .................................................................172 
 
List of Tables 
TABLE 1 ILLUSTRATION OF TIMEFRAME OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE......................................................................................... 16 
TABLE 2 TYPES OF INSTITUTIONS, CHANGE, AND CONTINUITY ................................................................................................ 17 
TABLE 3 BUREAUCRACY PLURALITY IN DRR IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD CONTEXT ...................................................................... 21 
TABLE 4 ILLUSTRATION OF SCALES OF DISASTER RISK GOVERNANCE ....................................................................................... 33 
TABLE 5 ILLUSTRATION OF RISK REDUCTION REGIMES ......................................................................................................... 35 
TABLE 6 DISASTER RISK REDUCTION AGENDA UNDER DIFFERENT REGIMES............................................................................... 41 
TABLE 7 INSTITUTIONAL VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT AT DIFFERENT SCALES ............................................................................. 43 
TABLE 8 UTILIZED RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 44 
TABLE 9  GEOGRAPHY OF DATA COLLECTION PROCESS ......................................................................................................... 48 
TABLE 10 CLASSIFICATION OF ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH .................................................................................................... 49 
TABLE 11 INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT FOR HFA IMPLEMENTATION .................................................................................... 56 
TABLE 12 BASIC DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS GLOBAL HFA 1-5 ................................................................................................. 57 
TABLE 13 SAMPLE SIZE BY REGIONS AND MISSING VALUES ................................................................................................... 58 
TABLE 14 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS HFA 3 ....................................................................................................................... 65 
TABLE 15 SOURCE OF GOVERNANCE DATA ...................................................................................................................... 74 
TABLE 16 SOURCE OF DATA ......................................................................................................................................... 75 
TABLE 17 PEARSON CORRELATION TEST (N = 63 COUNTRIES) .............................................................................................. 77 
TABLE 18 PHASES OF DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY AND REGULATION IN INDONESIA ...................................................... 98 
TABLE 19 DRR-RELATED LEGAL REFORM AND STATUS OF ENFORCEMENT (JUNE 2010) ............................................................144 
TABLE 20 CORRELATION TEST DEGREE, CLOSENESS, AND BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY ................................................................156 
TABLE 21 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................156 
 
  
xii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This PhD has been funded by the German Academic Exchange Service (or Deutscher 
Akademischer Austauschdienst: DAAD) and is part of the German-Indonesian Tsunami Early 
Warning System (GITEWS) project, which has been carried out by scientists and engineers from 
Germany and Indonesia. I gratefully thank DAAD and GITEWS for their great support during 
this PhD research.  
My great respect and grateful thanks go to Prof. Dr. Ing. Janos Bogardi for all the valuable 
support including faith in this PhD research that he has shown, from the beginning to the end. 
Special thanks to Prof. Peter Mollinga for his guidance on interdisciplinary research at Zentrum 
für Entwicklungsforschung (ZEF) during October-November, 2007, and his kind support as a 
PhD supervisor. Special thanks to Prof. Theo Kötter for his constructive comments and service as 
an examiner of this PhD research. Special thanks also go to Prof. Prof. Ernst Berg for chairing the 
defense. 
Many thanks also go to Prof.  Bogardi, Prof. Dr. -Ing. Torsten Schlurmann, and Dr. Koko Warner 
for having faith in me after the interview in Bonn, November, 2006. This PhD research would not 
have succeeded without endless assistance from Ms. Helga Islam (2008-2010) and Ms. Susanne 
Kammüller (2007-2008) from DAAD, and astonishing support from Dr. Thomas Zschocke and 
Ms. Evalyne Katabaro at the UNU-EHS, as well as Frau Rosemarie Zabel and Dr. Guenter 
Manske at the Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung (ZEF). Thank you for all your kind support. 
Thanks also to Dr. Fabrice Renaud for all the logistics support provided through UNU-EHS. 
Thanks to Dr. Juan Carlos Villagran who kindly supported this research during its early stage and 
kindly suggested the topic of the role of disaster reduction in the context of decentralization in 
Indonesia. Thanks to Dr. Dusan Sakulski for being “the backstop” for sometime for this research.  
I would also like to acknowledge all my ZEF 2007 batch colleagues and friends from the 
interdisciplinary courses where I have rediscovered the importance of interdisciplinarity and 
interdisciplinary research – thank you for your friendship. My research has also been enriched by 
the many scientific discussions with the multidisciplinary team formed from UNU-EHS’s 
GITEWS PhD students and colleagues: Neysa Jacqueline Setiadi, Niklas Gebert, Denis Chang 
Seng, Widjo Kongko, Ade Anggraini, Widodo Pranowo, Pachochenko Jintasarae, Raveloson 
Adrimiarto, Sumaryono, and Rokhis Khomarudin. 
xiii 
 
I would like to thank my brothers/sisters in the NTT Academia Forum, who are scattered around 
the planet: Dr. Dwantoro Hardjito, Dominggus Elcid Li, Rm. Leo Mali, Dion Bata, Syalomi 
Natalia, Matheos Mesakh, Wilson Therik, Dr. P. Gabriel Faimau, Andre Therik, Dr. Ermi Ndoen, 
and all the members who have taken part in constructive debates on NTT social problems. 
Thanks also to Neil Rupidara, Don Marut and Emanuel Bria and NTT Academia colleagues on 
recent debate on theories of institutions. I would also like to give thanks to Katharine Haynes at 
the RMIT for all the the opportunities, and supports. I also wish to thank my Indonesian friends 
who have helped and supported my research: colleagues at the Indonesian Disaster Management 
Society and colleagues Yulius Nakmofa, Djoni Ferdiwijaya, Hening Purwanti, Dr. Eko Teguh 
Paripurno, Avianto Amri, Patris Usfomeny, Vanda Lengkong, John Djonga, Affan Ramly, 
Malikah Amri, Tsu Babies, Roni So, Sebastian Saragih, Herman Kelen, Yos Boli and many more 
who have helped me with my fieldwork and desk research in Aceh, Padang, Sikka, Ende, 
Yogyakarta, Bandung, and Jakarta, including fellows in MDMC Garut and  Padang. Special 
thanks to Agustinus Uria for sharing brotherhood in Bonn and all the moral support from 
Indonesian colleagues in Bonn. To all my DAAD 2007 colleagues, thank you for sharing the 
papers.  
Thanks to Dr. Yanuar Nugroho at the Manchester Business School for introducing me to Social 
Network Analysis and the International Network on Social Network Analysis. Thanks to Dr. Saut 
Sagala for all the wild discussions regarding the future direction of disaster risk sciences in 
Indonesia.  
I would also like to thank Papa and Mama (Alex and Domina), my parents-in-law (Erens and 
Ester), and all my brothers/sisters/brothers-in-law/sisters-in-law in West Timor and Surabaya for 
all their prayers and encouraging support. 
 
  
xiv 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
To Axcelictho, Inskcy, and Linda 
 
Thank you Linda for all your love, sacrifice, care, and prayers.  
Thank you Axcelictho and Inskcy for your love, smiles, and prayers. 
 
  
xv 
 
ABSTRACT 
This PhD research addresses two central questions: How should institutional vulnerability that shapes 
disaster risks and disaster reduction policy be assessed? How does the quality of institutions and 
governance influence the level of disaster risk and disaster reduction policy? In this dissertation, 
institutional vulnerability at global and local levels is analyzed and an answer to such questions is pursued. 
General vulnerability assessment frameworks on the global scale and local scale have limitations in 
measuring how and to what extent institutions in all countries can reduce risks. This PhD dissertation is 
pioneering in that it assesses global institutional vulnerability using an index-based approach on a 
national/local scale by employing mixed methods such as social network analysis complemented by 
qualitative approaches (e.g. participant observation and literature reviews) and quantitative approaches 
(simple regression, scatter plots and simple descriptive statistics). In this dissertation, it is hypothesized 
that the countries with greater institutional quality tend to have better governance over disaster risks, 
which leads to a higher level of disaster risk resilience.  
Risk assessors have often overlooked institutions. In fact, when one assesses vulnerability, for example, 
social/human vulnerability (such as using health, education, human development indices), physical 
vulnerability (quality of physical housing and infrastructure), economic vulnerability (income, economic 
production), and environmental vulnerability (land degradation, environmental quality indicators), the 
assessor essentially measures the “outcomes” of the institutions rather than the institutions directly.  
Institutional vulnerability to disaster risk is defined here as both the context and the process by which 
formal institutions (regulations, rule of law, constitutions, codes, bureaucracy, etc.), informal institutions 
(culture, norms, traditions, etc.), and governance are either too weak to provide protection against disaster 
risk or are ignorant of their duty to provide safety and human security. Central to this argument is the 
concept that institutions are designed, among others, to reduce risks. In this research, the focus is on 
disaster risks. This suggests a hypothesis that nations will fail to reduce risks owing to institutional and 
governance factors that modify their vulnerabilities and resilience. 
The findings show that both qualitative and quantitative methods at different scales of governance can 
assess institutional vulnerability and the governance of disaster risk reduction.  At a global level, a 
quantitative approach to measuring institutional quality and governance disaster risk reduction is possible 
thanks to recent global data on countries’ implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action; however, 
more efforts are required in the future. At the meso- and microlevels, this work describes the history of 
institutions for disaster risk management in Indonesia from the colonial period until the present challenges 
of decentralized governance.  The main message is as follows: without considering institutions, 
institutional quality, and specific governance of disaster reduction at macro-, meso-. and microscales, 
disaster risk reduction will not be sustainably implemented.   
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Kurzfassung 
Diese Doktorarbeit befasst sich mit zwei zentralen Fragen: Wie sollte institutionelle Vulnerabilität von 
Massnahmen zu Katastrophenrisiken und -vorsorge beurteilt werden? Wie beeinflusst die Qualität von 
Institutionen und Governance den Grad der Katastrophenvorsorge? Diese Dissertation analysiert 
institutionelle Vulnerabilität auf globaler und lokaler Ebene, um eine Antwort auf diese Fragen zu geben. 
Allgemeine Beurteilungssysteme von Vulnerabilität auf globaler und lokaler Ebene sind in ihrer 
Aussagekraft darüber begrenzt, wie und in welchem Umfang Institutionen in allen Ländern Risiken 
tatsächlich reduzieren können. Diese Dissertation ist eine grundlegende Arbeit dahingehend, indem sie 
globale institutionelle Vulnerabilität mittels eines Index-basierten Ansatzes auf nationaler / lokaler Ebene 
misst ergänzt durch gemischte Methoden wie soziale Netzwerkanalyse sowie qualitative (z.B. 
teilnehmende Beobachtung und Literaturrecherchen) und quantitative Ansätze (z.B. einfache Regression, 
Scatter-Plot, einfache deskriptive Statistik). In dieser Disssertation wird die Hypothese aufgestellt, dass 
die Länder mit der höchsten institutionellen Qualität eine bessere Governance von Katastrophenrisiken 
haben, was zu einer höheren Widerstandskraft gegen Katastrophenrisiken führt. 
Risiko-Assessoren haben oftmals Institutionen übersehen. Im Falle der Messung von Vulnerabilität, z.B. 
soziale / menschliche Vulnerabilität (wie z.B. Gesundheit, Bildung, Indizes der menschlichen 
Entwicklung), physische Vulnerabilität (Qualität der physischen Behausung / Gebäude und Infrastruktur), 
ökonomische Vulnerabilität (Einkommen, Wirtschaftsproduktion) und 
Umweltvulnerabilität(Landverödung, Umweltqualitätindikatoren), misst ein Assessor eigentlich nur das 
"Resultat" von Institutionen, aber nicht die Institution direkt. 
Institutionelle Vulnerabilität gegenüber Katastrophenrisiken wird hier definiert als der Kontext wie auch 
der Prozess, durch die formale Insitutionen (Verordnungen, Gesetz, Verfassungen, Vorschriften, 
Verwaltung usw.), informelle Institutionen (Kultur, Normen, Traditionen usw.) sowie Governance so 
geschwächt werden, dass sie entweder keinen Schutz gegenüber Naturkatastrophen bieten oder zu 
Ignoranz gegenüber ihrer Aufgabe führen, für Sicherheit und menschlichen Schutz zu sorgen. Ein 
zentrales Argument ist die Vorstellung, dass Institutionen u.a dafür gestaltet wurden, um Risiken zu 
reduzieren. In dieser Forschungsarbeit wird der Schwerpunkt auf Katastrophenrisiken / Naturkatastrophen 
gelegt. Dies führte zu der Hypothese, dass Nationen nicht in der Lage sind, aufgrund institutioneller 
Faktoren und Governance, die ihre Vulnerabilität und Fähigkeit zur Abpufferung ändern, Risiken zu 
reduzieren. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass qualitative sowie quantitative Methoden auf verschiedenen Ebenen der 
Governance institutionelle Vulnerabilität und Governance der Katastrophenvorsorge messen können. Auf 
globaler Ebene ist die Anwendung eines quantitativen Ansatzes zur Messung der Qualität von 
Institutionen und Governance zur Reduzierung von Naturkatastrophen möglich dank der zur Verfügung 
stehenden globalen Daten aus Ländern, die das Hyogo Framework for Action eingesetzt haben. Trotzdem 
sind stärkere Anstrengungen in der Zukunft nötig. Auf der Meso- und Mikroebene beschreibt diese Arbeit 
die historische Entwicklung von Institutionen zur Katastrophenvorsorge in Indonesien von der 
Kolonialzeit bis zu den aktuellen Herausforderungen einer dezentralisierten Verwaltungsstruktur. Die 
wichtigste Aussage ist die Tatsache, dass Katastrophenvorsorge nicht nachhaltig implementiert werden 
kann, ohne Insitutionen, die Qualität von Institutionen sowie die spezifische Governance der 
Risikoreduktion auf der Makro-, Meso- und Mikroebene zu berücksichtigen. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Introduction  
The Emergency Event Database (EMDAT) shows an increase in disaster fatalities, people 
affected, and estimates of damage due to natural hazards during the period 1975-2009. Although 
the average number of people killed in natural disasters declined (although this was not always 
the case for Indonesia, Haiti, and Myanmar, among others) during the last 30 years, the trend of 
economic losses due to natural disasters increased in absolute terms1 equivalent to the increase in 
wealth.2 In view of the predicted changes in climate, coupled with demographic, social, and 
economic changes, the likelihood of natural hazard events becoming disasters is significantly 
higher.  
The Global Assessment Report (GAR) 2009 on disaster risk reduction noted an uneven 
distribution of disaster risk, in which the developing world and its sources of rapid economic 
growth, people, and their economic assets are moving closer to the spotlight of natural hazards; 
this contributes to an increase in disaster risks, which is growing faster than the rate of resilience 
building or capacity development achieved by these countries. The GAR 2009 notes that, even if 
the number of hazard incidents remains constant globally, there is still an increasing trend of 
disaster risks, which exacerbates the already uneven risk distribution between wealthier and 
poorer countries and between the wealthy and the poor in those countries. For example, mortality 
levels relative to hazard exposure to cyclones are currently much higher in low-income countries 
than in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.  
One of the key findings is that poorer countries with weaker institutions and governance are the 
places where global disaster risk is highly concentrated. Developing countries are still exposed to 
a great deal of high risk (UNISDR 2009:6). The governance arrangements for disaster risk 
reduction in many countries do not facilitate the integration of risk considerations into 
                                               
1 See the data online at http://www.emdat.be/natural-disasters-trends - last accessed on 3 Jan, 2010.  
2 Please treat global disaster statistics with care. Global Wealth Assessment 2000: On average, each person in the 
world owns US$95,000 (a total of US$639 billion - World Bank 2006). The trend of global disaster losses in 
absolute terms are increasing but the losses in proportion to the total wealth is decreasing. There have been scientific 
debates on whether there have been more wealth produced on earth that are placed in hazard prone areas or there is 
an increase in hazard incidents due to global change including climate change.  Bouwer et. al. (2007) and Pielke 
(2006) question some of the non-peer reviewed statistics produced by some insurance industries tend to claim an 
increase in disaster losses, including strong claim on an increase in climate change induced hazards that lead to 
disaster losses.   
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development. In general, the institutional and legislative arrangements for disaster risk reduction 
are weakly connected to development sectors. The last key finding shows the importance of 
institutions. It states that an institutional “failure to address the underlying risk drivers will result 
in dramatic increases in disaster risk and associated poverty outcomes. In contrast, if addressing 
these drivers is given priority, risk can be reduced, human development protected, and adaptation 
to climate change facilitated” (UNISDR 2009:3-4). 
 
1.2. Research Problems  
The UNDP (2004:11) defines vulnerability as a condition or process resulting from physical, 
social, economic, and environmental hazards that determine the likelihood and scale of damage 
from the impact of a given hazard.3 The UNU-EHS promotes the concept of multi-
dimensionality, which asserts that vulnerability encompasses “exposure, susceptibility, and 
coping capacity”4. From these perspectives, disaster risk reduction means reduction in physical, 
social, economic, and environmental vulnerabilities and hazard management. The main discourse 
behind this is the following simple formula: Risks = Hazards (H) X Vulnerability (V. economic, 
social, environmental, physical, etc.). 
There are at least two well-known global-scale vulnerability assessment frameworks: the Disaster 
Risk Index (DRI) and the Disaster Hotspots approaches. The Disaster Risk Index (DRI) 
developed by UNDP in 2004 is known as the first human vulnerability assessment exercise on a 
global scale, namely, a country-by-country comparison of human vulnerability and exposure to 
earthquakes, tropical cyclones, and flood hazards. The DRI consists of two indicators: the first is 
the Relative Vulnerability Index (RVI), which compares national data for exposed populations 
with recorded mortality. The second is the socio-economic indicators of vulnerability at the 
national level, which refer to GDP per capita and density of population (Pelling 2004).  
Global Disaster Risk Hotspots (GDRH) is another model developed for the sub-national scale for 
individual hazard analysis. The GDRH model includes assessment of disaster mortality data, 
                                               
3 UNDP 2004 “Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge For Development A Global Report”, Bureau for Crisis 
Prevention and Recovery, United Nations Development Program, New York. 
4 See the paper http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/research-papers/2008/en_GB/rp2008-50/ 
[last accessed 14 Aug, 2010]. 
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economic losses, and the risk of economic loss as a proportion of GDP. In addition to these 
indicators, GDRH includes social-economic vulnerability indicators such as gross domestic 
product per inhabitant at purchasing power parity, Human Poverty Index (HPI), total debt 
serviced (% of the exports of goods and services), inflation, annual food prices, and 
unemployment (% of total labor force) (see Arnold et al. 2006).  
However, it is insufficient to measure socio-economic-physical-environmental vulnerability. 
What has not been overlooked is the fact that when one measures vulnerability, such as 
social/human vulnerability (using health, education, or the Human Development Index, for 
example), physical vulnerability (quality of buildings and infrastructure), economic vulnerability 
(income, economic production), and environmental vulnerability (land degradation, 
environmental quality indicators), the assessor essentially measures the outcomes of institutions. 
Disaster vulnerability assessors often miss the insight to be gained from studies of institutions 
and governance, especially those on the roles of institutions in determining economic 
performance when measured by GDP, country income, infrastructure, and environmental quality 
(e.g. North 1993). Social economic indicators such as GDP, income per capita, and employment 
and demographic conditions are certainly the outcomes of institutions. For the use of these 
outcomes to measure countries’ vulnerability to natural disasters and risks, there are technical 
difficulties regarding how to measure material/immaterial goods and infrastructure that help 
human agents to reduce vulnerabilities.  
Furthermore, the prevailing vulnerability assessment framework at the global scale (and even at 
the local scale) still has limitations in measuring how and to what extent institutions in all 
countries can reduce risks. Conventional wisdom in risk management suggests that risk reduction 
starts with risk assessment, and one important aspect of risk assessment is vulnerability 
assessment. However, actions cannot be taken until the respective institutions decide to take 
them. 
This PhD dissertation is pioneering in its assessment of global-scale institutional vulnerability 
using an index-based approach and that at national/local scale using mixed methods such as 
centrality test of social network analysis complemented by other qualitative/quantitative 
approaches. In this dissertation, it is hypothesized that the countries with a higher level of 
institutional quality tend to have better governance of disaster risks, which also leads to better 
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social-economic capacity. Consequently, they tend to have better capabilities with more effective 
disaster mitigation, early warning systems, and disaster preparedness and response systems.  
The Global Assessment Report 2009 (in addition to UNDP 2004) is probably the first global-
scale report that substantially promotes the roles of governance and institutions in ensuring the 
sustainability of disaster risk reduction. Limited institutional and governance indicators were 
mentioned such as voice, accountability, and government effectiveness (UNISDR 2009:44). The 
report argues that richer countries “tend to have better institutions, more effective early warning, 
disaster preparedness, and response systems, and more open government is more supportive of 
disaster risk reduction” (UNISDR 2009:19).  
Global-scale vulnerability assessment depends very much on data availability. Few scientific 
studies on institutional vulnerability are available and there is still a lack of institutional 
vulnerability assessment frameworks.  
1.3. Research Objectives 
The main objective of this dissertation is to provide a new vulnerability assessment framework in 
order to understand the roles of institutions and governance in dealing with disaster risk. At the 
macro level, evaluation of global-scale assessment of institutional vulnerabilities is herein 
attempted using a quantitative approach. This will be repeated at meso- (national/provincial) and 
microlevels (local level) using a case study approach for Indonesia. In addition, how to improve 
the quality of institutions to reduce vulnerability and the role of governance in institutional 
change towards sustainable disaster risk reduction will be shown. 
The following are the specific objectives of the study: 
 To provide a new framework and method for institutional vulnerability assessment at 
global and local scales. 
 To understand governance and the role of institutions in disaster risk reduction at all 
levels. 
 To understand the conditions that enable and impede steady improvement towards less 
disaster risk in the countries. 
 To understand the linkages of global, national, and local disaster risk reduction.  
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1.4. Research Questions 
This PhD research addresses two research questions: How should institutional vulnerability that 
shapes disaster risks and disaster reduction policy be assessed? How does the quality of 
institutions and governance influence disaster risk level and disaster reduction policy?  
Some of the sub-questions derived from the main research questions are as follows: 
 To what extent can institutional vulnerability be measured at the global scale? 
 What are the roles of governance (and decentralized governance) in reducing (or 
increasing) vulnerability to natural hazards and disaster risks? 
 What are the processes undertaken by formal and informal institutions and their interplay 
in reducing risks?  
 Can a risk governance framework offer a better explanation of how to address the 
underlying causes as stipulated by the Hyogo Framework for Action? 
 How can vulnerability be reduced when institutions and governance are vulnerable and 
barely change towards better risk management? 
 
1.5. Research Outline  
Figure 1 outlines the overall research structure. Chapter 2 contains a discussion of the basic 
theories and concepts on institutions and governance of disaster risk reduction. The selected 
research methods are presented in Chapter 3 together with the overall research framework. 
Chapter 4 provides empirical observation on institutional vulnerability assessment based on a 
global dataset derived from the implementation reports of the Hyogo Framework for Action 
2009. Chapter 5 demonstrates the roles of governance and institutional quality indicators in 
measuring institutional vulnerability reduction. Chapters 6 and 7 provide evidence on 
institutional vulnerability assessment at the microlevel in the case of Indonesia. Social network 
analysis is used to demonstrate the polycentric nature of DRR governance. Chapter 8 contains 
conclusion on the whole study and presents a final discussion and recommendations.  
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 To provide a new framework and method for institutional vulnerability assessment at global 
and local scales 
 To understand governance and institutions in disaster risk reduction at all levels 
 To understand the conditions that enable and impede steady positive change towards less 
disaster risk in countries at global and local scales 
 To understand the linkages between global and local disaster risk reduction. 
PhD Research  
Objectives 
Level and scale of 
governance in 
question  
Macro Level 
Global 
Meso Level 
National 
Institutional Vulnerability and Governance of Disaster Risk 
Reduction: Macro, Meso and Micro Scale Assessment 
PhD Research 
Title 
How should institutional vulnerability that shapes disaster risks and disaster reduction 
policy be assessed? How does the quality of institutions and governance influence 
disaster risk level and disaster reduction policy? 
Main Research  
Questions 
Research 
methods 
Mixed method design  
 Combining qualitative and quantitative secondary data from 63 countries 
from a progress report of HFA 2009 (Chapter 4-5) 
 Exploratory social network analysis (Chapter 6 and 7) 
 For case study approach: ethnography and participant observation (un-
structured interviews, policy documents, minutes of meetings, observations 
from national and international conferences/workshops) as well as 
progress reports.  
Chapter 
design 
Chapter outline and design  
 Chapter 1. Introduction to context and research context 
 Chapter 2. Theories, concepts, and research framework 
 Chapter 3. Research methods and frameworks 
 Chapter 4. Global institutional vulnerability assessment:  (quantitative 
approach) using HFA 2009 data 
 Chapter 5. Assessment of institutional vulnerability  combining HFA 2009 
dataset and World Governance Indicators 2007 
 Chapter 6. Institutional vulnerability and governance in Indonesia 
 Chapter 7. Institutional vulnerability and decentralization In Indonesia 
 Chapter 8. Conclusion and final discussion  
Micro Level 
Local 
Figure 1 PhD Research Outline 
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Chapter 2. Theories and Concepts of Institutions and Governance  
2.1.  Introduction  
One of the lasting scientific explanations on the causation of disaster risk is from O’Keefe et al. 
1976 who argued that disaster risk marks the interface between an extreme physical event and a 
vulnerable human population (O’Keefe et al. 1976:566). This has been frequently confirmed by 
many scientific endeavors such as Lewis et al. (1976), Westgate & O’Keefe (1976), Alexander 
(1993), Blaikie et al. (1994), Wisner et. al. (2004), Pelling (2004), Bogardi (2004), and Tierney 
(2007) (see also editorial compilation by Birkmann 2006). Almost all agree that disasters occur 
because of interaction between natural events that cause them and social, political, and economic 
vulnerabilities that structure the lives and the livelihoods of different groups of people (Blaikie et 
al. 1994:4 and Pielke 2006:138). Vulnerability has been accepted as one of the main factors for 
the causation of disasters. This view has emerged as a 'consensus' among disaster risk 
management scholars over the last two decades (Pelling and Wisner 2009:34) 
The Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2004 and 2009 also designates 
vulnerability as the main explanation of disaster risk. Birkmann (2006:21) observes that “the 
concept of vulnerability has been continuously widened and broadened towards a more 
comprehensive approach encompassing susceptibility, exposure, coping capacity, and adaptive 
capacity, as well as different thematic areas, such as physical, social, economic, environmental, 
and institutional vulnerability”. While there are more and more academic efforts to explain 
physical, social, economic, and environmental vulnerability, on the other hand, there has been 
little effort in understanding institutional vulnerability. 
The content of earlier works on institutions involved in risk reduction and institutional 
vulnerability is implicit in the work of O’Keefe et al. 1976, which shows the differences between 
richer and poorer countries in terms of disaster impacts; unfortunately, their work only compared 
the produced economic assets of nations. The view that “richer countries” tend to have “better 
institutions” and not the vice versa is exactly like the previous debate in Natural Science 
regarding “heliocentric versus geocentric” during Copernicus era. The truth is of course 
heliocentric, i.e. the sun is the central in the solar system. The author maintain that institutions is 
the heliocentric whereas the social-economic-environment-physical vulnerabilities are “the 
geocentric.” 
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More recent works such as Blaikie et al. 1994 (which was later revised in Wisner et al. 2004) 
noted the importance of access to resources and the political economic arrangements that shape 
vulnerability and risks. Even though Blaikie et al. 1994 and Wisner et. al. (2004) implicitly 
promote the value of inclusive governance, and their work have been considered as a 
breakthrough in disaster risks studies, more should be done to explain the roles of institutions in 
disaster risk governance. 
UNISDR (2009) and UNDP (2004) show that developing countries experience more deaths 
related to natural disasters than the developed world (see also Peduzzi et al. 2009, Dao and 
Peduzzi 2005). Countries with a high level of human development experience lower numbers of 
deaths associated with natural disasters. In actuality, the Global Assessment Report of Disaster 
Risk Reduction 2009 is probably the first global report that substantially argues about the roles of 
governance and institutions for the sustainability of disaster risk reduction. Institutions and 
governance received more space in the Global Assessment Report 2009 than in Living With Risk: 
A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives supported by UNDP in 2004. This is probably 
due to the growing availability of global datasets that are updated annually, such as the World 
Governance Indicators 1998-2008. 
Previous works such as Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich 2006 use the terms “institutional quality” or 
“institutional setting” when talking about the formal administrative community.  Haase (2009) 
investigates “administrative resilience” while Grieving (2006) briefly refers to “institutional 
weakness”. Birkmann (2006) notes governance as the institutional aspects of DRR.  
UNISDR (2009:44) mentions institutional quality components such as “voice & accountability” 
(to represent participation and press freedom), and “government effectiveness”. The report argues 
that richer countries “tend to have better institutions, more effective early warning, and disaster 
preparedness and response systems, as well as more open government that tends to be more 
supportive of disaster risk reduction” (UNISDR 2009:19).  
A fuller discussion that provides a basic understanding of institutions and governance will be 
presented in the rest of Chapter 2.  
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2.2. Understanding Institutions of Disaster Risk Reduction  
2.2.1. Introduction  
In defining institutional vulnerability, Lebel et al. 2006 argue that institutions not only define 
what and who will be at risk, but also amend the way disaster risks are defined, perceived, and 
acted upon. Institutions are significantly important to disaster reduction because they make life 
and death decisions (Mary Douglas 1986). It has been considered that institutions are, among 
others, created to deal with disaster risks. “Modern governance occurs in and through institutions. 
Institutions matter not only [emphasis added] because they form such a large part of the political 
landscape” (Bell 2002:363), but also because they form a large part of the social, economic, and 
specifically risk and vulnerability landscape as well.  
The idea of institutions in disaster studies is rather a “black box concept” because previous 
academic work on this issue is considered to be lacking. Conventional awareness appeared in 
many policy documents (e.g. during the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction 
1990–1999) as recognition of the importance of the political will that can lead to disaster 
legislation, which is actually already an indication of the need for institutions to tackle disaster 
risks.  
The field of institutional theory is divided into “old” and “new” schools of thought about 
institutions. The old school emphasizes analysis of the formal-legal and administrative 
arrangements of government and the public sector (Bell 2002). The “new” school of thought is 
divided into four categories: rational choice approach, historical pathways approach, sociological 
approach, and finally discursive approach (Schmidt 2008).   
2.2.2. Rational Choice Critics on Institutions  
The rational choice paradigm suggests that ‘ideal’ risk management policies and strategies are 
planned ex-ante disaster events. Therefore, disaster risk reduction activities are divided into the 
so-called disaster management cycles, consisting of a sequence of activities from emergency, 
relief intervention, rehabilitation, mitigation, prevention, disaster preparedness, early warning 
systems, and back to emergency again in a full cycle. Alternatively, sometimes the strategies are 
broken down into simpler categories: before, during, and after disaster risk management.  
Furthermore, in many occasion, risk management often understood as a simple complete 
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management cycle with an order that begins with risk identification, then risk analysis, risk 
management planning, risk reduction intervention, risk communication, and finally risk 
evaluation, and back to the risk identification.  
The logic of rational choice persists in many domains of public policy including disaster 
reduction policy. Rational choice critics strongly disagree with the notion that people at risk and 
those that make decisions affecting them are rational agents with perfect knowledge (Ensminger 
2002). Herbert Simon argues that there are limits to the human ability to be rational because 
“boundedly rational agents experience limits in formulating and solving complex problems and in 
processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) information” (Hage 2007:106). Thus, 
people are not able to gather all information they need to make a completely rational choice: 
“And even if they did have every bit of information needed, their cognitive ability is also limited” 
(Hage 2007:106; Furubotn and Richter 2005,). Critics of rational choice theory often gloriously 
cite the attacks on the theory by at least two Nobel laureates, namely, Herbert Simon (1978)5 and 
Daniel Kahnemann (2002)6, which have provided mounting evidence that each individual 
(including social, economic, and political actors or even scientists) has limited rationality, often 
resulting in foolish decisions due to several limitations (such as imperfect information, limits of 
cognitive-ability, time-boundedness).  
2.2.2.1. New Institutional Economics Theory 
This theory asserts that “institutions matter because they form the incentive or disincentive 
structure of a society” (North 1998:247). This suggests that institutions provide incentives that 
may drive actors’ decisions and preferences to reduce/produce or amplify/attenuate disaster risk. 
Therefore, the making and unmaking of disaster risk reduction is heavily dependent on 
institutional regimes (old/new, formal/informal) or enforcement of existing formal/informal rules. 
This theory is often called new institutional economics theory. In this dissertation, the incentive 
structure is understood as referring to more than monetary value but to also include social, 
cultural, political, and symbolic incentives.  
North (1998:249) argued that “If institutions are the rules of the game, organizations and their 
entrepreneurs are the players.” This line of thought suggests that institutions are exogenous to 
                                               
5 http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1978/simon-lecture.pdf [accessed on 20 Sept 2009]. 
6 http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahnemann-lecture.pdf [accessed on 20 Sept 2009].  
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agents (organizations, individuals). In another interpretation, as suggested by Shepsle (2006), one 
may not interpret institutions as exogenously given, or “automatically exogenous”, because other 
rules of the game may be provided by the players themselves: “they are simply the ways in which 
the players want to play” (ibid). This argument is very abstract to some. If there were formal 
institutions (sound laws/regulations), however, corrupt bureaucrats might create different rules, 
and therefore might, to the detriment of society, create incentive of illegal tax for housing 
permits, for example.  
“Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction (e.g. among 
human and human-nature interaction), which are made of: formal constraints (i.e. rules, laws, 
constitutions), informal constraints (i.e. norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of 
conduct), and their enforcement characteristics” (North, 1998:248). Alternatively, in the context 
of DRR, institutions are an admixture of formal rules, informal norms, and enforcement 
characteristics that shape (North 1998:255) the landscape of disaster, disaster risk and disaster 
risk reduction policy, and implementation.  
The benefit of quoting North (1998) in a study of disaster risk is that there are many implications 
of transferring risk reduction strategies that work well in developed countries to the Third World 
in the form of formal strategies such as laws, building regulations and seismic codes, insurance 
market, risk assessment, and land use and hazard planning policies, among others. This is simply 
because the developing countries are neither homogeneous nor exhibit the same institutional 
constraints that affect how risk reduction strategies should be formulated since every one of them 
has their own institutional constraints.  This suggests that revolutionary change of formal rules 
will not always result in better risk reduction because the everyday decision making on land use, 
risk-sensitive spatial planning, housing quality, risk transfers and sharing, as well as risk 
assessment and risk management, is still heavily influenced by informal institutions.  
In the field of risk management, including disaster risk reduction, rational choice institutionalism 
helps to explain that institutional change (risk regulation, policy, early warning systems, etc.) can 
be made when actors are motivated by incentives and/or disincentives provided by 
formal/informal institutions. In addition, people’s preference to disaster reduction will be driven 
by their expected utility maximization (through several technical means: risk mitigation, risk 
transfer mechanisms, responding to early warning systems, rebuilding or building fixed assets 
such as buildings in less risky areas once information is available etc.) 
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The case of the devastating Haiti earthquake on 12 January, 2010, demonstrates perfectly the 
problem of institutions. There is a box of “Best Practice” of the National Risk and Disaster 
Management Plan from Haiti in 2001 from the UNDP (2004:77), which noted that “This National 
Plan was published in 2001 and established a highly decentralized Institutional National System 
on Risk and Disaster Management, in line with the importance accorded to participation of the 
population in the 1987 Haitian Constitution.” In fact the investment in risk reduction during the 
late 1990s in the country had little effect on the actual risk reduction because, as will be 
demonstrated in the Chapters 4 and 5, the institutions are too vulnerable and fragile to tackle 
risks.  
2.2.3. Theory of Pathways  
The theory of Historical institutionalism also known as “historical path dependency” theory. In 
selecting a definition of “pathways”, Kaag et al. (2003) are very insightful. If translated to the 
context of disaster risk reduction strategies, they suggest that the term “pathways” points to the 
fact that insecure conditions and risky environments (such as unsafe conditions and the presence 
of those unprotected from disaster risk because of circumstances including poverty and livelihood 
uncertainty) often make it difficult for local actors to make strategic decisions of disaster 
reduction in advance. “Instead, their strategies unfold as they interact with the changes in this 
dynamic production environment” (ibid, p. 14).  
Therefore, the concept of historical pathways provides the critics of rational choice approach with 
the argument that what is often called a strategy in fact turns out to be path dependency. In other 
words, instead of a detailed ex-ante institutional design and strategy development, institutions of 
risk reduction emerged as rather regularized patterns and routinized practices, “which are the 
often unintended outcomes of purposeful choices” (Schmidt 2009:127). The hypothesis that 
follows is that the pattern of disaster risk reduction strategies in developing countries such as 
countries bordering the Indian Ocean can be predicted not on the basis of formal written ex-ante 
DRR strategy as currently being drafted, but instead on the basis of previous policy development 
paths where participation has been limited, in which heavy reliance on a small elite persists even 
though there is formal regulation regarding participation in formal policy making.  Therefore, 
strategic policy written in papers may turn out to be de jure institutions while actual institutions 
are based on existing historical paths, which tend to promote business as usual.  
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The logic of path dependency suggests that DRR strategies at the local level are more a result of 
historical interactions than of anything planned in advance. Should there be any written disaster 
management strategy papers, they may at best serve as legitimate procedures more than actual 
plans to be implemented. At the national level, this view could be used to argue that DRR 
strategies (national action plans, disaster reduction plans as being enforced by Hyogo Framework 
for Action) may not be pure ex-ante disaster reduction plans, but instead a result of national-
international interactions built on the pre-existing donor-driven policy, especially in the context 
of developing countries where institutions are arguably weaker. One can hypothesize that the gap 
between actual practices and formal strategies (i.e. what is written in policy and planning 
documents) or between what is actually needed and what is actually implemented may arise 
owing to the fact that the former is the translation of the dominant discourse in trans-national 
interactions while the latter simply follows the old paths where homegrown risk reduction 
initiatives are less likely to be carried out and the sustainability of risk reduction will disappear 
once international support stops.  
2.2.4. Anthropological Approach to Institutions in Disaster Risk Reduction  
Oliver-Smith and Hoffman (1999) and Hoffman and Oliver-Smith (2001) are probably the key 
sources on the notions of institutional change, culture, and disaster risk. These books share an 
understanding of cultural change in relation to disasters. They do not focus directly on institutions 
but rather provide a broad analysis of culture. However, they can contribute to the study of 
institutions because cultures are difficult to change and can last for millennia. On the other hand, 
work by Prince (1920) showed how social institutions change after disasters (especially in the 
context of the Halifax explosion), which has been regarded as the earliest sociological approach 
to disaster research (see Nigg and Tierney 1993).   
The challenge is reflected in the old paradox mentioned by Hoffman (1999:304): "The more 
things change, the more they stay the same." Hoffman argued that the variables that may cause 
change are as follows: scales of events (magnitude of disaster, population mass, and amount of 
damage), time, the structure of cultural institutions (such as norms, customs, traditions).  
Lessons to be learned from Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast of the U.S. and from the Indian 
Ocean tsunami of 2004 in Aceh, as pointed out by Alex de Waal, that “the impact of human 
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disaster imprinted in social forms.”7 This suggests that, beneath the fault lines of social 
differences, such as culture, religion, gender, age, class, and race, lies the secret of past and future 
disaster risk distribution patterns.  
One should be mindful of the argument that culture should not be used as “an omnibus concept, a 
catch-all for all sorts of social traits and dispositions, from folkways to religious rituals and 
beliefs, from norms and values to traditions of law, from conversation habits to dress codes” 
(Meyer 2003:197) including gender relations, among others. Notwithstanding institutions, there 
clearly exists “cultural dependency”, and this has long been acknowledged by many scholars 
including those in disaster research communities. ‘Natural’ disasters together with existing policy 
prescriptions do not happen out of context but are embedded in a cultural context as well 
(Bankoff 2003).  
The case of the Smong culture, that is, the cultural practice of a tsunami early warning system that 
saved people on the island of Simelue during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami is a positive 
example of the impact of cultural institutions on risk reduction (see Yogaswara and Eko 2008). In 
this case, the established practices of Smong (meaning tsunami) warning developed over a 
century on the island are a product of cultural institutions. Therefore, culture can play a good or 
bad role in risk reduction as it may disable or enable the agents (the people at risk) to reduce 
disaster risks.   
2.2.4.1. Religions as Informal Institutions  
According to Chester (2005:319), “religion is an essential element of culture and must be 
carefully considered in the planning process and not simply dismissed as a symptom of 
ignorance, superstition, and backwardness”. Campbell-Nelson (2008:4) argued that “Categorizing 
disaster by cause is further complicated when we take the interpretive role of religion into 
account. From a secular point of view we could construct a continuum from purely natural causes 
on one end to human-induced (political, social, economic) causes on the other. However, 
religious perspectives introduce other possible agents that may seem highly realistic to local 
populations.” 
                                               
7 http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/deWaal/ (last accessed 20 Feb 2010). 
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Religions in themselves are institutions that play an important role in actors’ understanding of the 
earth’s dynamics (see Chester 2005), including institutional prescriptions to disaster risk 
reduction. A useful framework within which to consider the role of religion in risk consciousness 
can be borrowed from Paulo Freire’s Conscientizacao, which stratifies consciousness at three 
levels: magical, naïve, and critical.8 In regard to disaster risk, a magical consciousness may 
assume that “volcanoes and disasters are acts of God”. A naïve consciousness may be represented 
by the assumption that “humans are too small to deal with forces of nature”. Religion may shape 
peoples’ understanding in a way that leads to a magical and/or naïve consciousness in regard to 
risk. A critical consciousness, by contrast, can be exemplified by the notion that the disasters in 
connection with powerful earthquakes may have been prevented if houses had been built to 
withstand the shocks.   
Garcia-Acosta (2001) noted a variety of views of disasters in the context of Mexico, where 
previous religious responses to earthquakes as acts of God consisted of massive processions after 
disasters and mass prayers as protection against earthquakes, especially in the 19th century; 
however, this changed with the growing secularization of Mexican society. In the context of the 
Oakland firestorm in California in 1991, where property damage reached US$1.5 billion, 
Hoffman (2001:132) showed that the at-risk community in Oakland reiterated the belief long 
rooted in Western and Judeo-Christian thought “that disasters have occurred on a regular basis 
throughout time and take place because of moral malfeasance.” The belief that disasters occur 
owing to the demonstration of divine power and divine intervention still prevails in many areas of 
the world. The beliefs shown in Mexico and Oakland were also demonstrated during recent 
disasters such as the Indian Ocean tsunami and recent earthquakes in Indonesia.  
Religions as institutions deal with risk using their own narratives. In addition, public officials are 
bounded by the narrative of their religion. Trust in the narratives is often higher than that in 
science, which makes it very difficult to impose knowledge based on DRR policy. Therefore, 
DRR policy change requires actions within and without religious institutions to promote disaster 
risk reduction. This means that instead of religions being considered as sources of magical 
consciousness to risk that in some ways hinder disaster risk reduction policy, they should be 
regarded as institutions that are starting to play roles in reducing risk. Recent research on disaster 
                                               
8 See William Arthur Smith (1976) “The meaning of Conscientizacao: the Goal of Paulo Freire's Pedagogy”, Center 
for International Education, University of Massachusetts. 
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and religions noted the need to consider “religion as a resource rather than a hindrance in the 
planning of disaster risk-reduction” (Gailard and Texier 2010:83). 
Table 1 Illustration of timeframe of institutional change 
Disciplinary 
Interests e.g. 
Management Regime Change 
Frequency 
Risk Management 
Purpose 
Anthropology and 
Sociology 
Embeddedness: informal institutions, 
customs, traditions, norms, religion  
Hundreds to a 
thousand years 
Inbuilt path dependency, 
cultural dependency 
Sociology and 
Political Science 
Formal institutions: formal rules of the 
game, constitutions, risk-related laws, 
policy, bureaucracy,  
Tens to a 
hundred years 
Get the institutional 
environment right: 
“Strong basis for DRR 
implementation”. 
Political Economy,  
and Policy Studies, 
Governance Studies   
Governance: variety of game plays 
(projects, transactions, contracts, 
aligning governance structures with 
transactions) 
< ten years Get the governance 
structure right  
Technical Sciences 
(Economics, Risk 
Management, 
Engineering, 
Finance etc.)   
Incentives and resource allocation 
(finance, budgeting, capital, price, 
labor, technical knowledge, and 
innovation) 
Shorter 
timeframe 
(annual, 
monthly) 
Get the resource 
allocation right on a 
periodic basis  
Adapted from North 1998. 
 
2.2.5. Timelines of Institutions: Simplified Framework 
Table 1 above explains the timelines of formal and informal institutions and the level of inquiries 
that each institution tries to answer. Informal institutions such as customs, traditions, norms, and 
religion9 tend to endure and seldom vanish in less than hundreds of years and even a thousand 
years. Formal institutions such as constitutions tend to persist for decades, and the architecture of 
sectoral governance tends to change within years. This classification is of course not a rigid 
timeframe, but is rather flexible as it serves as an illustration that institutional change scenarios 
should be carefully understood, as North (1998) warned that rapid changes in formal regulations 
and policy do not necessarily lead to practical improvements in grassroots decision making and 
real life on the ground may still be influenced by norms or even by religion rather than shaped by 
formal institutions. In risk reduction contexts, incentives and resource allocation (e.g. financial 
capital, budgeting, and knowledge) are still largely the focus of technical sciences within which 
the focus is on technical knowledge and how to get resource allocation right according to the 
rationale of natural science calculation. One of the weaknesses of the timeframe is that it 
                                               
9 Religion is assumed as informal institutions. 
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inherently represents a deterministic view of institutions and thus could generate 
misinterpretations and pessimistic views on the possibility of institutional change.  
 
2.2.6. How Institutions Change   
Despite their power in explaining how institutions matter to society, the critical disadvantage of 
all approaches to the study of institutions (e.g. rational choice, and historical and cultural-
anthropological approaches) is that they do not provide adequate explanations of how institutions 
change owing to their embedded assumption that institutions are external to agents (actors or 
organizations). In contrast, a discursive approach to institutions (i.e. discursive institutionalism) 
assumes that institutions are “simultaneously structures and constructs internal to agents” whose 
abilities (such as knowledge, ideas, and “discursive abilities”) make for a more dynamic, agent-
centered approach. (Schmidt 2008:305). 
 
Table 2 Types of institutions, change, and continuity 
 Adapted from Schmidt (2008) 
 
The three approaches above (rational choice, historical and cultural-anthropological approaches) 
treat institutions as given, that is, institutions are external to agents or organizations whether as 
continuing structures, historical regularities (pathways), or as a cultural context within which 
agents act. They presume that “institutions are thereby external to the actors collectively. 
Continuity of institutions in the world is driven whether by way of incentives that structure 
action, paths that shape action, or norms/beliefs that frame action” (Schmidt 2008:313–314). 
Actions in institutions in the three older approaches conform to a rule-following logic, whether an 
Types of 
approach 
Agents – Institution 
Continuum  
Reason for change or 
continuity  
Remarks  
Discursive 
approach  
institutions are 
internal to agents 
Through discourse or 
ideas/ideation  
a.k.a. dynamic institutions 
or agent-centered 
approach  
Rational choice 
approach  
institutions are 
external to agents 
Through incentives  a.k.a. New Economic 
Institutionalism theory 
Pathways 
approach  
Institutions are 
external to agents 
Through historical 
pathways  
a.k.a. pathways theory  
Cultural approach  institutions are 
external to agents 
Through norms, 
religions etc.  
a.k.a. anthropological 
approach  
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interest-based logic of calculation, a norm-based logic of appropriateness (cultural 
institutionalism), or a history-based logic of path dependence. Schmidt (2008) further challenges 
as follows: “But if everyone follows rules, once established, how do we explain institutional 
change?” 
 
Without agents (e.g. individuals, organizations, actors), institutions have neither meaning nor 
presence. Therefore, agent-centrism is perhaps embedded in institutions. The position adopted in 
this dissertation is that institutional reforms and institutional change are the result of a complex 
interplay of both institutions and agents as both relatively external to and internal to each other. 
In the sectoral domain, such as disaster risk governance, institutional change is hypothetically a 
result of interplays between institutions and agents. In order to understand the landscape of 
institutions at any level, there are some identified variables that shape institutional change 
(whether there is change or no change at all as business as usual). The role of discourse or 
ideas/ideation in explaining policy change such as the institutionalization of new alternatives or 
approaches within an already established institutional stream can be explained by discursive 
institutionalism. A summary of this notion can be seen in Table 2. 
2.2.7. Institutional Plurality and DRR 
Risk management strategies to avoid or to limit adverse effects of hazards can be in the form of 
engineering approaches and non-engineering measures such as land-use planning, building codes, 
and risk transfers and sharing. What is often ignored is the fact that, for every risk management 
option, there is a legal context in which such risk reduction activities take place and have legal 
implication. The context of legality in one country is different from that in others.  
The context of legality within Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia is distinct from that of 
the developed world owing to the fact that the legacy of the colonial legal system may still co-
exist with traditional, religious, or new legal reform systems. In other words, there is institutional 
plurality that manages sectors such as land use, coastal zones, economy, agriculture, and 
specifically disaster risk. Fitzpatrick (2008) showed empirical evidence of legal plurality in Aceh 
in the context of agrarian and land use management, while Lee-Peluso (2005) noted how land use 
and local territorializations in West Kalimantan, Indonesia, have been exercised by actors during 
the last century.  
19 
 
The relevance of understanding institutional plurality for risk reduction strategy is very much 
connected to the issues of governance and institutions, termed by the HFA as a “strong basis for 
implementation.” For instance, the issue of land use policy arrangements when confronted with 
hazards, risk mapping, and zoning theoretically could not be managed through one single form of 
institution such as formal law but may co-exist with traditional laws. In addition, risk 
management exercises such as risk assessment and mapping are powerful but are ignored by 
technicians (see Lee-Peluso 2005). In theory, ignoring the fact of institutional plurality will lead 
to institutional clashes, which would hinder the implementation of risk reduction.   
Research on legal pluralism is globally shared in part through the Journal of Legal Pluralism, 
supported by the global community through the “Commission on Legal Plurality”.10 One of the 
consequences of this legal pluralism is that it has an impact on local actors’ behavior because 
individuals/organizations tend to advocate their legal rights or claims under the system that offers 
the best benefits. This is already implicit in the rational agent approach. The basic argument for 
the necessity of legal pluralism—in this regard for the sustainability of disaster risk 
management—is that “no formal system of law can hope to survive unless it is supplemented by 
multiple informal mechanisms” (McGinnis 2006:9). Therefore, it is important to note that the 
legal drafting process at both national and local levels does not necessarily provide a strong basis 
for implementation, as advocated in the HFA, simply because there are many institutional aspects 
of implementation and they do not co-exist in harmony but instead conflict with each other.  
Ostrom noted that diversity is the real challenge to understanding institutions. In fact, institutions 
emerge as “the prescriptions that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured 
interactions including those within families, neighborhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, 
churches, private associations, and governments at all scales”; simply illustrated, “opportunities 
and constraints individuals face in any particular situation, the information they obtain, the 
benefits they obtain or are excluded from, and how they reason about the situation are all affected 
by the rules or absence of rules that structure the situation” (Ostrom 2005:3). Such a situation 
includes disaster risk.  
                                               
10 Ref. http://www.commission-on-legal-pluralism.ch/index.html [last accessed on 1 July 2009].  
20 
 
2.2.8. Bureaucracy as Institutions and Governance 
The Global Governance Survey (GGS) project11 includes bureaucracy as one of six arenas of the 
realm of governance (i.e. civil society, political society, executive, bureaucracy, economic 
society, and judiciary). GGS defines bureaucracy as an arena that refers to “all state 
organizations engaged in formulating and implementing policy as well as in regulating and 
delivering services” (Hyden et al. 2003:1).  
In spite of the fact that formal institutional reform may take place and that bureaucracy is not 
isolated from other arenas of governance, the GGS project concludes that bureaucracy has proved 
to be the hardest arena to reform. Bureaucracy matters because it turns out to be either disabling 
or enabling conditions for overall disaster risk management performance, and embedded within it 
is a certain institutional quality.  
Publications on disaster and bureaucracy such as Henderson (2004) have stated that pervasive 
risk is a continuing challenge to the capacity of operation of public bureaucracy for disaster 
preparedness and response. “Bureaucracy must coordinate and orchestrate many actors very 
quickly and very effectively to minimize both loss of life and loss of control at disaster sites” 
(Henderson 2004:106). He further stated that there are more challenges to bureaucracy when a set 
of ex-ante disaster risk management measures such as mitigation, preparedness, and responses to 
warning systems are taken into account. Henderson focused on developing countries’ 
bureaucracies, however, he treated bureaucracy as a rather homogeneous and he only deals with 
the issue of bureaucracy in the post disaster context but his ideas can be developed for 
“bureaucratic preparedness” and the need for proactive bureaucracy to deal with ex-ante disaster 
risk management interventions such as mitigation.   
Takeda & Helms (2006) use Weberian approach to argue that the main feature of bureaucracy is 
based on clearly defined objectives where in the case of a disaster, it is also designed to facilitate 
“rational” response in a highly irrational and chaotic set of circumstances.”  In fact, there are 
many types of bureaucracies as the Table 3 suggests different forms of bureaucracy. Evers (1987) 
                                               
11  Overseas Development Institute noted that “the project was initiated in 1999 by Julius Court when he served as 
Program Officer at the United Nations University (UNU). Together with Goran Hyden, who was invited to serve as 
joint coordinator, they developed the World Governance Survey (WGS) project. The pilot phase was carried out 
from 2000 to 2002. The survey focused on three main questions: How can we best measure governance? How does 
governance performance differ across time and space? Which are the most critical issues of governance?” Please 
consult  http://www.odi.org.uk/projects/00-07-world-governance-assessment/Index.html (accessed 10 Jan 2010). 
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suggested that each bureaucracy model is not given but rather designed according to certain 
assumptions. Therefore, there is actually bureaucratic plurality that needs to be understood, 
especially in developing country contexts. Evers’s (1987) “The Bureaucratization of Southeast 
Asia” provides some basic features of bureaucracy such as the Parkinson model, which suggests 
an increase of government personnel as a programmatic approach to increase power and 
influence rather than the quality of public services; and the Orwellian model, which suggests 
bureaucracy as a means of power control under management of “suspicion” like a “big-brother” 
approach, as there is no right to privacy (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3 Bureaucracy plurality in DRR in the developing world context 
No Type of 
bureaucracy   
Core features  Examples (estimates) 
1 Weberian Penetration of rational principles of 
organization through government 
administration. 
International aid donors 
including UN bureaucracy  
2 Technocracy  Technocracy holds power through its 
control over data, information, and 
knowledge. It may be a governmental 
technical body. 
Government technical agencies  
3 Parkinson Growth in number of government 
personnel 
Some local governments in 
Southeast Asia 
4 Orwellian Tight control bureaucracy with “Big-
Brother” approach  
Authoritarian states 
5 Corporate  Citizens as customers who lack the vision 
of a rights-based approach 
Insurance companies, corporate 
philanthropies  
6 Populist  Informal, closer proximity, open house 
approach 
Local and grassroots NGOs 
7 Religions  Informal-formal – hierarchical approach   Buddhist bureaucracy in 
Thailand, Church bureaucracies, 
Islamic clerics etc.   
8 Hybrid  Mixture of more than one type of 
bureaucracy  
Mixed types of bureaucracy 
such as 1, 5, and 6 together.  
Adapted from Evers (1987) 
For a particular type of bureaucracy, such as Parkinson, Orwellian, and Populist, recruitment of 
bureaucrats is rarely based on merit. In addition, “bureaucrats are seldom to be accountable and 
the operations of the civil services often lack real transparency” (Hyden 2003:25). In this thesis, 
the diverse features of bureaucracy that need to be understood by disaster risk reduction 
managers is recognized, especially in the context of governance, where different kinds of 
institutional bureaucrats interact to work on responses to disaster risk.  
22 
 
The hypothesis is that, in reality, bureaucrats involved in disaster management as players may 
play by different rules or simply not follow the rules because of two factors. Amid weak 
institutions and complex contexts, by chance, there may be few creative bureaucrats exist out 
there in a particular context of time and place. Therefore, it can be said that creative bureaucracy 
is often not a by-design product, but rather an accidental fact within a specific context (see for 
example work by Laube 2009 on the existence of creative bureaucracy concerning irrigation in 
Ghana). In the context of disaster risk, bureaucracy is defined as a form of mental model and 
rationality that shapes the structures that comprise a set of regulations put in place to control 
disaster risk and disaster risk management. 
 
2.3. Theories and Concept of Governance 
In the paper entitled Interdisciplinarity in Governance Research, Brunnengräber and colleagues 
(2006) claim that if there were a contest of “Top Ten” terms used in social science at the 
beginning of the 21st century, “governance” would be the one that is used most. Renate Mayntz 
argues that governance theory began by “being concerned with the steering actions of political 
authorities as they deliberately attempt to shape socio-economic structures and processes.” 
However, recently, “governance” has been used in ways that differ from political steering. 
Firstly, it is used as an alternative mode of governing that is distinct from the hierarchical control 
model, namely, “a more cooperative mode where state and non-state actors participate in mixed 
public/private networks.” Secondly, it is used to mean different models of coordinating individual 
actions or basic forms of social order (Mayntz 2003:27). 
Mayntz (2003) further claims that modern governance after World War II arose from the growing 
aspiration of governments to steer their nations towards better defined goals of social and 
economic development. The first phases of this are as follows: Firstly, in the late 1960s, the trend 
began with a large boom of theory of planning for (and how to steer) economic development. 
Secondly, in the 1970s, as the planning euphoria declined, empirical analysis became preferable 
for policy development; this directed attention to contextual factors influencing policy 
development, in particular executive government organization. Different policy instruments were 
discussed, in particular the rule of law. Finally, in the second half of the 1970s, policy 
implementation became a new research focus. As Mayntz (2003:29) noted, “the first paradigm of 
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governance concept was thus concerned with policy development and policy implementation and 
it adopted a top-down or legislators’ perspective.”  
The failures of governments to govern (Mayntz 1993) towards “development as freedom” as 
advocated by Amartya Sen (1998), and the failure of the World Bank’s structural adjustment, 
which promoted pro-market reform including privatization of many basic social services in the 
developing world including Africa, led to a reflection that the underlying cause of poor economic 
outputs/outcomes in the past has been the failure of public institutions. In other words, the failure 
of state institutions is due to “bad governance”, which refers to a “political system where power 
is highly centralized, government intervention is excessive, corruption is rampant, and civil 
servants are not skilled enough to meet the demands of the people …. the absence of 
accountability and transparency in public affairs, lack of clarity in their legal framework related 
to the roles of private sectors in development” (Forsyth 2006:290). Therefore, in order to change 
the development machinery in weaker states to produce better development outcomes, “good 
governance” was called into the fore as the main enabling condition.  
Empirical evidence of governing failures could actually be seen globally during the 1970s and 
1980s. Mayntz (1993, 2003) gives examples from Germany while Sen (1998) also provides 
evidence from the 1970s and 1980s of government failures to guarantee peoples’ entitlements to 
food security in Asia and Africa.  
Mayntz (1993) asserted that failures of governance are due to failures of government to perform 
duties (e.g. to ensure economic performance, which can include disaster reduction and protection 
of human security), such as “the problem of implementation”, “the inability to establish rules”, 
“the problem of motivation”, “legitimacy of the rules”, “the problem of knowledge”, and 
“governability.” Therefore, there has been a shift of discourse from “strong state” during the 
post-World War II era that went through the crisis of the “welfare state” (see Mayntz 1993) 
towards the emergence of the “cooperative state” and the recent arrival of the “moderating state” 
(Messner 1998 in Brunnengräber 2006:5). This explains the history of governance concept, 
which shows institutions and institutional problems, where there were multiple severe problems 
in both developed and developing/underdeveloped worlds. Governance emerged from the 
development concept that initially viewed government as the only decision-making power but 
later added other actors to solve development problems.  
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The International Encyclopedia of International Development (first edition, Forsyth 2006) 
defines “governance” as an inclusionary means of politics: it is not merely a formal body of 
government (either elected or un-elected); instead, it refers to a process of decision making and 
policymaking that “includes bodies more than just ‘government’ as it is a process that, ideally, 
implies willing participation within politics by all citizens.” It does not mean that government is 
totally left out but that there are additional relevant actors who are involved in shaping public 
policy.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that the origin of the concept of governance is a concern for both 
political and economic governance, which then moved towards more sectoral governance, such 
as environmental governance. Rechkemmer (2006) noted the rising trend of global environmental 
governance, supported by a comprehensive list of more than 200 multilateral environmental 
agreements from 1933 to 2005 plus 19 UN resolutions and agreements from 1972 to 2005.  
The increased importance of the governance concept within many sectoral studies, such as 
environmental management science, has brought about calls for greater participation and reliance 
on local informal institutions (including knowledge), thus creating conditions that are removing 
emphasis from the dominant technocratic approach and top-down approach (Hilhorst 2004).  
The UN Commission on Global Governance’s report entitled Our Global Neighborhood defines 
governance as “the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, 
manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse 
interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal 
institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that 
people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest” (The Commission 
on Global Governance 1995; Chapter 1)12. Even though this definition is considered sufficient for 
this research, this dissertation will also demonstrate the role of the networked governance model 
in disaster risk reduction.  
The network governance (or networked governance) model criticizes the old assumption in 
structural analysis in social science (including economics and engineering), that development 
outcomes simply arise from the sum of efforts from agents, namely, individuals and 
organizations/institutions. When it comes to analysis, governance researchers tend to scrutinize 
                                               
12 See www.libertymatters.org/chap1.htm [last accessed 1 Sept 2009]. 
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the relations and correlations between variables. Network governance research tries to advocate a 
new approach based on the fact that agents and institutions exist and co-exist more in the form of 
networks. This is the main argument, which is based on the emerging form of governance as 
networks of individuals and organizations/institutions (see Jones et al. 1997, Stoker 2006, and 
Crawford 2006).  
Inside governments themselves, as Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) noted in their famous book 
“Governing by network: the new shape of the public sector”, there are rapidly growing spaces 
where governments purposefully network with networks of providers (of public goods) to 
enhance the delivery of public goods to meet their policy goals. The defined networks could 
involve third-party government, that is, private firms and NGOs, or joined-up government in the 
form of multiple and multilevel government agencies.  
 
2.3.1.  Application of the Concept of Governance to Disaster and Risk Research  
Disaster risks are actually driven by a number of unresolved, underlying causes such as 
vulnerable rural livelihoods, poverty, poor urban governance, lack of good governance, declining 
ecosystem services, and power inequality, which eventually lead to an uneven distribution of risk 
both socially and spatially, thereby “increasing the risks faced by the poor and further amplifying 
poverty” (UNISDR 2009). Efforts to reduce disaster risks often face barriers not only from 
limited or absent political will from the government, but also from other competing social 
problems in the priority lists of formal/informal actors and different perceptions on existing risk 
that lead to different prioritizations.  
It is obvious that there is no risk-free society. Every society (i.e. individual, household, village, 
district, or country) has its own stock of risks. Sources of risks can be either exogenous or 
endogenous to the society. Exogenous agents are considered indeterminate agents that may bring 
risk to human beings: natural hazards such as earthquakes, volcanic activities, tsunamis, and 
cyclones. Hazards that fall into the endogenous agent category include terrorism, war and 
conflict, chemical agents, biological agents, and technological hazards. A combination of both 
exogenous and endogenous agents could take the form of composite hazards such as health 
epidemics or a combination of war and drought that leads to the risk of famine and starvation. In 
reality, such hazardous agents may co-exist in certain spatial contexts, and the interplay of co-
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existing hazardous agents (chemical, biological, natural, etc.) can create serious consequences for 
livelihood assets and sustainable development.  
The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) defines disaster risk 
management as a “systematic process of using administrative decisions, organization, operational 
skills, and capacities to implement policies, strategies, and coping capacities of the society and 
communities to lessen the impacts of natural hazards and related environmental and technological 
disasters.”  This definition does not explicitly show the importance of institutions and governance 
as part of a “systematic process” beyond administrative decision making.  
Proponents of risk governance frameworks, such as of the Institute of Risk Governance Council 
(IRGC) suggest that risk governance includes risk assessment, risk management, and risk 
communication, which requires understanding of formal and informal institutions, social-
economic contexts within which risk is evaluated, and the involvement of actors and stakeholders 
who represent them in political and policy arenas that range from the local to the global level 
(Renn and Walker 2008:334, Renn 2008a). The stakeholders and actors range from grassroots 
communities, to civil society organizations, executive government and legislators, international 
financial institutions, and United Nations and university-based experts or academics. Renn and 
Walker (2008) and IGRC’s “risk management escalator and stakeholder involvement” defines 
four classifications of risk problems based on “knowledge characterization”, such as simple risk, 
complexity-induced risk, uncertainty-induced risk, and ambiguity-induced risk. It suggests 
involvement of actors as follows: Firstly, for simple risk, actors can be instrumental, such as 
simply agency staff; secondly, complex risk problems require epistemic actors such as external 
experts and agency staff; thirdly, uncertain risk problems require reflective actors such as 
external experts, agency staff, and limited stakeholders (industry and directly affected groups); 
fourthly, ambiguous risk problems require fuller participation, including the aforementioned 
actors plus the general public (Renn and Walker 2008). 
There is a lack of explanation regarding from where these categories - simple, complex, 
uncertain, or ambiguous - have been derived? These categories (simple, complex, uncertain, or 
ambiguous) are problematic when applied to natural hazard-driven risks, especially in the context 
of developing and under-developed countries where “simple” knowledge of natural hazard 
mitigation, such as seismic knowledge that has been available for decades, has not been put into 
practice by or for people at risk. The inclusion of the general public and the people at risk in 
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disaster risk reduction should be seen as creating opportunities to reduce the risks. In reality, 
especially in developing nations, participation in risk management depends very much on the 
governance and institutional context. In some particular governance context, institutions tend to 
exclude actors and decide themselves on which actors should be included.    
Rayner (2007:165) suggests that “risk plays a central role in the displacement of governmental 
responsibility to private sector and NGO actors at the same time as facilitating government 
control over citizens.” He further argues that “control by government is seen to have been 
supplemented, if not replaced, by a more distributed form of governing usually referred to by the 
term ‘governance’—defined as the management of a system, usually political or organizational, 
involving mutual adjustment, negotiation, and accommodation between the parties involved 
rather than direct control.” 
The first advanced effort is probably from the UNDP Global Report in 2004 entitled “Reducing 
Disaster Risk: A Challenge For Development”, which offers rich and bold understanding of the 
governance concept for disaster risk reduction. This report views governance as “the exercise of 
economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It 
comprises the mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups 
articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their 
differences. It brings together the actions of state, non-state, and private sector actors.”  
In addition, in this report, UNDP (2004) divided disaster risk governance into three categories: 
Firstly, economic governance, which means decision-making processes that affect a country’s 
economic activities and their implications for equity, poverty, and quality of life. Secondly, 
political governance, which is the process of decision making to set legislative processes, 
formulate laws, regulation, and policies, and which is referred to by HFA as strong institutional 
basis for implementation. Lastly is administrative governance, which is defined as the system of 
policy implementation that requires the existence of well-functioning government organizations 
at the national and local levels, and which play roles as enforcers of regulations related to disaster 
mitigation, building code enforcement, land use planning, environmental risk, and human 
vulnerability monitoring and safety standards (see UNDP 2004:1975). When it comes to the 
practical level, the meaning is simply the application of “good governance characteristics” such 
as participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, 
effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, and strategic vision in regard to disaster risk reduction 
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(UNDP 2004:75). UNDP views good governance as the commitment to sharing decision-making 
power among the stakeholders in disaster risk reduction, where government remains a critical 
actor in reducing risk as well as in the broader development context, based on its capacity as a 
mediator between private and public interests and as well as the people at risk, ranging from the 
local to the international level. 
Good governance is the very heart of development means and outcomes as well as disaster risk 
reduction means and outcomes. “The failures of urban planning, building regulation, 
environmental control, and regional development… can all be described as governance failures” 
|(UNDP 2004: 75-76). The conclusion is that risk reduction at all levels heavily depends on 
institutional innovation in governance. In order to move towards “good governance” in disaster 
reduction, UNDP (2004:89) argues that “There is a need for institutional systems and 
administrative arrangements that link public, private and civil society sectors and build vertical 
ties between local, district, national and global scale actors.” One of the first step towards new 
institutional system, it argues for the need of legislative reform (i.e. exactly the Hyogo 
Framework for Action Priority 1st).  
This dissertation views “disaster risk governance” as a complement to disaster risk management 
(DRM) frameworks by showing the route of disaster risk management within heterogeneous 
institutional and governance contexts beyond both ordinary “good governance principles” and 
conventional disaster risk management models.  
As a concept, disaster risk governance (hereafter DRG) has not been adequately defined; 
therefore, this dissertation takes the opportunity to define it. However, before going into further 
detail to define DRG, the author takes the opportunity to reflect that combining disaster risk and 
governance together as a concept is actually a rather new academic exercise. DRG is about being 
mindful of a multifaceted, multi-level, multi-stakeholder approach and cross-scale dynamics (see 
Cash et al. 2006). In addition, it strongly calls for consideration of balancing both contextual 
formal institutions (laws, regulations, policy) and informal institutions (norms, culture, customs) 
and the inclusion of agencies and actors (local-national-global with consideration of gender, age, 
and class), as well as different perceptions and types of knowledge of disaster risk reduction.  
The embedded meaning of governance attached to disaster risk is that it acknowledges new 
alternative forms of policy and regulation that are distinct from traditional hierarchical 
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government activity and implies an alternative form of governance, which is more inclusive to 
diverse actors and diverse knowledge. It does not mean that government no longer has a role 
because, in fact, governments are expected to steer the conditions of inclusive governance. In 
other words, any form of governance of disaster reduction is subject to government approval. 
DRG also refers to steering privileges that are no longer the monopoly of (the still relevant) 
“governmental agencies, but [are] de facto (and in many cases also de jure) the common 
responsibility of a variety of agencies, representing governmental bodies, market agencies, and 
civil society organizations” (Arts and Leroy 2006:13) in reducing disaster risk. At operational 
levels, from the global level to the national level down to the village level, there are a range of 
actors involved in reducing risk, ranging from state actors (executive and legislative agencies), 
United Nations agencies, Red Cross, NGOs/INGOs, grassroots organizations, professional 
associations, and private businesses. This is actually true for both developed and 
developing/underdeveloped countries. The difference is that the former may create a context for 
governance by the state actors creating a “steering deficit by design” (see Walls et al. 2005) while 
the latter (i.e. developing/underdeveloped countries) must deal with steering deficits due to lack 
of capacity in many dimensions (just to mention a few: financial capacity, human resources, 
weak institutions, lack of information and data).  
DRG can be defined as the way society as a whole, regardless of the form of clear cut 
entities/units such as individual/household/district/country or networked agents/institutions, 
manages the full array of its disaster risks that may be triggered by geological hazards (such as 
earthquakes), climate change and hydro-meteorological hazards (such as floods and cyclones), 
conflict, and war risks. It promotes the notion that there are many overlapping arenas (or centers) 
of authority for decision making and responsibility for disaster risk reduction. These arenas exist 
at all scales and levels from individuals, local community groups, to national governments 
(executive and legislative), and international institutions and organizations. The arenas may 
emerge as networks. For instance, in developing countries where the vast majority of houses were 
built by house owners directly with limited or absent building codes, decisions on building 
earthquake-resistant housing are in the hands of hundreds of millions of house owners.  
Risk governance encompasses a broader spectrum of politics, policies, and polity of disaster 
reduction at different scales and levels from global to local. It recognizes the polycentric nature 
of disaster risk reduction (sometimes a.k.a. disaster risk management) as there are many 
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overlapping arenas (or centers) of authority and responsibility for disaster risk reduction. 
Polycentric governance refers to the nature of decision making on risk management as 
functioning across many centers and domains and across scales and levels. The evidence of 
polycentric governance also appears in the context of emergency management today, especially 
under the concept of cluster approaches13, as currently promoted by international actors.  
Disaster risk governance (shortened to disaster governance) is a concept that emerges from 
political science, policy studies, natural resource management, development studies, and recently 
from global environmental governance, studies of the human dimension of global environmental 
change, and earth system sciences. Again, DRM is not dismissed, but in fact is embedded in the 
disaster governance concept. In comparison to DRM, what is actually new in DRG is greater 
emphasis on the decision-making process regarding disaster reduction policy and regulations with 
greater acknowledgement of the complexity, conflicts, and interests of actors, multi-
dimensionality and interplay of various institutions and actors at multiple levels as well as the 
polycentric nature of decision making regarding disaster risk reduction. DRG in other words 
provides the framework within which DRM is to be implemented.  
2.3.2. Decentralization and “Decentralized Governance”   
Decentralization is one form of governance aspects. Therefore, it is probably not a good idea to 
talk about governance without linking it to decentralization, sometimes termed as “decentralized 
governance.” The term sounds tricky; nonetheless, it still falls into the definitions provided above 
regarding being mindful of the inclusion of multiple stakeholders such as local actors 
(government, communities, local market, NGOs etc.). UNDP uses the term “decentralized 
governance” to mean “a situation of power sharing between the central and local governments 
that is based on the principle of subsidiarity and that transcends government to also include the 
private sector and civil society.”  
The knowledge of decentralization in use worldwide, especially under the auspices of multilateral 
organizations such as UNDP, often refers to Robertson Work’s (2002)14 paper entitled The Role 
of Participation and Partnership in Decentralized Governance: A Brief Synthesis of Policy 
Lessons and Recommendations of Nine Country Case Studies on Service Delivery for the Poor. 
                                               
13 Cluster approach is basically sectoral responsibility of actors during humanitarian emergency response.  
14 “Work” is the family name of the author. 
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This paper has been cited numerous times by many authors. Work (2002) distinguishes four types 
of decentralization15, which are reproduced here for clarity: 
 Administrative decentralization aims at transferring decision-making authority, resources, and 
responsibilities for the delivery of a select number of public services from the central 
government to other lower levels of government, agencies, and field offices of central 
government line agencies. In day-to-day work of DRR within government, this means that 
authority to reduce risks has been transferred from central government to local government 
and from local government to its specialized agencies. This transfer implies two steps: 
o Step 1: Deconcentration, that is, transferring authority and responsibility from one 
level of the central government to another while maintaining the same hierarchical 
level of accountability from the local units to the central government ministry or 
agency that has been decentralized.  
o Step 2: Delegation, that is, the redistribution of authority and responsibility to local 
units of government or agencies that are not always necessarily branches or local 
offices of the delegating authority. While some transfer of accountability to the sub-
national units to which power is being delegated takes place, the bulk of 
accountability is still vertical and to the delegating central unit.  
 Political decentralization “refers to situations where political power and authority have been 
decentralized to sub-national levels.” The manifestations of this type of decentralization are 
elected and empowered sub-national forms of government ranging from village councils to 
municipality/city/district/provincial levels. This implies that local political processes are very 
important as they may discourage or encourage disaster risk reduction.  
 Fiscal decentralization cuts across all forms of decentralization; some level of resource 
reallocation is made to allow local government to function properly. Decentralizing 
responsibilities, authority, and accountability without assignment of adequate levels of 
resources to the decentralized units does not work. This stage is vital in disaster risk reduction 
as transfer of financial resources may have been earmarked according to central government 
                                               
15 See the details at: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan006230.pdf [last accessed 4 
Feb 2010]. 
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interest, while local governments, especially those in the developing world, face shortages of 
financial resources.  
 Market decentralization transfers government responsibilities and authority to non-public 
entities where planning and administrative responsibility or other public functions are 
transferred from government to voluntary, private, or non-governmental institutions with 
clear benefits to and involvement of the public. This can be in the form of a disaster risk 
insurance market.  
2.3.3. Scale of Disaster Risk Governance  
One example of the global scale of disaster risk governance is the creation of the Global Platform 
of Disaster Risk Reduction under the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UNISDR), which serves to consolidate efforts of disaster reduction at global and 
national levels. The UNISDR itself can be considered as a form of global disaster risk 
governance.  
The DRR platforms (at national/global level) are formed by a wide range of actors such as state 
actors (executive and legislative powers), UN agencies, NGOs, Red Cross organizations, 
universities, and scientific and technical experts. Presumably, at lower levels, local platforms 
with inclusion of grassroots organizations are seen by many to be vital to make local level risk 
reduction more robust and make risk reduction a reality. 
The illustration of scales is shown in Table 4. There are at least 11 categories of scales, divided 
into hierarchical and non-hierarchical. There is no specific reason why there are four hierarchical 
scales at each category. The hierarchical are spatial scales (e.g. from global to patches), temporal 
(annual to minutes/hours)16, jurisdictional (from international to local), formal institutions (from 
constitutions at the macro level to standard operational procedures or SOPs at the micro level), 
management scales, and scales of networks. Non-hierarchical scales consist of four categories, 
namely, informal institution time scales (e.g. the cultural norms that last longer than a hundred 
years or simply long-established practices), level of stakeholder participation (from full 
                                               
16 The importance of minutes in the time scales is major in the case of tsunami early warning systems because 
institutions and organizations need to be designed to respond to very limited “lead time”.  
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participation to no participation), age scale (from senior citizens to children), and knowledge 
system (from science as global knowledge towards local knowledge).17 
 
Table 4 Illustration of Scales of Disaster Risk Governance 
Scales Hierarchical scales 
 
Remarks 
Spatial Global Regions Landscapes Patches Geography 
Temporal   Annual Seasonal Daily Minutes-hours  fast-slow & 
short-long 
continuum 
Jurisdictional International National Provincial Local Administration  
Formal 
Institutions  
Constitutions  Laws Regulation  Standard operational 
procedures –SOPs 
 
Management 
vision  
Strategic plan Program Project  Tactical plan Planning  
 Non-hierarchical scales 
 
 
DRR networks Trans-networks  State and 
interstate 
actors   
Non-state 
actors 
Intra community 
and inter 
community  
Links 
Density of 
DRR networks  
Dense and 
complex 
Thick or dense 
network  
Moderate  Thin and sparse Network 
architecture  
Informal 
institutions 
Norms Religion Customs Established practices   
Stakeholder 
participation 
Full 
participation 
Partial 
participation 
Targeted 
participation 
Top-down approach Inclusive versus 
exclusive  
Individual 
actors (age) 
Senior citizens Adults  Youth Children Age classification  
Individual 
(gender) 
Men/boys transgender Women/girls Gender 
classification  
Knowledge 
System  
Science as 
global 
knowledge 
Professional 
knowledge 
Local 
knowledge 
Indigenous 
knowledge  
General-specific 
and universal-
contextual ‘truth’ 
Source: adapted from Cash et al. 2006 
 
Institutions clearly have boundaries when arranged along scales such as jurisdictional and 
temporal, as well as those of bounded actors or stakeholders. Haynes et. al. (2010) argues that 
what is often called as ‘community’ in the disaster risk reduction often turned out to be men 
(indication of gender bias); while boys are viewed as stronger than girls which negate the 
capacity of girls in risk communication; There is also argument of age classification as often 
senior citizens and children were left out in the disaster management policy design. These bias in 
                                               
17 Local knowledge is often misunderstood as indigenous knowledge. It is defined here as locally adopted 
knowledge that may be derived from either science or indigenous knowledge.  
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terms of gender, age, at different scales have been actually shaped by institutions (Haynes et. al. 
2010:22, See also Goode 1994:700) 
However, it is no easy task to place clear boundaries on formal institutions. In accordance with 
Table 4, governance can be defined as a form of authority exercised through formal and informal 
institutions at all scales. The inclusion of stakeholders can range from full participation to the 
most undesired form of governance, which is state-only organizations. Governance also emerges 
as networks, for example, trans-society networks to kinships and family networks. The earlier 
understanding as discussed at length in the previous section is that institutions differ from 
organizations despite their overlapping boundaries. For instance, the World Bank is seen as an 
institution since its power enables it to create development policy, while at the same time, it is 
also an organization. 
Lastly, the governance of disaster risk reduction may appear in the form of networks that can be 
classified according to their nature: extra- or intracommunity networks, networks of professional 
affiliation, state and non-state actors, and transnetworks of actors/community/government. 
(Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj 2005)  
 
2.3.4. Polycentric Nature of Disaster Risk Reduction  
The global response to disaster risk in the 21st century can also be seen in the greater integration 
of global and regional early warning system infrastructures (such as for earthquakes and 
tsunamis) and the governance of space. There is more evidence that disaster risks are now 
managed through dense global-local interaction and networks of actors and institutions. Table 5 
and Figure 2 indicate the polycentric nature of disaster risk reduction as there are many 
overlapping arenas (or centers) of authority and responsibility for disaster risk reduction. 
Furthermore, this dissertation argues that the footprints of global institutions of DRR can actually 
be found at local levels. In other words, local level implementation of DRR is not fully separated 
nor isolated from global processes and interactions. For instance, seismic risk reduction is 
actually achieved through several processes at global levels, including global networks of 
earthquake instruments and scientific cooperation. These measures include non-governmental 
actors’ rules of the game such as International Building Codes stipulated by the International 
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Code Council18, which were later adopted by national standardization bodies in countries like 
Indonesia. These processes are often considered incomplete when there is neither local level 
adoption nor enforcement.  
Disaster risk mitigation requires coordination and cross-coordination at the local, national, and 
global scales (see Table 5). One of the reasons for such coordination or cross-coordination is the 
fact that the root causes of a global scale of contemporary risk “are often distanced in time and 
space from its impacts” (Pelling 2003:1). However, there are many governance regimes that have 
a vested interest in reducing risk at global and local levels. 
Table 5 Illustration of Risk Reduction Regimes 
Risk Reduction 
Regimes 
Jurisdictional Scales 
Global National Province/local 
General and 
broader risk 
reduction 
regime 
Broader Disaster 
Risk Reduction  
HFA, IDRL, 
GFDRR, WCDR 
Constitution and set 
of risk reduction-
related laws 
Local laws and 
regulation, SOPs 
etc.  
Humanitarian 
Disaster Emergency  
Sphere Charter 19 , 
IDRL,  
Constitutions and set 
disaster response 
laws 
 
Climate risk 
reduction  
GEF, Kyoto 
Protocols, HFA 
Constitution, 
environmental laws, 
regulation 
Local level 
regulation and 
enforcement policy 
Market mechanism 
such as insurance 
and reinsurance 
Global reinsurance 
industry 
General and specific 
risk cover 
Local insurance 
market  
Market mechanism: 
ISO 13,000 on Risk 
Management 
ISO 13,000 National Standards for Risk Management 
adoption.  
Specific hazard 
risk reduction 
Tsunami risk 
reduction 
Global TEWS 
networks 
National DRM 
agency and National 
Warning Centers incl. 
laws and regulations 
Local Warning 
Centers, Local 
DRM agency, 
Local SOPs 
Seismic risk 
reduction 
Global Earthquakes 
networks, 
International 
Building codes etc. 
National DRM 
agency, laws and 
regulations, National 
building codes,  
Local level building 
regulation, building 
permits etc.  
  
 
Climate governance regimes, disaster governance regimes (e.g. the Hyogo Framework for Action 
and international humanitarian institutions) also work through global-local pathways. Therefore, 
                                               
18 Please see the ICC site at http://www.iccsafe.org/Pages/default.aspx - last accessed 10 Jan 2010.  
19 A global humanitarian charter, stipulated by a range of international actors, promoting rights to humanitarian aid 
intervention. Please consult http://www.sphereproject.org/.  Accessed on 10 Jan 2010. 
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coordination in a broader sense should also consider cross-boundaries of regimes of disaster risk 
reduction. Disaster early warning systems do not work in isolation but work through existing 
pathways from international to local levels.  
2.4. Towards a New Concept of Institutional Vulnerability to Disaster Risk 
Institutional vulnerability is not a new term as its earlier usage can be traced back to the early 
1950s, as can be seen in Selznick (1951). Selznick defined institutional vulnerability as the 
condition where institutions such as culture and traditional institutions are prone to social change. 
The nature of traditional institutions with their support of a top-down approach was too fragile to 
respond to the social change, such as the start of the mass participation era, which emerged in the 
1950s. In other words, changing the form of governance from traditional government towards 
inclusive governance also creates problems because anarchy may arise and status quo institutions 
are often too fragile to respond to change. 
In its application to disaster research, earlier work such as that of Cannon et al. (2003) claimed 
that “risk management requires a system of control (institutional structure) and an actuation 
system (public policies and actions) to implement the changes needed.” Even though Cannon et 
al. (2003:6) are accurate to say that “institutions… determine the distribution of safety and 
vulnerability in society,” they treated institutions as merely organizations responsible for disaster 
reduction (see for instance p. 13).  
Birkmann (2006:33) quoted Cannon et al. as a reference for assuming that institutions are 
organizations. Despite efforts to partly distinguish organizational and institutional aspects of 
vulnerabilities, including the acceptance that understanding both organizations and institutions is 
as important as physical vulnerabilities, Birkmann (2006:35) claimed that “they should be 
analyzed within the three thematic spheres (economic, social, and environmental)”. On one 
occasion he cites institutional aspects such as “good governance, appropriate early warning, and 
appropriate legislation” (Birkmann 2006:64). In the view of any institutional analysis as noted in 
the previous section, all domains of vulnerability such as physical, social, economic, and 
environmental vulnerabilities as summarized by Birkmann (2006) are indeed outcomes shaped by 
institutions.  
Again, economic vulnerabilities are the outcomes of institutions, which can be asserted on the 
basis of ample evidence from new institutional economics studies including the well-regarded 
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work of at least four Nobel laureates, North (in 1993), Simon (in 1978), Ostrom (in 2009)20, and 
Williamson (in 2009)21. Interesting findings on the roles of institutions on environmental 
outcomes have been shown consistently by many, such as Ostrom (2005). Physical vulnerability 
such as vulnerable building structures in developing countries is further shaped by institutions 
rather than incomes alone, as will be shown later. 
Kahn’s (2005) empirical work using the comparative method shows that “good institutions” and 
institutional quality matter, especially in their intrinsic ability to reduce disaster risks. His basic 
conclusion is that “democracies and nations with higher quality institutions suffer less death from 
natural disaster” (p. 271). Raschky (2008) pioneered a conceptual exercise, some of the 
conclusions of which are as follows: higher income alone (as often falsely seen as less economic 
vulnerability) does not necessarily lead to better protection against natural disasters. This is 
supported by the fact that substantial infrastructure owned by private actors in recent earthquakes 
in Haiti and Indonesia simply could not stand against earthquake hazards. Raschky reiterates the 
numerous facts presented in the empirical works of many who have compared economically 
advanced countries in the North with stronger institutions and failed and vulnerable states in the 
South, which have experienced more casualties in recent disasters.  
In the disaster research community, Handmer and Dovers’ Handbook of Disaster and Emergency 
Policies and Institutions was probably among the first efforts to tackle the issue of institutions 
and their relation to disaster risk management. They argue that all actors and organizations in 
disaster reduction policy processes will be enabled or constrained by the institutional system 
within which they operate (Handmer and Dovers 2007:56). Institutions may play roles as factors 
that enable or disable learning from experience or managing risk. They further state that 
institutions can either be “effective or not, constructive or destructive, democratic or autocratic, 
well informed or ignorant, formal or informal, in fact, they are persistent, predictable 
arrangements, laws, processes, or customs, serving to structure transactions and relationships in a 
society. These transactions include political, social, cultural, economic, personal, legal, and 
administrative matters. …. Institutions allow organized, collective efforts around common 
concerns and reduce the need for constant negotiation of expectations and behavioral contracts. 
                                               
20 http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/ostrom-lecture-slides.pdf [last accessed 20 April 
2010]. 
21 http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/williamson-lecture-slides.pdf [last accessed 20 April 
2010] 
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Although persistent, institutions constantly evolve and adapt” (Handmer and Dovers 2007:145–
146). 
Boris Porfiriev (2007:372) narrowly views institutional vulnerability as simply associated with 
crisis communication and organizational coordination (page 372). Hochrainer (2006) talks about 
the macroeconomics of risk and the context of governments in developing countries. He views 
institutional vulnerability as the existence and robustness of institutions to deal with natural 
disasters.22  
Haanpää and Peltonen (2007) developed a scorecard of institutional vulnerability to climate 
change in the Baltic Sea region by measuring the following five categories: national capacity to 
conceptualize and formulate policies, legislation, strategies, and programs; capacity of local 
actors to implement policies, legislation, strategies, and programs; capacity to engage and build 
consensus among all stakeholders; capacity to mobilize information and knowledge including 
individuals; and the capacity to monitor, evaluate, report, and learn; In conclusion, Haanpää and 
Peltonen (2007) understood institutional vulnerability as the context where there is capacity to 
create formal institutions related to climate change, enforcement mechanisms or the 
implementation of policy and regulation, stakeholder participation, and inclusion of actors as well 
as administrative capacity in regard to climate change mitigation/adaptation.  
One of the central arguments of this thesis is that the “DNA code” of all vulnerabilities is laid by 
institutions; therefore, institutional vulnerabilities are hypothetically the main problem of not 
only resilience to, but also resistance, coping, and adapting to natural hazards. Institutional 
vulnerability to disaster risk is defined here as both the context and the process where formal 
institutions (regulation, rule of law, constitutions, codes, bureaucracy, etc.) and informal 
institutions (culture, norms, traditions, religion) are either too weak to provide protections against 
disaster risks or are ignorant of their duty to provide safety and human security. Centered on this 
argument is the logic that institutions are designed, among others, to reduce risks, which in this 
particular research field are disaster risks.  
                                               
22  Mechler (2004) which defined social vulnerability as the ability of a society to cope with the impact of a natural 
disaster and the susceptibility to damage of physical assets such as houses, dams, roads, and bridges. Economic 
vulnerability is the financial capacity to endure finance losses caused by a disaster and the ability to return to a 
previously planned path of activity. This includes private individuals, companies, as well as governments. Mechler 
cited APDC’s Glossary – i.e.  Workshop Urban Disaster Mitigation, 23-27 Oct 2000, University of Karlsruhe.  
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Chapter 3. Research Frameworks and Methods 
3.1 Research Frameworks 
3.1.1   Introduction to Overall Research Frameworks  
In this section, the framework of this PhD research is introduced. Figure 2 presents the disaster 
risk governance framework. The inner circle of Figure 2 shows the “core institutional 
commitments on disaster risk management” based on five priorities of the Hyogo Framework for 
Action (HFA), as elaborated in Table 11. The HFA is a non-legally binding institution that drives 
each member state to set five core agendas of disaster reduction. At the very heart of the 
institutional commitment to governance and institutions for disaster risk reduction is the need to 
“Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional 
basis for implementation.” The next agendas are as follows: to identify, assess, and monitor 
disaster risks and enhance early warning systems; to use knowledge, innovation, and education to 
build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels; to reduce the underlying risk factors, and 
lastly to strengthen disaster preparedness for an effective response at all levels.  
Figure 2 Disaster Risk Governance Framework for Macro, Meso and Micro Analysis. 
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The five macroindicators (a.k.a. priorities) above have been broken down into 22 sub-indicators 
of progress. Every member state is required to submit a national progress report. The Hyogo 
Framework for Action (HFA) for disaster risk reduction—stipulated by the World Conference of 
Disaster Reduction in 2005 in Kobe—has served as a non-legally binding international institution 
and the worldwide framework signed by 168 member states that will continue to shape global and 
local policies and efforts in reducing disaster risk towards 2015.   
The framework explicitly envisions the member states integrating climate change adaptation and 
mitigation into their disaster risk reduction activities. It brings together institutions and 
organizations from the humanitarian aid community, disaster risk reduction community, and 
climate change adaptation community, as well as many more. Furthermore, there are emerging 
indications of cross-fertilization of global institutions concerned with disaster risk reduction, 
humanitarian crises, and climate risk from market-based groups such as the insurance industry, 
global humanitarian groups, non-governmental organizations, member states, and the United 
Nations. Figure 3 (left) shows how conventional risk management has now expanded to cover a 
much broader spectrum of perspective that is needed to solve the increased risks globally.  
Figure 3 Old Disaster Risk Management vs. HFA Disaster Risk Governance Spider 
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Table 6 and Figure 3 show the agenda of disaster risk reduction during the International Decade 
for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNRD) 1990–1999, which provided nine focus issues for 
disaster reduction. The IDNDR was considered a success in its pioneering roles at the 
international level to facilitate the setting up of 130 national level disaster management 
committees/focal points (van Niekerk 2005). It is an empirical fact that IDNDR itself emerged as 
a soft institution that encouraged countries to move to reduce their disaster risks. The follow-up 
by the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World in 1994 brought 17 issues to the list,23 and today’s 
22 indicators for DRR under the auspices of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005–2015 
signal the need for new institutional arrangements including attempts at institutional change 
(a.k.a. reforms) to be able to reduce overall disaster risk.   
Table 6 Disaster Risk Reduction Agenda under Different Regimes 
IDNDR 1990-1999* Yokohama Strategy 2000* 
1. Mitigation capacity of each 
country 
2. Assessment of disaster damage 
potential esp. in developing 
countries 
3. Establishment of EWS 
4. Establishment of disaster-
resilient structures when and 
where needed. 
5. Development of appropriate 
guidelines and strategies for 
applying existing scientific and 
technical knowledge 
6. Foster scientific and engineering 
endeavors aimed at closing 
critical gaps in knowledge   
7. Disseminate technological 
information related to measures 
for assessment, prediction, and 
mitigation  
8. Technical assistance and 
mitigation technology transfer  
9. Education and training tailored 
to specific disasters and locations 
1. Political commitment through legislation and 
policymaking implementation  
2. Mobilization of domestic resources   
3. Enforcement of rules, standards, etc. 
4. Strengthen the institutional capacities 
5. NGO participation at the local level 
6. Risk assessment program  
7. Endeavor to document all disasters 
8. Cost-effective DR technologies incl. EWS 
9. Knowledge transfers and training   
10. Educational and information programs 
11. Application of traditional knowledge, practices, and 
values of local communities for disaster reduction 
12. Countrywide public awareness  
13. DRR integration into socioeconomic development 
planning  
14. Incorporating development plans and conducting 
Environmental Impact Assessments with a view to 
disaster reduction 
15. National disaster management plans with emphasis on 
disaster reduction 
16. Stimulate genuine community involvement and 
empowerment of women and other socially 
disadvantaged groups 
17. Emergency plans focusing efforts on disaster 
preparedness & response 
*Modified from formal documents on Yokohama Strategy 1994 and IDNDR 1990–1999 
                                               
23 Please consult http://www.unisdr.org/eng/about_isdr/bd-yokohama-strat-eng.htm [last accessed on 22 Sept 2009].  
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The outer circle of Figure 3 reflects the broader spectrum of Disaster Risk Governance such as 
the governance context and the quality of the institutions of a nation. Operational arena means the 
actual or real world context where disaster risk reduction agendas are being implemented.  
3.1.2 Disaster Risk Governance Indicators at National Scale  
In this dissertation, a new framework to analyze disaster risk governance at the national level 
(country by country) as well as at the community level is introduced. At the national level, the 
DRG indicators are developed on the basis of the institutional commitment of each individual 
country in implementing the Hyogo Framework for Action. In short, there are 22 individual 
indicators as shown in Figure 3 and Table 11 (in Chapter 4). The 22 individual indicators are 
broken down into five aggregate indicators. In this case, HFA Progress Indicators will serve for 
direct measurement of institutional vulnerability and quality of DRG at the national level.  
In addition, a global dataset from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project developed 
by the World Bank will also be used. The WGI data serves as the information of local context 
based on six factors such as regulatory quality, government effectiveness (including 
bureaucracy), political stability, corruption control, rule of law and participation and media 
freedom. It is almost impossible to manage disaster risk if the government is not effective in 
carrying out public administration, where regulatory quality is poor, where corruption control 
measures are absent, and where the rule of law and participation are discouraged. It is obvious 
that disaster reduction is impossible in the context where internal conflict and civil war are taking 
place and there is a lack of political stability. WGI views governance as “consist[ing] of the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process 
by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced; the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for 
the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.”   
3.1.3   Country Level Institutional Vulnerability Assessment  
Hochrainer (2006) claims that institutional vulnerability refers to the existence and robustness of 
institutions to deal with natural disasters but maintains that it is difficult to quantify. In contrast, 
in this dissertation, both quantitative methods as well as qualitative methods will be used to 
measure institutional vulnerability to “natural” disasters at different scales. 
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Institutional vulnerability to disaster risk is defined as the context where formal institutions 
(regulation, rule of laws, constitutions, codes, etc.) and informal institutions (culture, norms, 
traditions, religious values24) are either too weak to provide protection against disaster risks or 
ignorant of the necessity of their duty to guarantee human security. Furthermore, as a matter of 
term, institutional vulnerability may be associated with terms such as weak institutions, lack of 
good governance, poor institutional quality, and bad governance.  
For global scale analysis, institutional vulnerability framework is developed on the basis of both 
the HFA Progress Indicators and the World Wide Governance Indicators. In addition, 
governance/institutional aspects such as bureaucracy as suggested by The Global Governance 
Survey (GGS) project above will also be taken into account (Table 7).  
 
Table 7 Institutional Vulnerability Assessment at different scales 
Chapter No Scale DRG Indicators  Remarks  
Chapter 4, 5 Global Institutional commitments on DRR based 
on HFA indicator of progress  
Quantitative 
approach 
Chapter 5 Global Compare institutional commitments on 
DRR based on HFA indicator of progress 
and World Governance indicators 
Quantitative 
approach 
Chapter 6 National 
(Indonesia) 
Disaster risk management policy and 
practice   
Qualitative and 
quantitative 
indicators 
Chapter 7 National 
and Local 
(Indonesia) 
 DRR planning, policy and practice  Qualitative and 
quantitative 
approach  Governance volatility 
 
Since institutional vulnerability especially at the country level will be measured using an index 
approach or a quantitative approach, informal institutions such as norms/customs/values are 
considered embedded in the indicators. For instance, when “government effectiveness” is ranked 
in a range 1-10, it does not tell which kind of norms or culture is being in operation but it gives 
level of quality of bureaucratic services from ‘perfect’ at 10 scale to the absence of effectiveness 
(closer to 0). Assessment at national and local scale (from the context of Indonesia) will be also 
done using both qualitative and quantitative approach. 
                                               
24 The context of state religion such as Vatican is considered here as a formal institution. 
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3.2 Research Methods 
The selected methods are based on the scales and the levels of research. Institutional 
Vulnerability Assessment (Chapters 4 and 5) will use quantitative analysis. Chapter 6 will be 
based on mixed methods, namely, combining a set of multiple methods such as quantitative 
methods (including network analysis), desk research using secondary data, as well as 
ethnographic research (including e-ethnographic research such as participants observation 
through mailinglist of disaster management professionals in Indonesia), and documents of 
participatory risk assessment from villages. Chapter 4 will combine qualitative and quantitative 
secondary data from the progress reports of 63 countries from the HFA 2009. Chapter 5 will 
compare the dataset of 2007/2008 from World Governance Indicators with the HFA Indicators 
described in Chapter 4. For the case study approach (Chapters 6, 7), ethnography and participant 
observation (unstructured interviews, policy documents, minutes of meetings, observation in 
national and international conferences/workshops) as well as progress reports are used. 
Table 8 Utilized Research Methodology 
Methodological Approach/Tools Scale of data collection 
 
Remarks 
Global National Local  
Quantitative 
methods  
Global dataset from Global 
Governance Indicators and other 
additional datasets 
X 
63 countries 
  Chapter 5 
 
Country reports on progress of HFA 
implementation 
X 
63 countries 
  Chapter 4 
 
Case Study 
Approach: 
Indonesia  
Unstructured interviews (DRR 
stakeholders)  
 X X Chapters 6 
& 7 
Disaster reduction policy documents 
and reports  
 X  Chapters 6 
& 7 
Multi-stakeholder workshops X X X Chapter 6 
& Participant observations (on the 
ground as well as four selected major 
mailing lists of disaster management 
community in Indonesia) 
 X  Chapters 6 
& 7 
Social network analysis using Pajek 
software-derived formal reports and 
DM-related laws and regulations. 
 X  Chapters 6 
& 7 
Disaster risk assessment documents 
(national and local).  
 X X Chapters 6 
& 7 
Focus group discussions in four pre-
selected districts 
  X Chapters 6 
& 7 
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The motivation behind using mixed methods (Table 8) is the assumption that a mixed method is 
superior to a single method. It allows the author to utilize some data collection in answering the 
same research questions, which is in itself an effort to validate the findings. The other benefit is 
that the study can evaluate multiple spheres and polycentric governance of disaster risks. Mixed 
methods can help to improve the quality of the research in three ways: firstly, they make use of 
triangulation, which refers to ‘the use of quantitative research to corroborate qualitative research 
findings or vice versa’. Secondly, they involve facilitation that ‘arises when one research strategy 
is employed in order to aid research using another research strategy’. Lastly, it offers 
complementarities when ‘two research strategies are employed in order that different aspects of 
an investigation can be dovetailed’ (for more explanation related to multiple strategy research, 
see Alan Briman 2004:455). 
3.2.1 Quantitative Methods   
3.2.1.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis  
According to the standard statistical textbooks, descriptive statistics basically analyze the mean 
and confidence interval. The mean measures the "central tendency" of the selected variable, 
reported along with its confidence intervals. 25  
3.2.1.2 Correlation Tests and Multiple Regression  
Correlation tests measure “the strength of a certain type of relationship between two 
measurement variables” while regression gives “a numerical method for trying to predict one 
measurement variable from another” (Utts 2005). A simple regression measures one dependent 
variable with one independent variable, whereas multiple regression measures one dependent 
variable with many (more than two) independent variables.   
3.2.1.3 Social Network Analysis 
It is assumed that Social Network Analysis (SNA) can be used to demonstrate the network of 
disaster risk governance at any level of governance. It is argued that SNA provides a new 
thinking that institutions (including DRR institutions) do exist in a network rather than the sum of 
laws/regulations/codes therefore the structure of DRR regulatory network should be seen as a 
proxy of institutional quality and vulnerability. In Chapter 6 and 7, the network analysis is used 
                                               
25http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/basic-statistics/#Descriptive%20statistics [Last accessed 10 Feb 2010]. 
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to demonstrate the idea of polycentric nature governance of DRR, DRR regulatory quality, and 
also the discourse behind the DRR reform with a case studies from Indonesia. 
Mark Granovetter (in Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj 2005). argues that network analysis presents a 
better explanation of social behavior “by reference to relations among such concrete entities as 
persons and organizations”. SNA assumes a society is by no means merely a sum of individuals – 
instead society actually comprises of networks of individuals, organizations, and institutions. 
Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj (2005) stated that SNA focuses on ties among people, groups of 
people, organizations, and countries. Together, these ties form networks. Hence, SNA detects and 
interprets patterns of social ties among actors (Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj 2005:5).  
The network is also known as a graph (see Figure 4).  “A graph is a set of vertices and a set of 
lines between pairs of vertices. A graph represents the structure of a network; all it needs for this 
is a set of vertices (which are also called points or nodes) and a set of lines where each line 
connects two vertices.” A vertex (singular of vertices a.k.a. a node) is the smallest unit in a 
network and can represent either an agent (e.g., an organization, an adult female/male, an object) 
or, as this dissertation argues, an institution (e.g.  a policy, a regulation, or a specific law). 
Furthermore, a node/vertex can be identified by a number or a label. A line connects two nodes in 
a network, which can represent any relational quality. “A line is defined by its two endpoints, 
which are the two vertices that are incident with the line” [Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj 2005:6]. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Example of Social Network Graph of “Institutions” – Degree Centrality Test 
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Chapters 6 and 7 focus only on the three types of centrality analysis, namely, degree centrality, 
betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality analyses. Centrality analysis refers to positions 
of individual vertices (or nodes) within a network. For instance, each individual node in Figure 4 
represents a key word related to institutions. Degree centrality is the easiest to measure as it is the 
number of vertices adjacent to a given vertex– or number of ties connected to a given node or 
“the number of nodes that the focal node is connected to” (Opsahl, Agneessens, and Skvoretz 
2010). Equation [1] is the mathematical explanation of degree centrality: 
CD (Si) = ∑  Sijே௝ / N        [1] 
Here, i is the focal vertex (node), j represents all ties (or links), and N is the total number of nodes 
in the given network. From Figure 4, it is obvious that the degree of “Informal Institutions” is 5, 
calculated from the number of ties. Since N (number of nodes) is 25, degree centrality is 5/25 or 
0.20. 
To determine the institutional leader(s) in a network (to represent the lead institution/organization 
or individual leader of a unit of community or institutions), one can identify the highest value of 
betweenness centrality. Arbesman and Christakis (2010:6) rewrite the equation as follows:  
CB (Si) = ෍  (୔୧(୩୨)୔(୩୨) )/(N− 1)N− 2)/2ே௝       [2] 
Pi(kj) is the number of geodesics (a.k.a. the shortest path) between k and j that i lies on and P(kj) 
is the total number of geodesics between k and j (Arbesman and Christakis 2010). For instance, 
from Figure 4, “institutions” is intuitively the center of the network. The reason for saying this is 
that the centrality of “DRR institutions” depends on the extent to which it is needed as a tie that 
facilitates the spread of power within the network. Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj argue that the more 
a node is a go-between, the more central its position in the network. If it were an actor in the 
geodesics of Figure 4, it can mean that the more a node possesses dense relational ties between 
other nodes (agents/actors and or institutions) the more important the node is to the flow of any 
resources in the network.  The betweenness centrality has a value between 0 and 1. The higher 
the value the higher the centrality of the node in the network, which is an indication of leadership.  
From the Figure 4 analysis, after running Pajek, Institutions are ranked as the most important 
(0.681), with Organizations coming second (0.507). The lowest value is 0; therefore, the highest 
value is 0.681, indicating that Institutions are the “leader” in the network.  
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The equation for closeness centrality is as follows: 
CC (Si) = (ܰ − 1)/෌  l(i, j)ே௝       [3] 
In terms of closeness centrality of the network above, after running the Pajek software (with total 
nodes N=24), Institutions receive the highest score (0.511), Formal institutions are the second 
highest (0.451). (The lowest value is 0.258 and the highest value is 0.511; Figure 4 reflects the 
closeness centrality values – the size of the nodes is proportional to the real value of closeness 
centrality.) Insights from Figure 6.4 are that Organizations and Informal and Formal Institutions 
are important nodes. Provincial regulations seem to have roles as a connector of national 
regulations, laws, and district regulations, among others.  
3.2.2 Research Scales and Locations  
The global dataset is derived from the reports from 63 countries regarding the implementation 
progress of the Hyogo Framework for Action in 2009. The selected countries are basically 
representatives from throughout the continents of Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and North 
and Latin America. The work was carried out with a base at the United Nations University 
Institute for Environment and Human Security, Bonn, Germany, in June-December, 2009.  
3.2.2.1 Geography of Data Collection  
Table 9 below gives the geographical mobility of the research process. The base station was in 
Bonn, where desk research was carried out in March-December, 2009. The visited areas were the 
places where participant observations were carried out during 2008/2009 (See the Map in Annex 
6). 
Table 9  Geography of data collection process 
 
Country  Regency/City Agenda Duration  Remarks 
Global  Bonn, 
Germany 
Global dataset on disaster risk 
governance 
Jan-Dec 
2009 
Desk 
research 
Switzerland Geneva 2nd Global Platform for Disaster 
Reduction  June 2009 – participant 
observation 
June 2009 Participant 
observation  
Indonesia  Denpasar, 
Bali 
Asian Disaster Reduction Conference 
Nov. 2008 – participant observation  
Dec 2008 Participant 
observation 
1. CBDRM Conference 2008 
2. National Workshop on Risk 
Assessment February 2009 
August 
2008 
Feb 2009 
Participant 
observation 
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Indonesia  
  
10 Cities  Field data collection in 10 cities 
(Banda Aceh, Jakarta, Bandung, 
Yogyakarta, Kupang, Sikka, Ende, 
Rembang, Padang, Garut) – 
participant observation, FGDs, 
unstructured interviews, five 
conference presentations and 
document collection)  
June – 
Dec 2008; 
Feb 2009 
and March 
2010. 
Participant 
observation 
3.3 Case Study Approach  
The global scale analysis has been made possible by the availability of global scale reporting on 
DRR progress of implementation; This later encouraged the author to develop the methodology 
for institutional vulnerability analysis at the global scale. However, this needs to be 
complemented with meso and micro scale assessment for a specific country. Since the author has 
been part of the German-Indonesia Tsunami Early Warning System (GITEWS’) research group 
at the United Nations University Environment and Human Security, who is responsible for 
researching the institutional dimension of disaster risk reduction, Indonesia has been pre-selected 
since the beginning of the research.   
3.3.1 Ethnographic Research and Participant Observation 
In terms of research method, ethnography is synonymous with participant observation. According 
to Hammersley and Atkinson (2007), ethnography usually involves the “researcher participating, 
overtly and covertly, in people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what 
happens, listening to what is said, and/or asking questions through informal and formal 
interviews, collecting documents and artifacts—in fact gathering whatever data are available to 
throw light on the issues that are the emerging focus of inquiry” (p. 3). This could be 
characterized both qualitatively and quantitatively (Schensul 1999). 
Ethnographic experts often suggest that access to communities (e.g. of certain spatial localities, 
professional communities, e.g., DRR communities and communities at risk) is the key to success 
in ethnographic research (Briman 2004 and Hammersley & Atkinson 2007). This research 
benefited much from the author’s existing links and networks in Indonesia, such as the 
Indonesian Disaster Management Society and DRR-related civil society organizations, which 
were advantageous, especially during data collection.  
Table 10 Classification of Ethnographic Research 
 Involvement Detachment 
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Gold's 
classification 
Complete 
participant 
Participant-as-
observer 
Observer-as-
participant 
Complete  
observer 
Gans' 
classification 
Total 
participant 
Participant-Observer Total observer 
Source: Adapted from Briman 2004 
Table 10 above explains the flexible options for researchers to clarify their level of involvement 
in the field. Gold’s classification of the “involvement-detachment” continuum indicates that a 
researcher can act as a complete participant, either participant-as-observer or observer-as-
participant, or even exhibit full detachment as a complete observer. Gans’ classification is 
simpler as it suggests only three options, total participant, participant-observer, or total observer. 
This research falls into the participant-observer (either observer-as-participant or participant-as-
observer) category. 
3.3.2 Unstructured Interviews  
One feature of ethnography is informal and unstructured interviews. The author carried out 
several unstructured interviews with individuals engaged at the national and local levels. 
Interviews are considered important and strategic in fieldwork because they provide the 
opportunity for the researcher to ask questions not explicitly related to the research design. In 
addition, considering that the author was personally involved in the advocacy group and has 
written many articles on DRR policy in Indonesia (of which some were critical of some of the 
stakeholders) for national and local newspapers, the author viewed unstructured interviews as the 
best option for open access to many stakeholders. Therefore, in anticipating resistance during 
interviews, unstructured interviews (and at the same time informal interviews and in most cases 
informal chats) were carried out during breaks and spare time with the consent of the 
interviewees.  
3.3.3 Policy Documents as Sources of Data 
It is common and widely accepted by social science researchers that documents are sources of 
data for many different types of analysis (e.g., discourse analysis, content analysis [Briman 
2004], or policy change analysis [Marston 2004]). The documents can be personal documents, 
official documents from government and/or non-governmental organizations, private 
organizations, mass media, and the internet (Briman 2004), and can be in the form of manuals 
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and guidelines. What are defined as “documents as sources of data” are the materials that can be 
read, have not been produced specifically for the purpose of social research, and are preserved so 
that they become available and are relevant to the concerns of the social researcher (Briman 
2004:381).   
3.3.4 Multi-Stakeholder Workshops/Conferences  
Owing to the increased investment in DRR activities by international actors (e.g. INGOs and 
United Nations agencies), the author had some opportunities to participate in 
national/international and local workshops. I attended at least four district/provincial workshops, 
six national workshops, and two international conferences (i.e. Asian Disaster Reduction 
Conference in Bali in November, 2008, and 2nd Global Platform for DRR in Geneva, June, 2009), 
in which agents active on the Indonesian national level were involved, thus facilitating the 
performance of ethnographic research at the same time. In all six national 
workshops/conferences, the author was officially invited as a guest speaker and had the privilege 
of documenting and accessing the minutes and proceedings (including editing one set of 
proceedings as a means to collect data).   
 
3.4 Software for Data Analysis 
Three sets of software for quantitative approaches are used. The statistical softwares are the Excel 
Spreadsheet Statistical Function and SPSS 18th). The software helps in the research process by 
enabling analysis of the index of institutional vulnerability based on both the available global 
dataset and the newly developed global dataset on subjective measurements of institutional 
implementation of disaster reduction.  
Secondly, the software named Pajek is used (available at http://vlado.fmf.uni-
lj.si/pub/networks/pajek/). This is known as the best open-source program for Large Network 
Analysis by its users among members of International Network for Social Network Analysis 
(ISNA). This software helps the mapping of actors and institutions involved in disaster risk 
reduction at the national level in Indonesia (Chapters 6 and 7).  
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For qualitative data processing on institutions and governance of disaster reduction in Indonesia, 
Atlas-ti Version 6 is used as the main software for qualitative analysis because it is very useful 
for ethnographic research compared with other software.  
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Chapter 4. Introduction to Institutional Vulnerability Assessment  
4.1. Introduction to Overall Framework 
Since no existing framework is available to assess institutional vulnerability to disaster risks at 
the global scale, this work aims to pioneer a method for this. Chapters 4 and 5 introduce 
Institutional Vulnerability Assessment (IVA) framework. The IVA Framework suggests that 
institutional vulnerability to disaster risks depends on two factors: First, institutions either fail or 
succeed to reduce disaster risks in systematic ways. This approach measures institutional 
commitment to progress in DRR policy design and implementation according to the five HFA 
priorities (22 indicators in Table 11). Figure 5 suggests that the aggregate of the HFA priorities 
are the “specific DRR institutional index”. This will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter 4. This 
has become possible thanks to the availability of global data that was recently produced in 2008-
2009. 
Secondly, “macro-institutional quality” (Figure 5) data is derived from World Governance 
Indicators. The indicators have been annually updated during the last ten years, are used to 
measure the influence of “the governance templates” or “the enabling/disabling environment” 
where DRR policy and specific DRR governing exercises are taking place. This is based on the 
assumption that disaster risk management institutions are not isolated from the context of 
governance and general institutional quality, and hypothetically, DRR institutions are processed 
and shaped by the governance context, in which together they form “total institutional 
vulnerability” to disaster risks. However, it is true that institutions and governance also form the 
capacities and capabilities to deal with disaster risks. In order to support this hypothesis, Chapter 
5 will present the results of statistical analysis on institutional and governance quality. The used 
dataset only covers 63 selected countries, namely, those countries that voluntarily sent their 
standardized progress report to the UNISDR in 2009.  
Total institutional vulnerability consist of two factors: the specific DRR institutional based on 
the HFA concept and the macro institutional quality context. The framework (Figure 5) is further 
used to explain that disaster risk is a function of four key factors: First institutional vulnerability 
context that lead to the second: the multi-dimensional vulnerability (e.g. physical, social, 
economic, and environmental) And the third: “Outcomes of institutional quality” (i.e. 
development outcomes that are often measured by a series of development indicators such as the 
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human development and human poverty, income per-capita level, and so on); The fourth factor is 
the natural hazards components (climatological, hydrological, meteorological, and geological). 
IVA framework (Figure 5) also suggests that there are reciprocal relationships between disaster 
risks and the institutional quality outcomes (such as national GDP, human development, gender 
development index etc) and the social, economic, physical vulnerability at the other hand.  
Figure 5 Institutional Vulnerability Assessment Framework 
  
 
In this dissertation, the debates regarding the difference between institutional capacity and 
institutional resilience are not addressed, but instead a simplistic view is taken that both are the 
opposite of institutional vulnerability and could mitigate the consequences thereof. 
4.2. Data and Analytical Methods   
The remainder of Chapter 4 starting from this section demonstrates the institutional vulnerability 
assessment at the country level, mainly by using countries’ self-assessment for the Hyogo 
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Framework for Action (HFA) implementation update. The Hyogo Framework for Action 
suggests five large nexuses related to specific institutional commitments for DRR, as seen in 
Table 11. 
The dataset on institutional commitment to implement comprehensive disaster risk reduction at 
the country level is taken from self-assessment reports from 63 countries on HFA progress of 
implementation 2008-2009 available at www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/progress/reports/. 
At the end of the Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.4. page 65), Disaster risk index from the UNDP (2004) is 
used to demonstrate the correlation between disaster risk index with building codes using proxy 
from HFA Priority 4, Indicator 4th.   
The data scoring for HFA progress of implementation is on a scale from 1-5 as per the original. A 
score of 5 reflects that there has already been comprehensive institutional achievement, with the 
commitment and capacities to sustain efforts at all levels. Level 4 reflects substantial 
achievement, but with some recognized deficiencies in commitment, financial resources, or 
operational capacities. Level 3 denotes some institutional commitment and capacities to 
achieving DRR but progress is not substantial. Level 2 reflects that achievements have been made 
but are relatively small or incomplete, and while improvements are planned, the commitment and 
capacities are limited. Lastly, Level 1 indicates that achievements are minor and that there are 
few signs of planning or forward action to improve the situation.  
Figure 6 HFA Breakdown of Institutional Commitments on DRR 
 
Based on HFA Progress Indicators. 
 
Table 11 provides the key features of the institutional efforts to implement disaster risk reduction. 
It is clearly a survey format, in which every responsible actor in each country was asked to judge 
the indicators. In some countries, the practice of filling in the form (scale of 1-5) has been carried 
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out on a consensus basis and, for each indicator, the responders were asked to provide evidence 
that corresponds to the level of reported achievement.   
Table 11 Institutional Commitment for HFA Implementation 
HFA Priorities Self-evaluation Indicators  Scale 1-5 
 1: Ensure DRR 
is a national and 
a local priority 
with a strong 
institutional basis 
for 
implementation 
i. National institutional and legal frameworks for disaster risk reduction exist with 
decentralized responsibilities and capacities at all levels.  1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
ii. Dedicated and adequate resources are available to implement disaster risk reduction 
plans at all administrative levels. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
iii. Community participation and decentralization is ensured through the delegation of 
authority and resources to local levels. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
iv. A national multi-sectoral platform for disaster risk reduction is functioning. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
2: Identify, 
assess, and 
monitor disaster 
risks and enhance 
early warning. 
 
i. National and local risk assessments based on hazard data and vulnerability 
information are available and include risk assessments for key sectors. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
ii. Systems are in place to monitor, archive, and disseminate data on key hazards and 
vulnerabilities. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
iii. Early warning systems are in place for all major hazards, with outreach to 
communities. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
iv. National and local risk assessments take account of regional/trans-boundary risks, 
with a view to regional cooperation on risk reduction. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
3: Use 
knowledge, 
innovation, and 
education to 
build a culture of 
safety and 
resilience at all 
levels. 
i. Relevant information on disasters is available and accessible at all levels, to all 
stakeholders (through networks, development of information sharing systems). 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
ii. School curricula, education material, and relevant training include risk reduction 
and recovery concepts and practices. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
iii. Research methods and tools for multi-risk assessments and cost benefit analysis are 
developed and strengthened. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
iv. Countrywide public awareness strategy exists to stimulate a culture of disaster 
resilience, with outreach to urban and rural communities. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
4: Reduce the 
underlying risk 
factors 
 
i. Disaster risk reduction is an integral objective of environment-related policies and 
plans, including for land use, natural resource management, and climate change 
adaptation. 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
ii. Social development policies and plans are being implemented to reduce the 
vulnerability of populations most at risk. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
iii. Economic and productive sectoral policies and plans have been implemented to 
reduce the vulnerability of economic activities. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
iv. Planning and management of human settlements incorporate disaster risk reduction 
elements, including enforcement of building codes. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
v. Disaster risk reduction measures are integrated into post-disaster recovery and 
rehabilitation processes. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
vi. Procedures are in place to assess disaster risk impacts of all major development 
projects, especially infrastructure. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
5: Strengthen 
disaster 
preparedness for 
effective 
response at all 
levels. 
 
i. Strong policy, technical, and institutional capacities and mechanisms for disaster 
management, with a disaster risk reduction perspective, are in place. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
ii. Disaster preparedness plans and contingency plans are in place at all administrative 
levels, and regular training drills and rehearsals are held to test and develop disaster 
response programs. 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
iii. Financial reserves and contingency mechanisms are in place to enable effective 
response and recovery when required. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
iv. Procedures are in place to exchange relevant information during disasters and to 
undertake post-event reviews. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
Source: HFA Progress Indicators 
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4.3. Results of Statistical Analysis   
HFA Progress Indicators are the variables to be analyzed, using statistical software SPSS 18. The 
main statistical techniques are descriptive statistical analysis, correlation tests, and simple 
regression analysis.  In total, there are 22 indicators as variables (Table 11 and Figure 6), with 63 
cases (countries). All HFA priorities are to be read as perceived progress (or self-assessment) of 
the countries according to the authorized national agencies/responders. The analysis could clearly 
be undertaken and in principle the scope of the study is a global survey on DRR progress as 
reported voluntarily by relevant national authorities.  
Table 12 Basic Descriptive Statistics Global HFA 1-5 
HFA Priorities N Min Max Mean SD 
DRR governance and institutions (HFA 1) 63 2.00 4.75 3.35 .689
Risk assessment, information, and EWS 
(HFA 2)  
63 1.50 5.00 3.18 .807
DRR knowledge and education (HFA 3) 63 1.25 5.00 3.04 .841
Efforts to tackle underlying risk factors (HFA 
4) 
63 1.00 4.83 3.05 .767
Disaster preparedness (HFA 5) 63 1.25 5.00 3.41 .820
 
Apparently, the widest gap is in HFA Priority 4 (the lowest is 1 and the highest is 4.83), while 
substantial gaps also occur in HFA Priorities 3 and 5 (minimum 1.25 and maximum 5). 
Descriptive statistical analysis as summarized in Tables 12 and 13 shows institutional 
achievements in general, on the scale of 1-5, with the average level of achievement around level 
3, which denotes “some institutional commitment and capacities to achieving DRR but progress 
is not substantial.” Achievements have been varied across the regions and countries. OECD 
countries have been consistently above average in all five HFA priorities – the rounded-off 
figures are close to Level 4, which reflects “substantial achievement, but with some recognized 
deficiencies in commitment, financial resources, or operational capacities” (see Figure 7).  
Over all HFA priorities, OECD countries (and high-income nations such as Singapore) have 
experienced more progress. In terms of HFA Priority 1 (aggregate values of DRR-specific 
regulations, DRR financing, stakeholder participation, and existence of national DRR platforms), 
the OECD countries appear to be the highest achievers, followed by Arab states/West Asia 
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(Figure 7),26 Latin America, Central Asia/Eastern Europe, Africa, and Indian Ocean/South Asian 
states. Even though high variation occurs in Africa, Latin America, and Indian Ocean/South 
Asian states, these are the worst performers in terms of HFA 1 implementation (see Table 13). In 
the African country group, Swaziland is the bottom outlier (Figure 7). 
Table 13 Sample Size by Regions and missing values  
Regional 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N % N % N Percent 
Indian Ocean - S. E. Asia 8 100.0% 0 .0% 8 100.0% 
OECD/High Income Countries 15 100.0% 0 .0% 15 100.0% 
African Countries 17 100.0% 0 .0% 17 100.0% 
Central Asia + Eastern Europe 9 100.0% 0 .0% 9 100.0% 
Latin America 11 100.0% 0 .0% 11 100.0% 
Arab States + West Asia 3 100.0% 0 .0% 3 100.0% 
Note: N = number of countries (total 63); no missing values. 
In terms of HFA Priority 2 (aggregate values for risk assessment, risk information, and early 
warning system), some countries in Latin America like Dominican Republic stayed at the bottom. 
Rich countries including OECD countries still enjoy the highest average with the least variation, 
while Singapore stays on the top as an outlier (5 on the scale of 1-5) and Sweden is the bottom 
outlier of the group (still above 3 on the scale of 1-5). Indian Ocean/South Asian states, Africa, 
and Latin America exhibit more or less the same variation with different mean values (see Figure 
7). For Arab states/West Asia, HFA Priority 2 is the least well achieved.  
Figure 7 Box Plot HFA Priorities between Regions 
 
                                               
26 See Table 13. This is a representative problem for Arab states. The data for 2009 needs more improvement for 
2011. 
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In terms of the average value for HFA Priority 3 (DRR integration in education curriculum, 
public awareness, risk information sharing, etc.) Africa achieved the lowest, as a few of its states 
reach the bottom level, followed by the Arab states and the Latin America and Indian Ocean 
groups. In the African group, Sierra Leone serves as a top outlier but overall it still remains below 
most of the OECD states. OECD countries are in a better position than the rest of the world. Even 
their lowest spike is still higher than the highest level of Indian Ocean and African states. The 
highest variation is in the Arab states/West Asia, followed by Africa. Overall frequency 
distribution can be seen in Figure 7 where the SPSS 18 histogram frequency distributions are 
based on average values of each HFA priority (Figure 8).   
HFA Priority 4 is the least well-achieved sector in the OECD group. This is indeed a surprise as 
in general, people tend to think that the OECD countries have paid enough attention to aspects 
such as mitigation.  However, the OECD group still shows better results than the rest of the 
regional groups in the HFA Priority 4.  
The same can be said for HFA 5, as OECD countries tend to see themselves as more prepared 
than the rest of the regions, such as Indian Ocean states, African states, and Latin America. In 
Central Asia/Eastern Europe, Bulgaria and Uzbekistan serve as the outliers of the group. The 
benefits of showing the outliers are many as will be presented in the rest of the chapters. The 
outliers (either top or bottom) might have overestimated/underestimated their level of progress in 
disaster reduction policy therefore they trigger curiosity and further investigation.  
On average, both HFA Priority 3 and HFA Priority 4 are the areas where the least progress occurs 
(Table 12). The bottom outliers (Figure 9) such as Dominican Republic (1:3 and 1:4) together 
with Kazakhstan (Figure 9, HFA 1:4) and Senegal (HFA 1:3) probably exhibit additional factors 
that may cause Priority 3 and 4 values to be the worst overall. The descriptive analysis in Tables 
12 and 13 suggests that many countries view themselves as being better off in terms of disaster 
preparedness and emergency response (i.e. HFA Priority 5) but still fail to invest in knowledge 
and public education of DRR, as well as still showing limited efforts in mitigation policy and 
other root causes (HFA Priority 4). 
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Figure 8 Histogram Frequency Distribution for HFA 1-5 
 
 
There is strong correlation between investment in DRR regulations/institutions (HFA Priority 1) 
and the activities in HFA Priority 2 (risk assessment, risk information, and early warning system) 
with a correlation value R = 0.68 (at 0.01 significance, two-tailed). Even stronger correlation 
occurs between investment in HFA Priorities 1:3, 1:4, and 1:5 (0.72, 0.67, and 0.79, 
respectively).  
Figure 9 demonstrates that investment in institutions (disaster management laws and regulations, 
including governance, i.e., stakeholder participation, a national platform, etc., including 
institutional commitment to HFA Priority 1) eventually associates with the implementation of 
HFA 2-5. For example, Japan’s disaster preparedness sits well on the regression line. Lao PDR’s 
low investment in DRR governance/institutions has resulted in a low (the lowest among all the 
countries above) preparedness level, accompanied by those of Swaziland and Nepal. Indonesia’s 
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moderate level of DRR governance also correlates with the level of preparedness. However, 
exceptions occur, such as Italy (as an outlier in the HFA 5:1 scatter plot above) as a country that 
might be helped by the long-term existence of a civil protection agency responsible for disaster 
preparedness and civil emergencies.27 
Figure 9 Scatter Plot Analyses HFA 1 vs. HVA2-5 
 
 
                                               
27 The Italian Civil Protection Service is based on the Law No.  225 of February 24th, 1992 Please consult: 
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/8480_Italy%5B1%5D.pdf. See also English version of the system at 
http://www.protezionecivile.it/cms/attach/brochuredpc_eng2.pdf. Accessed on 10 Oct 2010. 
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The scatter plot for HFA 4 – HFA 1 (Figure 9 above-right) shows an interesting point. Most 
OECD countries are divided into two groups. Switzerland, United Kingdom, Australia, New 
Zealand, and others are located above the regression line, which claim stronger DRR 
governance/institutions consistent with their institutional commitment to reducing the root causes 
of disaster risks (HFA 4). On the other hand, below the regression line, Germany and Singapore28 
seem to invest less in HFA 4 despite their reportedly high DRR regulatory system. Clearly, there 
are exceptions, as seen from the bottom outliers, for instance, Kazakhstan, which claims to have 
very good disaster management regulation but the investment in HFA Priority 4-related activities 
is very low. Less extreme examples are Panama, Senegal, and the Philippines, with DRR 
regulatory conditions that are moderate but with very low investment in DRR education.  
Figure 10 Selected Scatter Plot Analysis for HFA Priority 1 
 
4.3.1. Selected Statistical Results for HFA 1 
The scatter plot in Figure 10 presents selected plotted variables. At the left, the plot serves as a 
good model to show that the likelihood of creating a DRR platform depends on the level of DRR 
stakeholder participation in countries. Singapore, Lao PDR, and Malawi are the bottom outliers. 
Singapore tends to neglect the need for a DRR platform while claiming its high stakeholder 
participation in DRR. Swaziland is consistent and fits to the model (95% confidence) as the 
country’s low public participation in DRR is strongly associated with the absence of DRR 
platform at the national level.  
                                               
28 Not an OECD country but included in the group as a high income country.  
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Lao PDR is a consistent bottom outlier in both models in Figure 10. It claims to have moderate 
participation; however, no platform emerges at the national level. Therefore, it seems to suggest 
that the existence of DRR platform (for multi-stakeholders engagement) has no association with 
community participation and vice versa because the former can be a top down arrangement. 
 
4.3.2. Selected Statistical Results for HFA 2 
An approach similar to that followed in Section 4.3.1 is now used in this section. The HFA 
Priority 1 serves as the “strong basis for implementation” of HFA 2-5 (see Chapter 3.1 Research 
Framework). Apart from giving a good correlation (significant at the 0.05 level), the plot in 
Figure 11 can serve as a model to predict the level of countries’ commitment to risk assessment 
(left) and the insistence of having an effective early warning system for multiple hazards (right) 
based on the composite indicator of HFA Priority 1.  
Figure 11 Selected Scatter Plot Analysis for HFA Priority 2 
 
The bottom outliers are Zambia, Kenya, and Bulgaria (left), as well as Bolivia and Panama 
(right). The results for these countries (except Bolivia) suggest that having a good level of 
investment in HFA 1 does not necessarily make a country willing to invest in risk assessment. 
Kenya is one example as it suggests that the country has managed substantial achievements (level 
4 on a scale of 1-5) for all indicators in HFA Priority 1, but it failed to invest in risk assessment. 
It also failed to invest in risk information although this is somewhat of an anomaly as it later 
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claims to have a good effective early warning system (Figure 11 right).29 For the feature that 
“Systems are in place to monitor, archive, and disseminate data on key hazards and 
vulnerabilities” (HFA 2.2), the level of progress is 1, which means that there has been “Minor 
progress with few signs of forward action in plans or policy.”30 This, however, is contradicted by 
Kenya claiming to have a perfect early warning system (5 on the scale of 1-5), but with neither 
hazard information/monitoring nor risk assessment. Italy serves as an outlier in Figure 11 (right) 
as it is indicated as having low investment in DRR governance and institutions but the country is 
stated to already have an effective early warning system (5 on a scale of 1-5).                                                                            
4.3.3. Selected Statistical Results for HFA 3 
HFA Priority 3 is about the use of “knowledge, innovation, and education to build a culture of 
safety and resilience at all levels”, which comprises four main aspects that can be summarized as 
follows: risk information sharing, integration of DRR into curriculum/education, development of 
multirisk assessment and cost benefit analysis, and public awareness, which are hereafter defined 
as HFA 3.1, HFA 3.2, HFA 3.3, and HFA 3.4, respectively.  
Figure 12 Selected Box Plot Analysis for HFA Priority 3 
                                                       
 
Overall, on the basis of Figure 12 and Table 14, HFA Priority 3.3 (research and development on 
multi-risk assessment and cost benefit analysis) is the variable that has been achieved the least.  
Both risk information sharing and public awareness are better than the other indicators. Yemen 
                                               
29 Please find the discussion on the scoring on the progress of HFA implementation at Section 7.7.1. Discrepancy 
between expert knowledge and non-expert knowledge on the scoring system will be discussed from the context of 
Indonesia.  
30 See the report at http://www.preventionweb.net/files/7432_finalkenya.pdf [last accessed 7 July 2010]. 
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and Ivory Coast are the bottom outliers for HFA 3.1 while Senegal, Swaziland, Ivory Coast, and 
Dominican Republic are the bottom outliers for public awareness (HFA 3.4).  
Table 14 Descriptive Statistics HFA 3 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Risk info sharing 3.29 .906 63 
DRR curriculum 3.02 1.024 63 
Multirisk & CBA 2.70 1.102 63 
Public awareness 3.14 .981 63 
Correlations tests 
 Risk info sharing 
DRR 
curriculum 
Multirisk & 
CBA 
Public 
awareness 
DRR governance 
and institutions 
(HFA 1) 
Pearson Correlation .708** .483** .647** .586** 
Sig. (two-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 63 63 63 63 
Note. ** Significant at 0.01 (two-tailed). 
 
Figure 13 Selected Scatter Plot Analysis for HFA Priority 3 
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Kenya and Burkina Faso are the countries where there has been substantial achievement in 
formal DRR regulations (HFA 1) but clearly investment in research and development for multi-
risk and CBA analysis has been close to non-existent (level 1 on a scale of 1-5). For Kenya, it 
was also noted that the achievements in DRR regulations have not been accompanied by good 
risk information sharing, and there has been no integration of DRR into the local curriculum. On 
the other hand, Ecuador is a top outlier as it has a poor disaster management policy; however, its 
investment in DRR education seems to be substantial. The remaining countries are arranged in 
the model within the 95% confidence interval, as shown in Figure 13. 
Figure 14 Selected Scatter Plot Analysis for HFA Priority 4 
 
 
4.3.4. Selected Statistical Results for HFA 4 
Figure 14 (right) presents a slightly different style of comparison to the analyses above. Disaster 
risk index (DRI) and HFA 4.4 (indicator for building codes and the existence of risk-sensitive 
settlement planning) exhibit a negative correlation, which means that an increase in one variable 
may eventually cause a reduction in the other variable. This seems to suggest that investment in 
general in HFA 4.4 “pays off” at lower DRI. There are the exceptions of Sweden and Syria. 
Sweden is a country with a very low DRI; however, its “success” in having a low risk must be 
due to a factor other than HFA 4.4 – such as the exposure factor or other institutional variable (as 
will be discussed in Chapter 5). The same explanatory exercise also applies to Syria, in which 
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there is poor DRR policy and regulation but low risks; this must be due to some factor related to 
the level of exposure but it is likely not because of an absence of institutional vulnerability. 
However, in general, the correlation in this figure seems to be low. Iran for example exhibits a 
high level of adoption for both DRR regulation and building codes (Figure 14 left), but the 
outcomes of these regulations/codes seem to have a low correlation, as seen for example by its 
level of disaster risk index.  Mozambique claims to have a good level of building codes and 
settlement policy as well as moderate DRR policy and regulation; however, its disaster risk index 
is the highest in the scatter plot.  
The left panel of Figure 14 shows some interesting phenomena. The outliers clearly indicate that 
the claims to have good DRR regulations/institutions (HFA 1), such as in the cases of Malawi, 
Kenya, and Kazakhstan, do not necessarily imply the vision to have good building codes. The 
same can be said for earthquake-prone countries, such as the Philippines, for which substantial 
achievement in DRR regulation was claimed, but with a failure to invest in HFA 4.4 and its 
outcomes being highlighted by the very high disaster risk index.  
 
4.3.5. Selected Statistical Results for HFA 5 
The absence of a national contingency plan may have nothing to do with DRR regulation. 
Personal observation from Indonesia shows that, occasionally, non-state actors (NGOs, CSOs, 
and the UN) facilitate processes at the national and selected local levels related to contingency 
planning in cases where there are no disaster management laws or other similar legislation. This 
is the case for Zambia and Mozambique (the top outliers). Interestingly, for Indonesia, the 
opposite seems to have occurred (the only bottom outlier in Figure 15 left), where moderate 
achievement in HFA Priority 1 has not necessarily led to the establishment of a national 
emergency contingency plan, as reported in 2009.31  
The results in Figure 15 (right) are counterintuitive because past experience suggests that 
countries tend to emerge from having emergency-oriented or reactive emergency-oriented policy 
(including enforcement) towards a prevention- and mitigation-oriented DRR policy (See Petak 
1985, see also long debate in Perry  and Quarantelli 2005 and Quarantelli 1998) as stipulated in 
                                               
31 Another reason can be that, in the reported period, transitions took place and such activity had not yet been carried 
out. See also Indonesian Report 2009 to the UNISDR. 
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HFA Priority 1. Therefore, HFA Priority 1 can be a dependent variable (Y) while emergency 
policy can become an independent variable. 
 
Figure 15 Selected Scatter Plot Analysis for HFA Priority 5 
 
It is particularly interesting to see that, for all the countries claiming to have moderate emergency 
policy (level 3 on a scale of 1-5), there is substantial variability in terms of HFA 1 
implementation. Swaziland, Dominican Republic, Cambodia, Ecuador, and Sri Lanka invest 
more in emergency policy than in strong DRR regulation and policy (HFA 1). More contradictory 
results are shown for Serbia, Peru, Ghana, and Mozambique, as well as Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic, for which very high results for emergency response accompany low results for HFA 1. 
Nevertheless, Figure 15 still demonstrates the general relationship between HFA 1 
implementation and HFA 5 implementation (for both contingency planning and emergency 
policy). 
4.4. Discussion   
All the selected scatter plots (HFA 1:2 to HFA 1:5)   can be used to explain that HFA 1 can 
reflect the institutionalization of disaster reduction through a specific DRR regulatory framework, 
which eventually enables countries to progress to having comprehensive disaster risk 
management.  Most of the models indicate that the investment in HFA Priority 1 (composed of 
indicators for DRR regulation, financing, and participation in DRR) is likely to trigger better 
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planning, risk assessment, early warning system, integration of DRR education, and disaster 
preparedness.  
Figure 16 Frequency Level and HFA 22 Indicator Average (N=63) 
 
Note: See also a similar figure with N=6032  
It is very simplistic to claim that DRR investment in any given country should have clear policy 
and regulation which enable the country to create enabling conditions, such as by creating a 
specialized organization to take leadership in managing disaster risks. The policy and regulation 
later enable the country to allocate financial resources to fund disaster risk reduction activities. 
Since disaster risks are too broad and versatile to be tackled by the government alone, stakeholder 
participation is imperative, which together with the government works in a polycentric way (as 
broad as the HFA 22 indicators of progress).  
It appears that, overall, significant progress has been achieved in HFA 1.1 i.e. (national policy 
and legal framework for disaster risk reduction) and HFA 5 (disaster preparedness and response, 
mainly HFA 5.1 and HFA 5.2) (see average value in Figure 16). It is also interesting to see that 
HFA priorities have served as driving forces to create national platforms for DRR (HFA 1.4) and 
this achievement is similar to the achievement of HFA 5.4 (post-disaster risk assessment) with an 
average value of 3.4 on a scale of 1-5. 
                                               
32 See GAR 2009, Chapter 5, Page 120. The mean or average value for each variable is different owing to size 
differences. See http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/report/documents/GAR_Chapter_5_2009_eng.pdf 
[last accessed 10 July 2010]. 
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However, the investigation above mainly focuses on the roles of the existence of formal 
institutions (e.g. DRM laws). In fact, not all DRM laws are seen by the member states as 
sufficiently effective. Ghana claims that its status for HFA 1.1 is level 4, while at the same time 
explaining that Act 517 - 1996 regarding the National Disaster Management Organization 
(NADMO), which is responsible for DRR at all levels of government, has shortcomings because 
the act impedes the inclusion of other vital stakeholders in DRR activities.33 
In Sri Lanka, the Disaster Management Act enacted in 2005, which was claimed to have been 
achieved through a high level of participation34, is now being challenged and reviewed owing to 
some deficiencies alongside arguments that the powers vested in the Disaster Management 
Agency are insufficient to implement DRR policies. The Philippines admitted divergence from 
DRM regulation enacted in 1978 and recently succeeded in ratifying a new DRM Act in June, 
2010.  
Abundant evidence reported by the member states shows that, for the progress of HFA 
implementation, especially in many developing countries, DRR policy reform does not occur in 
isolation. For instance, Turkey benefits from the support of international actors (both state and 
non-state actors) as its representatives accept that multi-stakeholder participation (including key 
organizations, academia, and local administrations) is a key factor in risk and vulnerability 
mapping as well as data collection at the national level35.   
4.4.1. Conclusion  
The HFA progress reports provide some evidence of risk governance, but not all the countries 
share real processes on the ground, apart from the specific DRR governance-related indicators. 
For instance, the Philippines and many African states clearly mention the role of international 
actors (INGOs and donors) that are involved on the ground (see evidence for Indonesia in 
Chapters 6 and 7).  
                                               
33 See the detail report from Ghana at http://www.preventionweb.net/files/7431_finalghana.pdf.  Last access on 20 
Feb 2010.  
34 Please consult all the minutes of meeting between all the stakeholders prior to the endorsement of the Act 2005. 
Apparently, the actors are a mixture of governments, donors, academia, and other stakeholders.  
www.srilankanparliamentonnaturaldisasters.org [last accessed Jan 2010]. 
35 Please consult http://www.preventionweb.net/files/7460_Turkey.pdf [last accessed 20 August 2010]. 
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An interesting case for disaster risk management practice is from Central America, especially the 
Flood Early Warning System (FEWS) after Hurricanes Mitch and George in 1998, where some 
organizations have continued to support FEWS up to the present. There have been at least 80 
registered FEWS units, of which 50% are in operation; of these, 84% are operated with the 
support of NGOs/INGOs, 12% are managed by the Meteorological Office, and the rest are run by 
private organizations. Gonzales noted that 85% of the FEWS in operation lack information on 
hydrology (Pablo Gonzales 2010).36 Gonzales continued in stating that, in the Americas, there are 
institutional challenges: Firstly, there is a lack of public policy, strategies, and guidelines (HFA 
Priority 1.1). There is also a lack of hydrological studies and low coverage in small valleys, 
namely, observation and monitoring networks designed for different purposes such as monitoring 
hydropower and irrigation (HFA Priority 3, HFA Priority 2). There is a lack of coordination 
amongst NGOs, which hampers the replication and the optimization of information (HFA Priority 
1.3). Furthermore, there are physical and geo-political challenges: a predominance of flash-floods 
with short concentration times and transboundary basins (HFA 4). Sustainability relies mainly on 
international financial aid (HFA 1.2) and there is overlap of competencies in operating the 
different components, such as contingency planning and preparedness (HFA Priority 5). Finally, 
there is a limitation on the use of high technologies (HFA Priorities 2 and 3).  
Measurement of institutional vulnerability for the HFA implementation progress can be 
undertaken with some adjustment. Overall tests of the scatter plots of HFA progress of 
implementation from the 63 countries in this chapter strongly demonstrate the following features 
of the Hyogo Framework for Action: that institutions and governance (including disaster risk 
management laws/acts/policy/regulation (HFA Priority 1) are the basis for risk assessment and 
risk information (HFA Priority 2);  DRR education (HFA Priority 3); multi-sector vulnerability 
reduction (the underlying root causes – HFA Priority 4); and, finally, emergency management 
policy and practice (HFA Priority 5). 
The quality of data entry appears to be a problem in some countries. Some countries appear to be 
inconsistent. Kenya, for instance, judged its level of progress in HFA 1.1 at level 4. However, it 
                                               
36 Pablo Gonzales 2010 “Community-centered Flood Early Warning Systems: the Central American Experience.” 
Davos GFR IDRC 2010.  PowerPoint Presentation, via personal contact (email). The author was also able to visit 
Jamaica from 26 April – 4 May 2010. Jamaica is one of the knowledge hubs for DRR knowledge in the Caribbean. 
Based on personal interviews with the key person at the Centre for Disaster Risk Reduction, University of East 
Indies and DRR stakeholders in Jamaica It was clear that the willingness of the governments within the region to 
invest in DRR is very low.  
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was found that it has just referred to a recent delivery of the Disaster Management Policy to the 
cabinet office. This causes Kenya to often appear as a bottom outlier in many regression models 
as presented above. This is clearly a technical problem in which the quality of self-evaluation 
should also be advanced by proper training.  
Malawi is another example of inconsistency in results as it judged its HFA 1.1 at level 4 
(substantial achievement); however, its representatives stated that it does not have a DRM policy 
as it is just about to enter the processes of formulation. Its recent works in DRR are clearly based 
on an ad hoc organization (Malawi Report on HFA Progress 2009). Malawi is not alone, but it is 
crucial that any country that has passed new laws on DRM must also prove its level of 
enforcement at different levels to give a balanced overview on the actual level of progress.  
Iran is a country that claims to be excellent (Figure 17). This is noteworthy, even though it is not 
an outlier in statistical terms (based on 95% confidence interval as seen in Figure 14). Iran views 
its progress as comparable only to that of UK (in the cases of HFA Priorities 1 and 5), 
Switzerland (HFA Priorities 1 and 4), and Singapore (HFA 1 and 3). In terms of progress in HFA 
2 (risk assessment and early warning system), Iran is placed at the same level as the majority of 
OECD countries, such as Japan, United States, Norway, Australia, and South Korea. Iran will 
receive special attention in Chapter 5, especially in terms of how the DRR regulatory quality 
(HFA Implementation) is dependent on/independent from the regulatory quality and institutional 
quality context. 
While countries provide technical reasons for perceived progress, besides the old reasoning that 
every context is unique, there are things need to be improved. It therefore requires effort to 
improve the way that countries evaluate their progress to fill the gap between perceived progress 
and the reality of implementation. However, it is argued that, although such a gap can be reduced, 
it is impossible to completely eliminate it.  Continued reporting for the next couple of years is 
suggested, while also encouraging more countries to voluntarily issue regular report. 
Owing to the scale of analysis, there is a triangulation (or cross-examination) problem for in 
depth validation of the findings. Apart from the qualitative explanations and indicators given in 
the reports, extensive investigation of countries’ DRR policies is very time-consuming.  
However, in the next chapter, a challenge is made to the claims of the countries given the 
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“objective” realities of governance in the broader sense, the volatility of institutional quality, and 
other factors, which arguably play roles to disable or enable DRR implementation. 
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Chapter 5 Institutions and Governance Assessment  
5.1. Introduction  
The IVA framework defines institutional vulnerability to disaster risk as “both the context and 
the process where formal institutions (regulation, rule of laws, constitutions, codes, bureaucracy 
etc.) and informal institutions (culture, norms, traditions, religion) are either too weak to provide 
protections against disaster risks or ignorant of their duty to provide safety and human security. 
This suggests that countries and states would fail to reduce risks due to institutional factors 
modifying their vulnerabilities” (taken from Chapter 2). 
This chapter shares the same IVA framework as Chapter 4 (see Figure 5) by explaining the 
governance context where the DRR policies and practices (in Chapter 4) have been exercised.   
5.2. Data Source 
This research specifically uses 63 selected countries from the 202, for which data (longitudinal 
observations) from the World Governance Indicators (www.govindicators.org or 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp or). The number of 63 is the same as the 
countries that voluntarily sent their subjective measurements in the standardized format to the 
UNISDR in 2009 (see Table 15 for details).  
Table 15 Source of Governance Data 
Assessment Indicators  Source of Data 
1. Institutional commitments on DRR 
based on HFA Progress Report 
 See Chapter 4 
Spreadsheet generated from global reports on HFA 
implementation – 63 countries using data from 2009.  
2. World Wide Governance indicators 
 Voice and Accountability 
 Political Stability   
 Government Effectiveness.  
 Regulatory Quality  
 Rule of Law  
 Control of Corruption 
Global dataset from World Governance indicators – 
World Bank – using data from 2008. 
www.govindicators.org 
and  
http://www.worldbank.org/kam   
Note: Definitions are provided in Box 1. 
3. Disaster risk index Peduzzi´s (2009) supplemental data are available at the 
permanent link http://www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-
sci.net/9/1149/2009/nhess-9-1149-2009-supplement.pdf) 
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Box 1 Working Definition of Selected World Governance Indicators 
 
Voice and Accountability measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.  
Political Stability, 2007 This index combines several indicators that measure perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional means and/or violent means 
including domestic violence and terrorism. This index captures the idea that the quality of governance in a country is 
compromised by the likelihood of wrenching changes in government, which not only have a direct effect on the 
continuity of policies, but also at a deeper level undermine the ability of the citizens to peacefully select and replace 
those in power. 
Government Effectiveness measures the quality of public services, bureaucracy, and the quality of the civil 
service, as well as the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.  
Regulatory Quality measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development.  
Rule of Law measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
Control of Corruption measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.  
Source: World Governance Indicators and KAM Database. 
 
 
 Table 16 Source of Data 
 Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of 
Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Political 
Stability 
Control of 
Corruption 
N Valid 63 63 63 63 63
Missing 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 4.6 4.5 4.6 4.9 4.5 4.5
Std. Deviation 2.88 2.91 2.87 2.73 2.89 2.85
Minimum .34 .14 .27 .3 .07 .41
Maximum 9.8 10.0 10.0 9.9 9.8 9.8
 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Descriptive Analysis 
All the governance indicators in Table 16 are based on standardized values from 0-10. The HFA-
related indicators still use the range of 1-5. The cases number 63 in total with no missing values. 
The mean of the variables varies between 4.5 and 4.9. The maximum standardized value is 10 
and the minimum is greater than 0. 
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Figure 17 shows a gross discrepancy between overall DRR quality (policy and practice measured 
by HFA implementation progress) and institutional quality in general. Iran is ranked as the 
highest performer based on self-evaluation by its DRR authority. Of the top 20 countries, 
apparently Iran, Uzbekistan, Sierra Leone, and Madagascar represent developing countries. 
Interestingly these four countries are also ranked very low in terms of average institutional 
quality index (composite of rule of law, regulatory quality, voice and accountability, corruption 
control, government effectiveness, and political stability). Therefore, there are big discrepancies 
between specific DRR regulatory quality/practice and the reality of institutional quality in almost 
all non-OECD countries. Only a few non-OECD countries such as Swaziland, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Sri Lanka, and Senegal have been relatively consistent in the two categories. 
Furthermore, in terms of developing countries, only Mauritius and Dominican Republic have 
rated institutional quality higher than DRR-specific governance and institutions.  
Figure 17 Average Perceived HFA Implementation vs. Institutional Quality (N=63) 
 
  
Figure 18 below provides the frequency distribution of selected governance indicators, which 
shows the variability of all six selected variables; not one is exactly the same as another variable. 
Apparently positive skewness (asymmetry of the frequency distribution) can be seen for the rule 
of law variable (Figure 18 top-middle) and government effectiveness (Figure 18 top-right). 
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However, qualitatively, this can be neglected because the discrepancy of mean-median is 
relatively low.  
 
Figure 18 Frequency distribution of governance indicators 
 
 
Table 17 Pearson Correlation Test (N = 63 Countries) 
Correlation tests 
G1 
Regulatory 
Quality 
G2 Rule of 
Law 
G3 
Government 
Effectiveness 
G4 
Voice and 
Accountability 
G5 
Political 
Stability 
G6  
Control of 
Corruption 
HFA 
1*** 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.562** .561** .596** .483** .509** .534** 
Sig. (two-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
DRI 
(Disaster 
risk 
index) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.280* -.296* -.269* -.184 -.374** -.277* 
Sig. (two-
tailed) 
.026 .019 .033 .150 .002 .028 
**, Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). *, Correlation is significant at the 
0.05 level (two-tailed). ***, Value is based on the average rate of HFA Priority 1 
78 
 
5.3.2. Selected Correlation Tests  
The results of Pearson correlation test in Table 17 suggest that there is a significant correlation 
between HFA Priority 1 and countries’ regulatory quality (R=0.562, at 0.01 significance) and, 
apparently, there is a strong association between DRR governance and government effectiveness 
(0.596, significant at 0.01). The correlations between DRR governance and rule of law, control of 
corruption, and voice and accountability are 0.561, 0.534, and 0.483, respectively, all of which 
are significant at 0.01.   
The disaster risk index (DRI) is based on an index calculated using standardized mortality rate 
due to natural hazards measured on an annual basis per 1 million people. The reason for using 
DRI is because, globally, DRI is based on the natural hazard-based mortality and the data are 
considered to be the most reliable data on the global scale (Peduzzi et al. 2009). 
For all the tests between DRI and the selected governance indicators, there is a negative 
correlation, which suggests a significant association between good governance and disaster risk 
index. An increase in good governance is associated with a reduction in disaster risk. This test 
gives “the magic value” of 0.05 significant for all selected variables. DRI is even more sensitive 
to political stability (correlation -0.37 with significance at 0.01).   
5.4. Volatility in Governance  
Before showing the results of simple regression test with disaster risk reduction indicators, the 
notion of volatility in governance is briefly dealt with in this section. This concept is important 
because disaster risk reduction will be difficult to achieve when volatility in governance prevails, 
which may in fact increase multi-dimensional vulnerability and disaster risks. 
The Philippines is an example where governance quality has been markedly reduced during the 
last decade. The Philippines government’s level of effectiveness has remained at a moderate level 
but it still suffers much from a lack of control of corruption, high political instability, and low 
regulatory quality. Its rule of law has been volatile while voice and accountability show a 
negative trend (see Figure 19). In this context, especially during its present disaster risk 
management reform and after the endorsement of the 2010 Disaster Management Act, 37 how can 
                                               
37 See the information at http://ndcc.gov.ph/home/index.php [last accessed 10 June 2010]. 
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HFA implementation be independent of the larger context of governance and institutional 
quality? The rest of Section 5.4 will demonstrate this concern.  
Figure 19 Selected Cases of Volatility in Governance Indicators  
 
A more promising trend can be seen in Ghana. However, China still suffers from a lack of voice 
and accountability. Jamaica has been volatile in terms of control of corruption, which shows a 
negative trend. Meanwhile, Sweden and Japan are relatively well off and enjoy high stability in 
all governance indicators.  
5.4.1. Government Effectiveness and Disaster Risk Reduction  
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido (2009) explained that the primary focus of the “government 
effectiveness” index is the relevant inputs essential for a government to generate and implement 
good policies. They called it “government effectiveness”, comprising the perception of public 
service provision, the quality of bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, and the 
independence of the civil service from political process, as well as the government’s commitment 
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to policies. In this case, the index is used as a proxy for how governments generate and 
implement disaster reduction policy, which received a great deal of emphasis in the Hyogo 
Framework for Action 2005.  
There is a strong correlation between government effectiveness and the level of DRR 
regulation/policy (r=0.596), which is significant at the level of 0.01. However, in reality, for any 
good policy on DRR, the government must play a central role in the enforcement of DRR-related 
regulation. While enforcement is related to the rule of law, success should be determined by the 
quality of bureaucracy and the quality of government delivery of basic social services, which in 
this section is termed government effectiveness.  
Figure 20 Government Effectiveness Plots 
 
If Iran claims a perfect match between investment in DRR policy and DRR governance, as 
described in Chapter 4 (e.g. Figure 14), then Iran can be described as an outlier in this section as 
it claims to have excellent policy on DRR; however, on the basis of both exercises above (Figure 
20), it is likely that, owing to low government effectiveness (including bureaucracy), it is able to 
enforce neither building codes and all HFA 4.4-related regulation and practice nor DRR 
regulation in general (HFA 1).  The plots above suggest that, given the low level of government 
effectiveness, the real-world implementation of DRR in Iran (and also Kazakhstan) is very likely 
to be low. 
Apart from the outliers, it is also apparent that a number of countries, such as Sierra Leone, 
Kenya, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan, as well as Angola, Bangladesh, and Mozambique, need not 
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only reform their disaster risk management policy but also reform the way in which the 
government provides basic services, which should include bureaucracy reform. The plots above 
suggest that, without the latter, the former is very likely to involve a serious challenge.  
Figure 21 Government Effectiveness Overtime 
 
Note. The data is based on the views on governance of survey respondents and public, private, and NGO 
sector experts worldwide. For more information please consult Kaufmann et. al. (2010) 
 
Figure 22 Distribution of Government Effectiveness 
 
 90-100 Percentile  75-90 Percentile  50-75 Percentile  25-50 Percentile  10-25 Percentile  0-10 Percentile 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido (2009) 
Figure 21 suggests that government effectiveness in some parts of the world is not stable. While 
DRR sectors under the driving force of the Hyogo Framework for Action appear to be moving 
across the globe, the government effectiveness data show that quality in government services is 
highly volatile in some regions of the world, while in some regions (the green areas in the maps 
in Fig. 22) it exhibits relative stability. Russia, for instance, was perceived as moderate in 2003 
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but in 2008 its level returned to that of 1996. The same can be said for Indonesia, China, and 
certain Latin American states (see also Figure 22).  
 
5.4.2. Corruption and Disaster Risk Reduction  
Conventional understanding suggests that corruption challenges governments not only by 
depleting development resources, which in the end leads to poor development outcomes, but also 
by increasing vulnerability to disaster risks.38 The correlation test above clearly shows that there 
is a correlation between disaster risk index and the control of corruption. A negative correlation (r 
= -.277 with confidence at 0.05%) indicates that an increase in the level of corruption control is 
associated with a decrease in disaster risk and vice versa (Table 17, see also Figure 23). 
The overall institutional commitment to tackling underlying risk factors (HFA Priority 4) face 
real challenge including corruption. Figure 23 indicates that there is a significant correlation 
between corruption control and HFA 4 implementation (r = .415, significant at 0.01). 
Furthermore, results from Figure 23 below show that the greater the level of corruption control, 
the higher the quality in HFA 4 sectors (DRR through building code enforcement, risk-sensitive 
settlement planning including reduction in social-economic vulnerability, etc.).  
The good news from the map (Fig. 24) is that some countries have managed to move from a state 
of high-level corruption to one of low-level corruption (indicated by an increase in corruption 
control). On the other hand, the bad news is that some countries could not manage to reduce 
corruption, as seen in Central Asia, Russia, and some African countries. 
                                               
38 See the views of James Lewis in Global Corruption Report 2005 p. 23.  
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Figure 23 Plot of Corruption and HFA 4 
 
Figure 24 Control of Corruption Global Map 
 
 90-100 Percentile  75-90 Percentile  50-75 Percentile  25-50 Percentile  10-25 Percentile  0-10 Percentile 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido (2009) 
  
5.4.3. Rule of Law and Disaster Risk Reduction  
Rule of law is a very strong proxy indicator of the level of policy and legal enforcement because 
it relates to the quality of legal enforcement, the police, and the courts, among others. The plots 
below are based on rule of law standardized index of selected countries relative to the level of 
HFA priority 1 (i.e. DRR governance and institutions) as well as specifically HFA 1.1 (DRR 
Regulations). Apart from the outliers, Figure 25 (right) shows clearly that countries such as 
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Tajikistan, Venezuela, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Colombia, along with many others, experience 
a serious lack of law enforcement. This brings a clear message that the achievement of legal 
formal laws/regulation of disaster risk management is one thing. However, the enforcement of 
DRR laws/regulation is quite another. Impediments to law enforcement including DRR 
laws/regulations are often influenced by the quality of the rule of law. 
 
Figure 25 Plot Rule of Law vs. DRR Regulations 
 
5.4.4. Voice and Accountability and Disaster Risk Reduction  
The plot below (Fig. 26 right) is very insightful as it suggests that the overall trend of public 
participation in a country (coded by WGI as voice and accountability) strongly associated with 
the level of stakeholder participation in DRR sectors.  
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Figure 26 Plot Voice and Accountability vs. DRR Governance 
 
 
Singapore is known to many as an undemocractic country where press freedom is low. However, 
the claim of its representatives that DRR sectors encourage stakeholder participation needs 
further investigation in order to determine how it becomes isolated from the macro setting where 
institutions tend to constrain press freedom and freedom of expression. The same can be said for 
Iran and Central Asia (Fig. 26 left and right). The plots suggest that improvement in participation 
in DRR sectors is less likely unless there is also improvement in the macroscale institutional 
setting regarding public participation in decision making and innovative approaches, such as 
community-based disaster risk reduction, as reported by some of the member states.  
 
5.4.5. Regulatory Quality and Disaster Risk Reduction  
“Regulatory quality” measures the capacity of the government to create and implement 
regulations/laws/policies that permit and promote sustainable development. Under the Hyogo 
Framework for Action, there is a global commitment to encourage the establishment of public–
private partnerships (a.k.a. PPP) to better engage the private sector in DRR activities, such as by 
encouraging disaster prevention including through the allocation of resources to risk assessments 
and early warning systems.39  
                                               
39 See http://www.unisdr.org/eng/hfa/hfa.htm  [last accessed 20 March 2010]. 
86 
 
One can be sure that the countries’ regulatory quality shapes the DRR regulatory quality. Overall, 
OECD countries enjoy better regulatory quality but do not always seek to improve DRR 
regulatory quality, as can be seen in Figure 27. Again, the discrepancy for Iran between its 
regulatory quality and the overall picture of the country’s regulatory quality showed the widest 
gap among all the countries. The plot suggests that DRR regulatory quality is not independent 
from the countries’ regulatory quality. 
Figure 27 Plot Regulatory Quality vs. DRR Regulations 
 
 
Figure 28 Regulatory Quality – Global Map 
 
 90-100 Percentile  75-90 Percentile  50-75 Percentile  25-50 Percentile  10-25 Percentile  0-10 Percentile 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido (2009). 
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Figure 28 shows that some countries emerged from a low level of regulatory quality in 1996 and 
2003 to higher quality in 2008. Examples of this are Belarus, Libya, and Angola. However, other 
countries have regressed, such as Chad and Zimbabwe. Indonesia, Argentina, Bolivia, and 
Kazakhstan are some examples of middle-income countries that have experienced fluctuations in 
regulatory quality. The rest of Central Asia, Western Asia, and some African countries have also 
shown fluctuating patterns. Among the OECD countries, South Korea and Turkey are still located 
in the intermediate level for the regulatory quality index. Canada has moved to a much higher 
level today compared with that a decade ago.  
5.5. Simple Regression Analysis for Institutional Vulnerability Index 
Figure 29 is based on a model that predicts countries’ institutional vulnerability index in the 
absence of information regarding DRR-specific institutions and governance. The “Specific DRR 
Institutional Index” is taken from the average value of 22 indicators of HFA Priorities 1-5. 
“Institutional Quality Index” is the average value from all six governance indicators. It suggests 
that even though some countries have claimed that their level of DRR policy and practice is very 
high (such as Iran, Uzbekistan, Sierra Leone, and many more), in fact, their actual level of 
enforcement should be questioned.  
Annex 1 gives the regression model, which can be summarized as follows: y = a +bx, where 
intercept a = 2.485, constant b = 0.153, and x = Institutional Quality Index. Therefore, y or 
(Institutional Resilience Index) = 2.485 +0.153* Institutional Quality Index. A detailed result of 
this Institutional Quality Index can be seen in Annex 4.  
Figure 29 shows the result of such an exercise. In this case, Institutional Vulnerability Index is 
the inverse value of Institutional Resilience and Capability Index (IVI = 1/IRCI). 
This research uses the institutional/governance context where the DRR policy takes place in the 
vulnerability analysis. Figure 29 shows that, even when countries possess a good level of disaster 
management regulation, this does not reflect the total institutional resilience and capability of the 
country. In fact, countries can have excellent DRR regulations but, in terms of Institutional 
Vulnerability Index (measured by the inverse value “Institutional Resilience Index”), they can 
posit at a very low level that may reflect the prospects of implementation of countries’ DRR 
policy. In this case, Figure 29 can be used to predict that Iran, Uzbekistan, Sierra Leone, and 
others must face serious questions regarding the implementation and enforcement of their disaster 
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management policy. Consequently, their disaster risk index is not likely to decrease, except 
perhaps for countries such as Syria for which more investigation is needed because information 
on Syrian’s disaster risks and hazard exposure is very limited.40  
Figure 29  Scatter Plots of Institutional Resilience, DRR Quality and DRI 
  
 
Figure 29 (right) above presents disaster risk index in relation to institutional vulnerability index 
(low value means high vulnerability, high value means low vulnerability). The correlation is good 
(r=-0.301, significant 0.05). Therefore, it can now be easier to predict the level of DRI on the 
basis of the institutional vulnerability index.  
 
5.6. Discussion  
Some evidence from the Caribbean (including Jamaica) can be interesting as Williams (2010)41 
has shown limited regulations on DRR in this region. Even though DRR legislation does exist, it 
is ineffective on action planning and actual implementation in disaster risk management. 
Furthermore, some national disaster management agencies do not have enough authority to 
                                               
40 Please consult the report from Ministry of Local Administration and Environment of Syrian Arab Republic at the 
link:  http://www.preventionweb.net/files/7497_Syria.pdf. (Last access 10 Feb 2010).  
41 Williams, Michelle-Ann (2010) “Good Governance in Disaster Management in the Americas: Experiences from 
the Caribbean Emergency Legislation Project. IDRC Davos 2010.  
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implement policies. There is a greater need for information sharing on the risks and 
vulnerabilities associated with disasters generally. There is a lack of cohesion among response 
agencies and a need to strengthen the supporting agencies. In addition, there is a lack of national 
building codes and little or no direct allocation of funds for “natural disasters”, even though the 
region is considered to contain middle-income countries.42  
From the theoretical view of institutions, especially perspectives based on the New Institutional 
Economics, such as those of North (1998), corruption is seen as a variable that increases the 
transaction costs in reducing risk, such as through building code enforcement. Heinemann and 
Coppola (2007) maintain that corruption may amplify vulnerability in the sense that a building 
inspector may be bribed to neglect violations of building codes, the approval on poor building 
materials may result in structural weakness, and government officials may be redirecting funding 
earmarked for disaster mitigation or preparedness. 
Corruption in formal systems of government has often been mentioned as the main factor that 
amplifies vulnerability to disaster risk (see UNDP 2004, Peduzzi 2009). Corruption has been 
considered as the root cause of the absence or poor enforcement of disaster reduction policy. 
DFID (2006:7) associated corruption with poor governance, which influences the ability of a 
country to mitigate and manage disaster risks as it claims that the so-called “natural disasters” are 
political, regardless of the naturalness of the hazards that trigger them. Furthermore, it argues that 
with corruption at the local level, especially in the case of the enforcement of building codes and 
land use planning, disaster mitigation cannot be achieved (DFID 2006:12).  
Returning to Iran, the country is not the worst in terms of corruption control as there many more 
countries threatened by endemic corruption. From Figures 23 and 24 one can claim that it is still 
better to have a good disaster management policy, as Iran does, while maintaining a similar level 
of corruption control in comparison to countries such as Bolivia, Senegal, or the lowest placed 
Dominican Republic. This suggests that, even though corruption is bad and increases 
                                               
42 During one informal interview on 2 May 2010 at the Port Royal, near the capital Kingston, the author asked one of 
the tourist guide at the King’s Royal Naval Dockyard whether the community have been prepared  for the next 
earthquake or tsunami, given the freshness of earthquake in Haiti recently. The answer was “Lets pray that God will 
not do that.” One week after the visit in Jamaica, there were riots as CNN broadcasted the condition.  There was also 
nice reflection about how risk can be prioritized in Jamaica, as one Nepali professional argued: that people will be 
more willing to invest in live security (through paying security companies) as it is an everyday problem rather 
natural hazards such as tsunami or earthquake that comes in its ‘cyclical’ period.  
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vulnerability, the “second-best” option demonstrated by Iran is reasonable: try to set the best 
policy as you can on paper while gradually challenging endemic corruption. 
But the disaster in Turkey in 1999 is often used as a great reminder of the role of corruption and 
its association with weak enforcement of building codes (see Kreimer, Arnold, and Carlin 2003 
and Özerdem 2003). Stuart Millar43 focused on the notion of “building mafia” to stress the role of 
corruption in the collapse of a school building in Turkey in 2003. In this case, corruption goes 
hand in hand with the context of rule of law (i.e. law enforcement) and government effectiveness. 
Of course, Turkey is not alone in this, as Wisner et al. (2004: 348) also mentioned El Salvador, 
India, and Japan in this context.  
The collapse of 100,000 buildings in Haiti demonstrates how weak states (indicated by low 
regulatory quality, lack of rule of law, ineffective government) hampered by endemic corruption 
coupled with the absence of building codes eventually led to a perfect example of how 
institutional vulnerability may create conditions for higher disaster risks. It is also important to 
note that many sources have previously underlined the relationship among disaster risks, disaster 
mitigation policy, and the practice of corruption in the implementation of building codes (see 
DFID 2006, Heinemann and Coppola 2007, Kreimer, Arnold, and Carlin 2003, UNDP 2004, 
Ahrens and Rudolph 2006). 
Nepal’s HFA Report 2009 identified political stability as the highest obstacle. Nepal assessed its 
HFA achievement at Level 3, which means “Institutional commitment attained, but achievements 
are neither comprehensive nor substantial.”  It reflects that the status quo of its reactive response 
to disasters has been rooted in the Natural Disaster Relief Act in 1982, but the country 
experienced a painful social-political transformation during the last 15 years and there is a “lack 
of designated institutional mechanisms to address the DRR from national to local levels.” 
However, to solve this problem, the country’s representatives suggested that political stability 
should come first, while political commitment to DRR comes later along with activities such as 
“formulation and enactment of a new comprehensive act related to DRR” and specific DRR 
institutional reform. 
To conclude this section, it is worth mentioning the complex interplay of all selected governance 
indicators, such as regulatory quality and government effectiveness, rule of law, participation, 
                                               
43 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/may/04/turkey.stuartmillar [last accessed 10 May 2010]. 
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and press freedom on the one hand and the disaster risk reduction policy on the other hand, which 
together determine the quality of DRR institutions. It appears that governance variables are 
volatile in some context such as the Philippines and Indonesia (see also Chapter 7). From Figure 
19 and 20 concerning the volatility of observed governance variables in some countries, one 
interesting conclusion can be made: the higher the institutional vulnerability, the more volatile 
the governance variables.   
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Chapter 6. Institutions and Disaster Risk Governance in Indonesia  
6.1. Introduction  
Indonesia is the largest archipelagic state in the world, with at least 17,000 islands, of which more 
than 7,500 have already been named44 and about 6,000 are inhabited. Its unique position on the 
Pacific Ring of Fire leads to high exposure to recurrent natural hazards, such as earthquakes, 
tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions. About 10% of the world’s volcanoes are situated in 
Indonesia.45 Indonesia has a total population of 234 million46 and nearly half of these inhabitants 
are now living in cities near or on the coast, which is associated with high exposure to coastal 
hazards such as tsunamis and floods, including coastal floods and storm surges.  
6.1.1. Introduction to Hazard and Risk Context in Indonesia 1960-2009 
On the basis of the Mortality Risk Index (hereafter MRI, i.e., the number of people killed per 
million inhabitants per year and people killed per year in absolute numbers), Indonesia has been 
classified as a high-risk country together with India, China, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, among 
others. The modeled multi-hazard MRI shows that Indonesia is a high-risk country that 
experiences disaster mortality greater than 1,000 deaths per year and annually more than 10 
people killed per million inhabitants. The Mortality Risk Index (MRI) below is based on four 
composite hazards (earthquakes, cyclones, floods, and landslides – see Figure 30).  
The increased disaster risks triggered by both geological and hydro-meteorological hazards, 
coupled with anthropogenic drivers throughout the Indonesian archipelago during the last 30 
years, have caused at least US$21 billion in economic losses, affected 18 million people, and led 
to total casualties of 190,000, about 85% of which were caused by one single event, the Indian 
Ocean tsunami in 2004.47  In the last 50 years, the total monetary loss is estimated at about 
US$24 billion, and at least 95% of the total loss occurred in 1996-2009. The highest losses were 
due to the 1997 forest fire and drought, for which direct economic losses almost double those of 
                                               
44 Source: Ministry of Home Affairs,  http://www.depdagri.go.id/konten.php?nama=DataWilayah [accessed 1 Nov 
2009]. 
45 See for instance: http://www.volcano.si.edu/world/region.cfm?rnum=06. [last accessed 6 June 2010].  
46 The formal figure is based on an estimated figure of 234.18 million people. Cited from Trends of Selected Socio-
Economic Indicators of Indonesia by National Bureau of Statistics, October 2009. 
47 This data was developed from an online disaster database available at www.emdat.be managed by the Center for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and combined with existing data available at the National 
Disaster Management Office 2009. 
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the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 in Aceh were reported. Going further back in history, the 
available disaster mortality statistics, such as CRED 2010, suggest that Indonesia’s disasters 
peaked notably in 1966 (triggered by drought events that killed a total of 8,000 people and a 
volcanic eruption that killed more than 1,000).  
 
Figure 30a Mortality risk index; b. recorded deaths 1960s-2009; c. without tsunami 2004 
 
Source: GRDF 2009, Source: Data from CRED – EMDAT 2010.  
 
 
The Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 marked the highest recorded disaster mortality during the last 
50 years, which killed about 170,000. Two years later in 2006, Indonesia experienced a 
devastating earthquake in Yogyakarta, which killed almost 6,000 people. Apart from the two big 
disasters known internationally, there were actually recent events that caused other big losses, 
such as in Aceh province alone, where flood hazards in 2006 affected more than 500,000 people 
(assessment report—World Bank 2007) and displaced 90,000 people from 757 villages, 46 sub-
districts, and 7 districts. This produces a record in that, in 2006 alone, at least 1.5% of the more 
than 76,000 villages in Indonesia48 were affected by flood hazards, which caused the death of at 
least 1,000 people nationally (own calculation)49. However, global databases such as CRED do 
not capture such events.  
                                               
48 In Statistical Book of the Year 2009 the figure was 76,546 villages. 
49 The calculation is based on the available database in the CRED combined with national data available from the 
disaster management office, combined with private data sources.  
94 
 
Recent policy documents such as the National Action Plan 2010-2012 and the National DRR 
Planning 2010-2014 document confirm Indonesia as a disaster-prone country. Both documents 
claim that, of about 490 cities/districts, at least 184 cities/districts are heavily exposed to 
earthquake risks, 60 cities/districts are prone to tsunami risks50, 75 cities/districts are highly prone 
to volcanoes, 174 cities/districts are prone to both flood and landslide risk, and more than 150 
cities/districts are prone to drought. Even though these figures seem to be a rough estimate and 
can potentially be misleading as disaster risks neither respect administrative boundaries nor exist 
because of hazard exposure alone. Almost all cities/districts are exposed to more than a single 
hazard. Vulnerability in terms of exposure to natural hazards is the main recognition of disaster 
risks in the public policy sphere.  
6.1.2. Vulnerability Context in Indonesia  
The size of Indonesia’s economy has been maintained during the last ten years. In 2005, the GDP 
per capita (in terms of US$ purchasing power parity) was US$3,712. There has been a slight 
decrease in the poverty level during the last five years: 2005 (18% lived under the poverty line), 
2006 (17.75%), and 2007 (16.58%). In 2008, those living in poverty comprised 15.42% of the 
total, with the actual number of poor people numbering 12.8 million in urban areas and 22.2 
million in rural areas.51 At least 6.7% of the people may not survive to the age of 40; this is 
equivalent to 14 million people.52   
Eight percent of the adult population, namely, those aged 15 and above, are illiterate; this number 
is almost double the Belgian population or equivalent to 17 times the total population of East 
Timor today. About 40 million people or 20% do not have access to a clean water source.53 There 
were 21 million children under 5 in 2008. In 2009, the Bureau of Statistics noted that a total of 
28% of children under 5 are underweight, which is equivalent to at least 5 million.  
                                               
50 This number is very conservative because in the “General Guidelines for Mitigation of Natural Disaster in Coastal 
Areas and Small Islands: Special Focus on Tsunami,” published in 2003, it was clearly noted that around 60% of 
cities/towns (290 out of 490 cities/towns) are situated in earthquake-prone regions. Proceedings of International 
Seminar and Workshop on Tsunami: In Memoriam 120 Years of Krakatoa Eruption – Tsunami and Lessons Learned 
From Large Tsunamis.  26-29 August 2003 in Jakarta/Anyer (p. 195). 
51 Source: Data and Information Poverty, BPS 2009. 
52 One provocative question is that, if these deaths were to happen altogether in a particular time and place, would 
this be called a disaster or simply vulnerability, and why should this not qualify as a disaster? 
53 http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_IDN.html [accessed 1 June 2010]. 
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As far as the human development index is concerned, Indonesia belongs to the medium group 
(after both very high and high human development groups). The country’s Human Development 
Index (HDI) is 0.73, ranked 111 out of 158 countries in 2007. Life expectancy has shown a 
steady increase over the years and, for 2007, Indonesian life expectancy at birth was 70.5 years. 
The combined gross proportion enrolled in education is 68.2%, which is modest. In contrast to 
HDI, the Gender Development Index (GDI) was 99% of HDI in 2004. In terms of the Gender 
Development Index, Indonesia is better off than countries such as Afghanistan and most African 
countries, and slightly better off than the rest of South Asia. Still, there is a gender gap: although 
life expectancy at birth (for females as % of that of males) is 105.8, adult literacy at ages 15 and 
older (for females as % of that of males) is 93.3%. Fewer girls experience schooling compared to 
boys (relative proportion for combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment is 96%). 
In terms of the ratio of female to male income, on average women enjoy only 44% of a man’s 
salary (compared with Norway 77%, Singapore 53%, Saudi Arabia 27%, Jamaica 58%, for 
example). 54  
 
Figure 31 Selected Vulnerability and Resilience Indicators 
 
Source: data from Knowledge Assessment Methodology and WGI 2009 
                                               
54 See the UNDP Report on Gender Empowerment Measure and its Components 2009 available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_Table_K.pdf. Last accessed 2 June 2010. 
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Figure 31 shows loosely defined multiple vulnerability and resilience indicators: the inward 
direction towards a score of 0 denotes vulnerability; the outward direction towards a score of 10 
denotes resilience. In terms of telephones and mobile telephones per 1,000 people, Indonesia’s 
value is greater than those in the rest of Africa and South Asia. On the other hand, there is a big 
gap to the rest of the world in Western Europe and Latin America.  There are only three 
indicators where Indonesia is at the same level or higher on average than Latin America, which 
include values for TV ownership and press freedom. The importance of mentioning the context of 
information and telecommunication technology (ICT) is because in the existing vulnerability 
assessment, especially in the hazard research context such as tsunami early warning system, ICT 
plays important roles in both knowledge and information dissemination and disaster warning 
services (see for instance Birkmann 2006). 
Another aspect of both vulnerability and resilience that is often overlooked and needs to be 
valued is the availability of e-government services55. The internet is available but there is limited 
use in government offices in various regions. Given the fact that there are about 6,000 occupied 
islands out of 17,000 in Indonesia), information and communication technology (ICT) can help to 
shorten the distances provided that the government and local government make use of available 
ICT for public services.  On a scale of 1-7, Indonesia’s e-Government Services Index is 3.55. In 
fact, Indonesia has almost 14 million Facebook members already56, which is clearly an indication 
of the potential of e-government services (e.g. for disaster early warnings etc.). However, as 
predicted, e-bureaucracy is a new development that the government is about to implement. 
However, given the geographical difficulties of delivering risk knowledge and information 
services at low cost, e-government should be discussed.  
                                               
55 This aspect received greater attention and reflection after fieldwork on Flores Island in Indonesia, especially in the 
Sikka district in June 2008, where the author visited the Kesbangpol Office for issuance of permission for research 
(i.e. Office for Political Development Unit - which was sometimes, especially in the 1990s, the host of the local 
disaster management response office). The author had a dialogue with the head of the office who admitted that the 
office had neither the copy of the Disaster Management Law 24/2007 nor was aware of the legislation process of 
Disaster Management Regulation at the provincial level for 2008. Therefore, the author shared the PDF files of the 
law with the office. As a result, the research permit was issued quickly after the PDF file sharing. In a recent visit to 
the district (during 29 Oct – 2 Nov 2010), it was found that local DRR stakeholders still do not have the files. In a 
visit to a new local disaster management office, the head of prevention unit admitted that till today, the copy of the 
law and new local regulation concerning disaster management have been barely available in the office due to limited 
resources.   
56 The Facebook’s function as social network tool that facilitate disaster warning and post disaster community 
response especially the case of Merapi volcano eruption in late October till mid November 2010 has been remarkably 
mentioned by many Indonesia friends and colleagues who were based in Yogyakarta city. 
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The extent to which the institutional quality indicators (such as rule of law, voice and 
accountability, press freedom, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and corruption 
control) have implications for the overall vulnerability and disaster risk reduction have been 
discussed in the previous chapters. 
Figure 32 Administrative Map of Indonesia 
 
 Source: www.mapsofworld.com 
 
It is clear that Indonesia needs improvement in reducing its social-economic vulnerabilities and 
that, in order to do this, it needs changes in its institutions or new institutional arrangements 
where social-economic problems can be reduced and where social-economic capacity can be built 
towards resilience to disaster risks. What is also important is that institutions place such resources 
(human, economic, social-cultural, infrastructure assets) gained from development processes in 
risk-exposed areas without taking measures to reduce the risks.  
 
6.2. Phases of Indonesia Disaster Management Institutions  
Disaster risk management (DRM) policy in Indonesia can be divided into six different eras. The 
first era is the colonial emergency policy created at the end of the 1930s. The second era is 
demarcated from independence in 1945 until the early 1960s (see Table 18). The 1960s-1990 can 
be considered as the third period. The fourth era started in 1990, at the beginning of the formal 
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IDNDR period. At the end of the IDNDR era, Indonesia entered its fifth phase of DRM policy 
during 2000-2007.  
Table 18 Phases of Disaster Risk Management Policy and Regulation in Indonesia 
Phases Name of Law/Regulation Remarks 
Colonial 
Emergency 
Policy  
1930s - 1945 
Regeling op de Staat van Oorlog en van Beleg 
a.k.a. SOB 1939. This was later formally cancelled 
12 years after independence through Law 74/1957 
This regulated war emergencies and 
extraordinary emergency wars. Officially, 
it co-existed with Emergency Law 6/1946 
for 11 years till 1957. 
1945-1960 Law 6/1946 on Emergency Situation (or Bahaya), 
The amendment of Emergency Situation Law 
1/1948, and Law 30/1948 on Transfer of Full 
Sovereignty to the President during Danger 
Situation 
Regulated emergency situation due to war 
and natural disasters – the original law 
6/1946 acknowledged civil society actors 
as an alternative power to deal with 
emergency.   
1960-1990 Keppres* 54/1961; 312/1965 regarding Central 
Committee for Natural Disaster Shelter; Keppress* 
256/1966 and Cabinet Presidium Decision 
14/U/Kep/1/1967 on Coordinating Team for 
Natural Disaster Management Implementation; 
Advisory Agency on Natural Disaster 
Management Keppres 256/1966; Keppres 28/1979 
- National Coordinating Agency for DM 
Ad hoc emergency response committees 
for natural disasters – government-centric. 
Three revisions of DM regulation during 
1965-1967 due to large-scale and nation-
wide impact of El Nino-driven drought as 
well as the eruption of a volcano  
1990-2000 Keppres 43/1990 - National Coordinating Council 
for Disaster Management; Keppres 106/1999 - 
National Coordinating Council for Disaster 
Management 
A shift to re-acknowledge manmade 
disasters. It suggested considering both 
natural and manmade disasters. This 
coincided with the IDNDR period. 
2001-2007 Perpres** 3/2007 on Amendment of Perpres** 
83/2005 National Coordinating Council for 
Disaster Management; Perpres 83/2005 - National 
Coordinating Council for Disaster Management; 
Keppres 111/2001 Amendment of Keppres 
111/2001; Keppres 3/2001 - National Coordinating 
Council for Disaster Management and Internally 
Displaced People 
2001 amendments of Presidential Decree 
were made to accommodate the need for 
aid distribution to internally displaced 
people during 1998-2002. The 2007 
amendments were related to catastrophic 
events such as the Indian Ocean tsunami in 
2004 and the devastating earthquake in 
Yogyakarta in 2006. 
2007 onwards 
 
Disaster Management Law 24/2007 enforced at 
national level through Presidential Regulation 
08/2008 regarding NDMA; PP*** 23/2008 
regarding Roles of International Agency and 
INGOs in DM;  PP*** 22/2008 on Budgeting and 
Management of Disaster Aid and PP 21-2008 DM 
Implementation/Operational 
Long deliberative processes since 2005 
with hundreds of meetings/public 
debates/hearings/consultations. Drafts 
provided by many different sources, with 
local and international support behind the 
scenes. See section 6.5 for more detail 
explanation. 
*Keppres = President’s Decree; **Perpres = Presidential Regulation; ***PP is Government Regulation. 
 
The year 2007 onwards is known as the Indonesian DRR reform era because there were dramatic 
shifts in the form of regulation, evidence of a big push to implement the new disaster 
management law, and, for the first time, the government started to set a clearer vision of disaster 
risk management as it clams to depart from reactive response to be more proactive in reducing 
99 
 
risks ex ante disaster emergency events.57 The following sub-sections describe the details of each 
phase of DRM policy in Indonesia. 
 
6.2.1. Disaster Management Institutions in Colonial Period 
The colonial emergency management policy was also known as Regeling op de Staat van Oorlog 
en van Beleg (a.k.a. SOB 1939). It was an important piece of legislation that determined disaster 
management and emergency policy in Indonesia for the next 20 years after independence in 1945 
and its influence can be tracked during the New Order period (see 6.2.3). The SOB 1939 
regulated states of emergency that might arise from acts of external agents (mainly external siege 
by foreign forces in the beginning of World War II). SOB 1939 distinguished between two 
different situations: the Staat van Oorlog (SvO) declared an ordinary war situation and the Staat 
van Beleg was activated under extraordinary conditions of a war emergency.58 
For both conditions, the general governor had no obligation to seek permission from volksraad or 
legislative body (see fuller discussion in Hariyono 2008:24-34) in times of emergency. The links 
between emergency and mitigation policy in the Netherlands and its colony of the Netherlands 
East Indies (i.e., Indonesia) will not be discussed; however, study of such links is well 
recommended for further scientific investigation.  
In the Bulletin of Volcanology,59 December, 1949, the former leader of the Netherlands East 
Indies Volcanological Survey, Mr. van Bemmelen, published a “Report on the Volcanic Activity 
and Volcanological Research in Indonesia during the Period 1936–1948”. It was somewhat 
incomplete for the whole East Indies but relatively comprehensive when compared with other 
colonial affairs data, as all information on Java was complete, including the activities of its 
volcanoes. At least 33 volcanic eruptions during 1936-1948 were recorded with at least 38 
written reports. In fact, the Indonesian Geological Agency still maintains and improves the data 
                                               
57 See DM Law 24/2007. See also the White Paper in Pujiono 2005.  
58 The original term was bahaya, which means danger. However, in today’s language, ‘emergency’ is used instead of 
‘danger’. Hariyono (2008) is based on a PhD thesis dedicated to investigating the implementation of emergency 
status in Indonesia during colonial times and after independence.  
59 This journal is published under the auspices of the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the 
Earth's Interior (IAVCEI), which was established 85 years ago. See http://www.iavcei.org/ [accessed 7 May 2010]. 
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produced in the early 1940s. Out of 80 Category A volcanoes60 known today, 71 had been 
reported in 1941 (see also the detailed report from van Bemmelen 1949). Recent data on 
volcanoes in Indonesia according to the classification system of A, B,61 and C62 are as follows: 80 
(71 in 1941), 28 (38 in 1941), and 21 (40 in 1941), respectively.   
This research did not seek evidence on how the colonial institutions made use of volcano risk 
knowledge to undertake mitigation. However, a few notes from van Bemmelen explained how 
thankful the Resident of West Timor to the Bureau Chief of Mines in Batavia (now Jakarta) in 
June, 1948, was for the services of the Volcanological Survey scientist to calm down “the 
alarmed population, and for the efficient precautionary measures proposed … … to the local 
government officers” (van Bemmelen 1949:28). 
In terms of investment in science, the colonial government was far more advanced in comparison 
with the later new government of Indonesia, especially during the period of 1945-1960s. It was 
not simply the lack of human resources but also the radical change in the organizational and 
institutional “template” (e.g. leadership, bureaucracy’s epistemic culture63, national institutions 
etc.) that set back the young state for quite some time. 
Another obvious reason for the discontinuity of institutions dealing with geo-risks is the multiple 
displacements of the Geological Agency and its volcanological survey over a period of more than 
30 years. The Geological Agency during 1945-1946 was under the management of the Ministry 
of Public Works. During 1946-1947, it went under the management of the Wealth Minister. 
During 1949-1950, it went under the remit of the Wealth and Industrial Ministry. During 1952-
1957, it went under the remit of the Ministry of Economy. During 1957-1959, it went under the 
remit of the Industrial Ministry and, in 1966-1974, it went under the remit of the Department of 
Ministry of Trade and Mining. It enjoyed stability during 1974-1992 as it was administered by 
                                               
60 Volcanoes that, since 1600 A.D., showed magmatic eruptions or periods of increased volcanic activity. 
61 Volcanoes in fumarolic stage since 1600 A.D. No magmatic eruptions have been registered. 
62 No registered activity but can be considered active with weak indications of solfatara (volcanic gases dominated 
by sulphur) and fumarola (a.k.a. hotspring i.e. the an opening in the neighborhood of volcano that emits steam and 
gases). See Global Volcanism Program at http://www.volcano.si.edu. Last accessed 15 October 2010.  
63 See Epistemic Cultures are “cultures that create and warrant knowledge” and according to Knorr-Cetina (1999). 
“the premier knowledge institution throughout the world is, still, science.” This means that science only one out of 
many the knowledge institutions available. Traditions and religion can partially be other type of knowledge 
institutions. To the author’s knowledge, no study available regarding the Epistemic Culture within the Geological 
Agency during and after the colonial era. But it can be said that epistemic culture in both colonial and post colonial 
era must be very different.  
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the Ministry of Mining. In 1992, the government changed this institution from the Ministry of 
Mining to the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources.  
One issue that is almost forgotten is the case of Krakatoa in 1883, which is probably one of the 
largest emergency relief operations in the Dutch colonial government’s history, in terms of post-
natural disaster emergency response. It would be incorrect to say that the Netherlands East Indies 
government disregarded the importance of dealing with natural disasters given the absence of 
specific notes in the SOB 1939 to cover natural disasters. In fact, the opposite might be the case 
in that the colonial government learned from the Krakatoa eruption on 27 August, 1883: one 
month after a catastrophic eruption and tsunami, while people were still dealing with the 
emergency operations, such as burying dead bodies and clearing ruins, rebellion actually took 
place in Serang, Banten Province. Such a rebellion reemerged at greater intensity five years later. 
Winchester (2003) asked the question of whether social change after the Krakatoa disaster (e.g. 
the fading of the influence of the colonial government, the loss of its self-confidence after the 
Krakatoa disaster, and the rise of Banten peasant’s revolt backed up by Islamic teachers and 
hajjis) in Banten, which later propagated the spirit of anti-colonialism elsewhere, might have 
triggered movement in the rest of Java (see Winchester 2003:334-445). The teachers and hajjis 
applied religious explanations about divine punishment to the colonial government as well as the 
Banten people who served this non-believing government. Kartodirdjo (1966) stated that the 
revolts were due to the misery directly caused by exploitation through the colonial system and 
later severely amplified by the Krakatoa tsunami in 1883 that swept through Banten’s coastal 
communities.   
In other words, disasters weaken institutions; in addition, vulnerable institutions may lose their 
power after disasters, which can initiate a vicious circle. In fact, in the United States during the 
1960s, government-supported disaster sociologists tried to understand people’s behavior during 
disasters, which was to enable the government to take measures and provide remedies to reduce 
the surprise effects and people’s aggression towards government institutions after disasters.64 
6.2.2. Indonesian Disaster Management Policy 1946-1960s 
                                               
64  See for instance the pattern of war approach and military orientation of disaster inquiry during the Cold War 
period as noted by Claudia Gilbert (2005).  
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One year after independence in 1946, the young state started to regulate emergency management 
by taking natural disasters into account in addition to manmade emergencies through National 
Law 6/1946. There are important lessons from Law No 6/1946. Firstly, surprisingly, from early 
on and before the nation experienced its first authoritarian regime, in the so-called Old Order 
period, the government acknowledged the power of civil society actors, especially the prominent 
Islamic organizations, as civil stakeholders to deal with emergencies. Furthermore, as another 
interpretation to the law, it accepted a great deal of influence of civil bureaucrats and early civil 
society organizations in the drafting of the law by bringing in other actors to tackle potential 
bahaya65 and there were demands not to hand all the power to the military in emergencies 
(including those caused by natural disasters; see Hariyono 2008:39).  
Figure 33 Laws and Risk-Related Laws Produced During 1945-2009 
 
Source: data derived manually from Supreme Court Legislation Database  
 
Law 6/1946 marked the first attention paid by the very young government to natural disasters, 
and their assignment as the fourth external agent that might be a threat to the young nation (along 
with external attacks by foreign military, potential attacks by a latent enemy, and riots that might 
take place beyond the civilian government’s capacity to control). The law gave the authority for 
emergency management  the National Defense Council which comprised of the prime minister66 
                                               
65 The direct translation is danger but can mean emergency. 
66 In its early period, Indonesia had a prime minster, but this system has not been in use for 60 years.  
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and relevant ministries, three civil society organization representatives (mainly faith-based), and 
the military commander. It stated that the president could declare a dangerous situation to the 
nation that may arise from natural disasters.67 However, Law No. 6/1946 was short-lived and 
soon became redundant, an example of ‘institutional mortality’, a term coined here to explain 
either abandoned laws produced by the government (hence, waste investment) or the absence of 
law enforcement at all levels. When the first regime under President Sukarno became 
authoritarian, the law was amended by Law 1/1948 and later Law 30/1948 regarding the transfer 
of full sovereignty to the president during states of national emergency.  
This can be considered the second form of disaster governance in Indonesia, when the design of 
emergency laws was driven by post-Second World War logic, and when emergency management 
heavily focused on attacks from either foreign powers and/or civil war. There was very little 
paradigm shift towards the need for natural hazard management (pre and post disasters) because, 
during this period, apart from a large-scale eruption of Kelud volcano68 in 1951, which only 
attracted scientists, there were no significant “focusing events” that triggered a policy and 
political response (see Birkland 1996)69 towards the management of natural hazards.  
During the period of 1945-1959, the focus of the national governments was fully on building a 
nation state and most priorities were focused on the nitty-gritty of various sectoral legislation 
developments and legislation products related to the formation of new administrative units 
throughout Indonesia: as Figure 33 shows, at least 30 pieces of legislation related to regional 
formations were produced during 1945-1959. During this period, the legislative authorities 
produced a total of 509 laws, the highest number in Indonesian history, of which dozens were 
risk-related laws, including laws on accidents, emergency pharmacy, and states of emergency 
law.  All laws had to refer to the Indonesian Constitution of 1945 as the highest law in the 
country70, which still holds today, as the legal basis for any legislation. In such a transitional 
                                               
67 See Article 1-d, UU 6/1946 about dangerous situations. 
68 Situated in East Java, see the map in Chapter 6. 
69 See the theory of disaster as a focusing event by Thomas Birkland  (1996) p. 221-243. 
70 According to the formal institutional hierarchy (i.e., hierarchies of formal laws and regulations) in Indonesia, the 
highest of all legal formal products is the National Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945, often called UUD 
1945. Below the constitution are the laws – the first steps created to achieve the vision of the constitution – often 
products created by both executive and legislative branches of government. To make the laws operational, horizontal 
enforcement at the national level is needed through several mechanisms, via the creation of presidential regulation, 
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period, the national institutions were very vulnerable, therefore, in order that the nation to be 
resilient to external shocks, institution building through formal laws and regulations can be seen 
as a necessity to national resilience building. 
 
In the mid-1950s, the government produced a Five Year Development Plan 1956-1960 document, 
one of the earliest development policy documents that revealed early recognition of disaster risk 
within a development context.71 There are at least two important written messages: an awareness 
regarding the roles of forest ecosystem services to mitigate disaster risk72 and post-disaster policy 
mandated to the social service sector to provide assistance for the people affected by natural 
disasters, conflicts, wildfire hazards, displaced persons, and the victims of attacks by dangerous 
animals and beasts.73  
Changes occurred in the 1960s when some regulatory tools related to disaster response were 
produced. At least five organizations related to disaster response were produced during this 
period, such as the Central Committee for Natural Disaster Shelter74, the Advisory Agency on 
Natural Disaster Management75, and the Coordinating Team for Natural Disaster Management 
Implementation.76 All these agencies were ad hoc in nature. However, in practice, things stayed 
the same because these agencies were merely reactive to disaster events; there is barely evidence 
that they comprised an ad hoc structure that could act prior to events.77  (See Pujiono 2005)  
  
6.2.3. Indonesian Disaster Management Policy 1960s-1990 
                                                                                                                                                        
national government regulation, or presidential decrees. Without this horizontal enforcement, any enacted law 
remains paralyzed or useless (see Box 2). 
71 Five Year Development Plan (FYDP) 1956-1960 in UU 85/1958 signed by President of the Republic of Indonesia 
on 27 Dec 1958 (Jakarta) Source: LN 1958/161; TLN No. 1689.  
72 FYDP1956-1960 Page 27. It does not mention flood mitigation but simply disaster.  
73 (FYDP) 1956-1960 143  
74 See Presidential Decree - hereafter Kepress - No 54/1961 and 312/1965 and also Presidential Decree 256/1966. 
75 Based on Keppres 256/1966. 
76 The Cabinet Presidium Decision 14/U/Kep/1/1967. 
77 Workshop Proceeding: Increasing Efforts for Natural Disaster Management. Jakarta 12-14 July, 1976. Published 
by Direktorat Urusan Korban Bencana Alam, Direktorat Jenderal Bantuan Sosial, Department Sosial, Jakarta 1976 
105 
 
During the 1960s there were some natural hazards with catastrophic effects, such as the Mount 
Agung eruption in Bali (see Bali in Figure 32 above), which killed about 1,600 people in 
February 1963; the severity of El Nino drought-related events resulted in about 8,000 deaths in 
1966; in the same year, Mount Kelud erupted again, which resulted in the deaths of about 200 
people.78 Its eruption in 1966 was far less intense than the eruption in 1856, when lahars79 were 
emitted that killed 10,000 people. The different numbers of deaths are not because of better 
policy or better capacity in volcano preparedness in 1966, but simply different scales and 
characters of the eruptions; clearly, the magnitude and characteristics of hazards play roles in 
shaping the risks (See e.g. Alexander 1993). 
There was a paradigm shift from war/conflict to “natural” disasters during the 1960s, which can 
be considered an achievement of institutional change, the main cause of which was probably an 
increase in the number of natural hazard events that drew some attention from the government. 
However, in terms of manmade disasters, this was probably the worst period in the nation’s 
history. The second half of the 1960s was a bad time in Indonesian politics. With the fall of the 
Old Order regime under Sukarno’s presidency and the coming of the New Order regime under 
General Suharto, Indonesia experienced a high level of political instability during 1965-1970. 
During 1965-1966, many political scientists have asserted that political conflict caused a total of 
about 500,000 deaths80, especially among those associated with the Indonesian Communist Party. 
Such a catastrophic number is obviously greater than the result of any single natural hazard that 
has occurred in Indonesia, and even worse than the combination of all the total losses of life 
triggered by natural hazards during the last 50 years in the country. 
It is understandable that knowledge on disaster risk management during the 1960s was lacking as 
elsewhere in the world and more lacking in the developing world. Few scientific conferences 
took place during this period, but some international reports regarding geological expeditions in 
                                               
78 In CRED database 2006, it is claimed that there were about 1,000 deaths from the 1966 eruption. However, this 
figure cannot be confirmed by many sources related to volcano studies.  
79 Lahar is an Indonesian term for a volcanic mudflow, which has become an internationally recognized term. Please 
consult http://www.geology.sdsu.edu/how_volcanoes_work/Lahars.html [last accessed 18 August 2010]. 
80 Between 100,000 and 2 million people deaths occurred according to McGregor 2009. However, she preferred to 
follow one estimate of 500,000, which is the most common estimate. See McGregor, Katharine (2009) The 
Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966.Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence: 
www.massviolence.org/IMG/article_PDF/The-Indonesian-Killings-of-1965-1966.pdf (last accessed 1 June 2010).   
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Indonesia during the 1960s are available. For instance, a volcanological mission from UNESCO81 
studied volcano-associated risks in Indonesia. At the national level, knowledge accumulation was 
achieved at a very low rate and one of the problems was that the government of the 1960s was 
not able to capitalize on all the knowledge produced by technical agencies such as the Geological 
Agency (established in the 1850s, which later created its volcanological research division 
(Volcanologisch Onderzoek), in 1922 as well as a the meteorological office, established in 1866).  
The Geological Agency emerged from the “Volcanological Survey of the Netherlands East 
Indies.” 82  In addition, these kinds of technical organization suffered with the discontinuity of 
support from the Dutch Government, which occurred at the end of 1949 after the handover from 
the Dutch government following the decision to grant full independence after an agreement in 
1949.  
Natural events such as volcanic eruptions during the 1970s did not appear to be on the same scale 
(in terms of impacts such as loss of life and damage) as those in the 1960s. However, it was 
mainly that all large-scale natural hazards in the 1970s happened on remote islands or away from 
Java; the major event that was closest to the country’s administrative and population centers was 
in Bali, while others happened on Flores and in the West Papua region (see map in Figure 32)83. 
In the Flores region in 1973, there was a cyclone that killed about 1,600 people according to 
EMDAT 2006.84 In 1976, there were modest earthquakes in Bali and West Papua, which in sum 
caused over 1,000 casualties.  In July, 1979, there was a large-scale event of a landslide-triggered 
tsunami on Lembata Island, Eastern Flores, which killed more than 500 people according to 
different sources. Five months before that, less than 100 kilometers away and also in the Eastern 
                                               
81 See Haroun Tazieff, Giorgio Marinelli, Gorshkov (1966) Indonesia Volcanological Mission, A Preliminary 
Report. Unesco Paris.  
82 Please consult http://www.bgl.esdm.go.id/ (last accessed Feb 2009). 
83 During 1979, West Papua and Papua regions were in the same administrative unit of West Papua. 
84 See the history of cyclone tracking from the Australian Met Office: http://www.bom.gov.au/cgi-
bin/silo/cyclones.cgi (last accessed 1 June 2010). 
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Flores district, flash floods and lahars85 swept away 50% of Larantuka Town situated beneath the 
dormant Ile Mandiri volcano mount.86 
Given the history of ASEAN Cooperation on Disaster Management, disaster policymaking in 
Indonesia during the 1970s was not completely isolated from regional and international 
processes. In 1971, disaster management experts in the ASEAN region formed the ASEAN 
Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) and met every two years. In five years, the 
issue of regional cooperation in the field of disaster management was adopted as one of several 
ASEAN objectives and principles stipulated in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord I. This was 
further manifested as the ASEAN Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters in June, 
1976.87  
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali Concord I), adopted on 24 February, 1976, further 
stressed the need for cooperation in disaster management within ASEAN. One of its eight 
principles and objectives was as follows: “natural disasters and other major calamities can retard 
the pace of development of member states; therefore, they shall extend, within their capabilities, 
assistance for relief of member states in distress.” The agreement was known as ASEAN 
Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters – signed in Manila on 26 June, 1976. 
Looking at the driver behind these initiatives, it was partly in the United States’ interest to fund 
such kinds of declaration as soft mechanisms to control the influence of communism in the region 
in this Cold War period (See e.g. Buszynski 1992).   
Indonesia’s approach to the structure of disaster risk management shared a similar history to 
those of other Southeast Asian countries, such as the Philippines. In the Philippines, following the 
earthquake of 1968, the Civil Defense Administration was pushed to create an ad hoc structure 
called the “National Committee on Disaster Operation” (based on the Administrative Order No. 
151, 1968). This was later changed following the Sening typhoon that devastated the Bicol 
Region and inundated metropolitan Manila for almost three months, which placed great pressure 
                                               
85 United States Geological Survey recognized this as an Indonesian term which means “mudflows and debris flows 
that originate from the slopes of a volcano” http://vulcan.wr.usgs.gov/Glossary/Lahars/description_lahars.html - (last 
access on 10 Oct 2010). 
86 For Lembata, CRED gave a death toll of 539. The International Herald Tribune of 23 July, 1979, reported 700 
deaths and revised the figure a day later to 539 based on the formal report from the local government of 539 deaths 
with 364 missing (see Jeffery 1981:1). Another field source mentioned 84 deaths and 322 missing. For Larantuka 
and Lembata disasters, please consult http://ntt-academia.org/nttstudies/LLlassa2009.pdf [last accessed 1 Jan 2010].  
87 http://www.disaster.go.th/html/ricb/foreign/2006/acdm/background/acdm_tor.html [last accessed June 2009]. 
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on the government to create a National Disaster Control Center. The Civil Defense 
Administration era was superseded by the new Office of Civil Defense, which was to ensure 
protection of people during calamities. However, in 1978, a presidential decree (No. 1566) 
provided a new milestone for the establishment of a structure of disaster management, namely, 
the National Disaster Coordination Council (NDCC) including regional and local structures. The 
NDCC under the presidential decree lasted for 32 years until the country changed its institutional 
structure (namely, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council) through the 
new Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act in February, 2010.88  
Returning to Indonesia in July, 1976, one of the first recorded national multidisciplinary 
workshops on disaster risk management was held in Jakarta, and was attended by stakeholders 
such as the National Development Planning Ministry, the Health Department, the Finance 
Minister, the Office of Meteorology and Geophysics, the Geological Survey, the Indonesian Red 
Cross, and international players such as the United Nations Development Program and USAID - 
one of the main sponsors of the ASEAN agreement.89 Only one multilateral agency, the UNDP, 
presented a paper related to “pre-disaster planning and relief instruction” and some national 
organizations started to argue on the need for disaster mitigation.90  
Table 18 seems to suggest a shift of institutional focus from manmade disasters (such as 
war/conflict) in the earlier period to natural hazards (often misperceived as natural disasters) in 
the 1960s, which lasted to 1990. This can be interpreted as a dramatic change of focus towards 
natural hazards, especially when a presidential decree was finally issued in 1979. The 1979 
disaster management regulation placed emphasis on natural disasters. Disaster risk management 
activities during this period were reactive emergency response and recovery as indicated by the 
decree. The structure often got activated after disasters (Pujiono 2005). The organizational format 
of the “National Coordination Agency” lasted for almost 30 years (with different names from 
time to time – either “National Coordination Agency” or “natural disaster management”, or 
“disaster management” or “disaster management and internally displaced people.”), but it was 
                                               
88 See the information at http://ndcc.gov.ph/home/index.php [last accessed 10 June 2010]. 
89 This is indicative of some conference proceedings and meetings in the 1970s and the early 1980s. 
90 See page 14 Workshop Proceeding: Increasing Efforts for Natural Disaster Management. Jakarta 12-14 July, 1976. 
Published by Direktorat Urusan Korban Bencana Alam, Direktorat Jenderal Bantuan Sosial, Department Sosial, 
Jakarta 1976. 
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succeeded by the new format of the National Disaster Management Office in 2008 as stipulated 
in Disaster Management Law 24/2007, three years after the Hyogo Declaration.  
The national disaster management institutions were partially dormant because of either a lack of 
natural disaster events during the 1970s or the remoteness of the events from Jakarta that did 
occur. There was no significant institutional change from the second half of the 1960s until the 
end of the 1970s, when, in 1979, the government suddenly produced a presidential decree 
regarding the National Coordinating Council91 on Natural Disaster Management (a.k.a. Keppres 
28/1979).  
From ignorance of the need to manage natural hazards before the 1960s, it was now committed to 
more serious actions. This was an indirect product of a discursive change on the need to have a 
fixed structure to manage natural disasters, which had some roots in the ASEAN regional 
workshops on disaster management during the 1970s. The details of how this change happened 
are subject to further academic investigation, but the organizational change only happened at the 
surface with a shift from ad hoc committees to a coordinating body that could organize all 
disaster cycles (in accordance with Cuny and Abrams’s cycles of prevention, mitigation, 
preparedness, emergency, rehabilitation, and reconstruction – See Cuny and Abrams 1983). 
Presidential Decree 28/1979 had the noble objective of taking natural hazard management more 
seriously than the Old Order regime by recognizing the need for systematic emergency 
management triggered by natural events. The departure from war/conflict towards a post-natural 
disaster focus was not by chance. Nevertheless, enough evidence suggests that national-
international interaction since the early 1970s had managed to place this agenda on the table of 
the government.  
The sudden change of disaster management policy in Indonesia in 1979 was based on discursive 
change made through national-international interactions. The persistence of the old disaster 
management policy before 1979 was due to the fact that the previous fatalistic paradigm on 
disaster went unchallenged. However, in principle, disaster management institutions in Indonesia 
did not change significantly during the 1960s until 1990. This was a long period when the 
disaster management discourse was embedded in ad hoc structures and the actions were reactive 
                                               
91 Direct translation from Bahasa is badan koordinasi, which means coordinating body. However, the term council is 
preferred instead of body because, in practice, for 30 it was clearly of a council and not a specific type of 
organizational body to execute a specific mandate. 
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responses. Some evidence for this is shown in Figure 33, which indicates that few risk-related 
bills were produced during this long period.  
The New Order of Indonesia brought political stability during the period of 1970s-1990, during 
which manmade disasters such as conflict and civil war were not considered a big deal because 
the New Order regime was very coercive in silencing sources of civil society power and 
rebellions that might challenge the authority of the government. The only factor that could not be 
fully controlled was the element of surprise of natural disasters. This was one explanation for the 
New Order regime simply correcting the 1960s disaster management policy by making the ad hoc 
committees into a single more stable entity, namely, the National Coordinating Council for 
Natural Disaster Management, in 1979, which lasted until 1990.  
In the 1990s, at the same time as the start of the International Decade for Natural Disaster 
Reduction (IDNDR), the government corrected the 1979 decree arguing that a focus on only 
natural disasters, with a purely humanitarian emergency and post-disaster response-oriented 
policy, was not enough. It suggested reconsideration of non-natural hazards and, for the first 
time, formal recognition of the need to work in accordance with disaster management cycles, the 
famous before-during-after disaster management. In Presidential Decree 43/1990 on “National 
Coordinating Council for Disaster Management,” it was argued that the country needed to 
manage disasters (both natural and manmade) in different phases, such as prevention, mitigation, 
emergency response, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.  
The 1992 Flores disaster has been remembered as one the largest-scale disasters in Indonesia at 
the end of the 20th century; it taught important lessons to the central government, as stated by a 
former Minister of Finance that “Flores goes back to the pre-development era before 1970” 
because the destruction of the fruits of investment from a quarter century development had set the 
region back to poverty in only a few hours. This awareness is well recorded in a local 
newspaper.92 However, this national disaster was not translated into a nationwide transformation 
of disaster mitigation and preparedness, which did not happen for almost 15 years.  
At the end of the IDNDR period in 1999, a new presidential decree was issued to correct the one 
made in 1990, which was justified by stating that the National Coordinating Agency for Disaster 
Management had not been mandated to deal with disasters that arose from riots and mass 
                                               
92 See Ministry of Finance’s explanation in Tabloid Dian, January 1993. 
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violence. This change was partly a reactive response to the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, 
when violence suddenly spread in many parts of Indonesia, which was caused by many internally 
displacement persons (IDPs). However, the 1999 regulation93 did not regulate the IDPs even 
though it was coincident with the crisis in Timor Leste together with the East Timorese refugees’ 
influx to West Timor in 1999.  
 
6.2.4. Indonesian Disaster Management Policy 2000-2007 
The answer to the call for a more serious approach to IDPs (at least on paper) took place in 2001 
with two sets of revisions: the first was the revision of the 1999 regulation to revise the name to 
the National Coordinating Council for Disaster Management and Internally Displaced People 
(Keppres 3/2001); this was revised again in the same year with the same title held until 2005.94  
Based on personal observation, the nature of this revision was probably related to the introduction 
of the “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” by United Nations Commission of Human 
Rights. In Indonesia, this guideline has been translated in early 2000 by civil society 
organizations such as Oxfam.95 Furthermore, the issue of IDPs came to the fore in 2001 when 
prominent international and multilateral agencies dealing with the refugees from East Timor in 
West Timor were removed from their operation in the year 2000 owing to the killing of three 
staff of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in August, 2000. With 
the dearth of resources to meet the basic needs of the refugees (for the East Timorese who resided 
in Indonesia) and IDPs (e.g. East Timor-born Indonesians and other IDPs throughout Indonesia 
produced by conflicts in several regions), the national government needed a new justification for 
financing humanitarian responses. This partly forced the government to create new rules to be 
legally and politically appropriate for dealing with both IDPs and refugees. Therefore, Law 
3/2001 on “National Coordinating Council for Disaster Management and IDPs” was signed. For 
the first time, the Minister of Transmigration was included in the structure of national disaster 
management (i.e. Bakornas) in Presidential Decree 3/2001.  
                                               
93 Keppres 106/1999 - National Coordinating Council for Disaster Management. 
94 Namely Keppres 111/2001.  
95 This has been based on personal observation since 2000 as the author also involved in the humanitarian operation 
during 2000 in West Timor and later on dealing with the issue of IDPs triggered by local conflicts in the Eastern 
Indonesia during 2002-2004. 
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The 2000-2007 period was noted for a willingness to increase the legitimacy of the Bakornas by 
giving power to the vice president in terms of direct responsibility to command the system of 
disaster management in all four versions of Presidential Decree (Keppres) 3/2001, Keppress 
111/2001, Perpres 83/2005, and Perpres 3/2007.  
The notion of carrying out disaster reduction beyond the government, namely, governance, 
emerged notably after the fall of the Suharto regime. In 2003, in the opening remarks of the 
International Seminar and Workshop on Tsunami: In Memoriam 120 Years of Krakatoa Eruption 
– Tsunami and Lessons Learned From Large Tsunamis, the former coordinating minster of social 
welfare (later a vice president in 2004-2009) noted the following: “Disaster is our responsibility. 
Not merely government responsibility but also that of the private sector and society.” This view 
of shared responsibility to manage risks of disasters is not new as it has existed in practice, 
notably since the 1990s. The speech was given exactly a year before the catastrophe of the Indian 
Ocean tsunami. As the Head of Bakornas, Mr. Kalla reflected on the history of catastrophic 
tsunamis, including the recent ones in Flores-NTT in 1992, East Java in 1994, West Papua in 
1996, and Central Sulawesi in 2000, not to forget the tsunami triggered by the Krakatoa volcanic 
eruption in 1883.  He further noted that “it is difficult to predict when tsunamis will occur. 
Scientists have predicted that tsunamis can happen in a few minutes (5-20) after being triggered 
by earthquakes. Therefore, considering the limitation of time, there are steps that need to be 
taken, such as the identification of tsunami-prone areas by means of hazard and risk mapping, 
socialization of preventive measures for example to persuade people to stay away from risky 
areas, an increase in public awareness, and improvement and development of early warning 
systems for all kinds of hazards, especially earthquakes and tsunamis.” 96  
In one of the papers of the conference in August 2003 entitled “General Guidelines for Mitigation 
of Natural Disaster in Coastal Areas and Small Islands: Special Focus on Tsunami,” it was 
clearly noted that around 60% of cities/towns (290 out of 490 cities/towns) are situated in 
earthquake-prone regions (page 195) and the vast majority of these cities are a potential ‘target’ 
for a tsunami. It was added that, in order to mitigate tsunami risks, there was a need for the 
                                               
96 See Page 6, the Opening Remarks by Coordinating Minister for Peoples’ Welfare and Daily Chairman of National 
Coordinating Council for Disaster Management and Displaced Persons, Mr. Yusuf Kalla. Proceedings of 
International Seminar and Workshop on Tsunami: In Memoriam 120 Years of Krakatoa Eruption – Tsunami and 
Lessons Learned From Large Tsunamis.  26-29 August 2003 in Jakarta/Anyer. This conference was hosted by the 
Meteorological and Geophysics Agency (BMG) in cooperation with other related national technical agencies such as 
Ministry of Research and Technology.  
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integration of three approaches: integrated coastal zone management, integrated fisheries 
management, and integrated coastal hazard management.  
Responding to this, in the second last paragraph of his remarks, Mr. Kalla suggested that “On this 
occasion, I ask you to increase our attention to the efforts to undertake prevention and disaster 
mitigation, not only by talking, but also by doing. On the basis of all the experiences we have in 
this country and abroad, we can draw lessons for the future.” With this statement, it was clear that 
the political will was there for an idea that had not been translated into the existing structure of 
government during that period.   
How did local policymakers see the problems during this period? In a reflection on an earthquake 
event that scaled between VII-VIII MMI97 on 4th June, 2000, in Bengkulu Province (in Sumatra, 
Indonesia) and that killed 93 people and caused 3,339 houses/buildings collapsed (not including a 
total of 13,756 houses heavily damaged and 29,090 houses with medium-light damage), the 
Bengkulu governor asserted the root causes of the damage and losses: “The shifts from wooden 
and bamboo house structures to masonry, while the collapsed masonry was due to the quality of 
the materials, the quality of joint elements of house structures such as beam-columns; each 
element moved not according to a single mass acceleration, and there was no stiffness in the 
houses; most of the buildings are situated by the fault lines of earthquakes.”98 In the last 
reflection of the paper, especially on how provincial policy would respond to the situation, he 
maintained that mitigation and risk reduction measures could make structures earthquake-proof 
by going back to the previous building/housing patterns (wooden and bamboo structures 
including the use of aluminum roofs), as well as no longer building houses exactly at already 
recognized earthquake/fault lines or on unstable areas (hence the recognition of land use policy 
design, monitoring, and enforcement; in line with HFA Priority 4th); the need for new risk 
analysis and mapping of earthquake risks including seismic zoning in the whole province (Hyogo 
                                               
97 MMI is known as the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale, ranged I-XII, The lower scale is measured by the situation 
in which the earthquake is felt by people while the higher scale are based on observed damage of structures caused 
by an earthquake.   Scale VII means “Damage negligible in buildings of good design and construction; slight to 
moderate in well-built ordinary structures; considerable damage in poorly built or badly designed structures; some 
chimneys broken” while Scale VIII means “Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable damage in 
ordinary substantial buildings with partial collapse. Damage great in poorly built structures. Fall of chimneys, factory 
stacks, columns, monuments, walls. Heavy furniture overturned.” See for more detail explanation is available from 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/learn/topics/mercalli.php. (last accessed 20 Oct 2010) 
98 Zen, Hasan (2003) “Masalah Gempa Bumi” - Bengkulu Governor. In Proceedings of International Seminar and 
Workshop on Tsunami: In Memoriam 120 Years of Krakatoa Eruption – Tsunami and Lessons Learned From Large 
Tsunamis.  26-29 August 2003 in Jakarta/Anyer (pp. 241-249). 
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Priority 2nd); increasing the practical knowledge on post-disaster response to the whole society as 
well as recognition and greater appreciation of the embedded mitigation measures in the existing 
local knowledge and technology such as wooden and bamboo structures (Hyogo Priority 3rd). 
Such awareness and vision of risk management in many instances was unfortunately not often 
found in the regions where recent disasters took place. However, before Disaster Management 
Law 24/2007, there were hardly any policy instruments available that enabled actors with “good 
political will” to clearly change the knowledge into action. 
Figure 34 DRM Regulatory and Organizational Network 1979-2007 
Coded from regulation on Bakornas 1979, 1990, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007 and regulation on 
BNPB 2008.  
 
Figure 34 shows the network of regulation of disaster management and the organizational ties 
over the period 1979-2008. Every dot represents either a regulation or an organization. The 
analysis is based on six different regulations and the organizational ties required by each 
regulation. In this analysis, qualitative explanation and quantitative explanation of the graph are 
important because of the interest in looking at the actors and forms of governance utilized in each 
period. 
Visually, one can guess the “leaders” or lead organizations from 1979-2008. The size of nodes 
explains their closeness centrality (see Section 3.2.1.3) .The calculation can be seen in Figure 35 
(closeness centrality). Apparently, the Ministry of Interior and the Military Commander have the 
highest score (0.56) as they existed in all regimes of the Bakornas (National Coordinating 
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Council) system from 1979-2007, as well as after the reform.  This obviously reflects the 
discourse in the public where the military are still seen as an important group even after the 
reform, given the limitation of logistical resources within civil organizations, such as today’s 
National Disaster Management Office, and the still weak local disaster management offices. The 
figure also suggests that the Ministry of Interior is always involved in the business of disaster risk 
management in Indonesia. In fact, the minister is key to successful enforcement in the form of 
local endorsement of reform.  
 
Box 2 Selected Definitions of Indonesian Laws/Regulatory Terms 
 Legislation is written rules established by state agencies or authorities and is binding in general. 
 Law is the legislation that is established by the House of Representatives by agreement with the 
President (a.k.a. Acts or Undang Undang). 
 Government Regulation in Lieu of Law is the legislation that is established by the President (a.k.a. 
Peraturan Pemerintah – a form of national level enforcement). 
 Government regulation is the legislation that is established by the President to carry out the Law as it 
should be carried out (a.k.a. Keppres – a form of national level enforcement). 
 Presidential Regulation is legislation made by the President (a.k.a. Perpres – a form of national level 
enforcement). 
 Presidential Instruction (a.k.a. Inpres– a form of national level enforcement).  
 Ministerial Regulation (a.k.a. KEPMEN– a form of national level enforcement). 
 Provincial Regulation is legislation that is established by the legislature with approval along with the 
head province (a.k.a. Perkada or Perda – a form of provincial level enforcement). 
 City/District Regulation is legislation that is established by the legislature with approval along with 
the head city/district (a.k.a. Perkada or Perda – a form of city/district level enforcement). 
 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and the Coordinating Ministry of Social Affairs as well as the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource each got 0.54. This shows their importance in the 
disaster management system in Indonesia. The Ministry of Social Affairs used to be the long-
term leader in the early form of Bakornas in 1979 and its membership in Bakornas was 
consistent; the Coordinating Ministry of Social Welfare took over the leadership quite a few 
times before it was taken under the remit of the vice president’s office in 2001. The importance 
of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources was due to its control of the Geological 
Services and Volcanological Survey since the 1970s. The involvement of the Ministry of Foresty 
in the Bakornas system was notable since 1999 owing to the forest fire problems during the El 
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Nino year of 1997/8. The Ministry of Public Works contributes to the system through its dual 
roles in the disaster management system, such as providing logistical services for post-disaster 
intervention such as rehabilitation and reconstruction as well as its roles in mitigation and spatial 
planning. The Ministry of Finance has good ties to the system because of its roles in providing 
support to it. 
 
Figure 35 Selected Centrality Test for Organizations/Institutions 1979-2008 (N=28) 
 
 
There are other insights from Figure 34. The involvement of the Indonesian Red Cross in the 
system started with the establishment of Bakornas in 1979. However, it disappeared and re-
appeared again in 2005. The inclusion of civil society in the structure started just after the reform 
in 2007.One of the recent surprises found during this research was that the current government 
tends to work outside the existing institutional pathways, but not always with good reason. For 
instance, in Figure 34, the Coordinating Ministry of Social Welfare can be seen to be involved 
during the last 28 years and was the host of Bakornas during the 1990s. However, in early 2010, 
things suddenly changed as Presidential Instruction No. 1 2010 simply neglected the structure 
under reform by putting disaster risk reduction under the remit of the Coordinating Ministry of 
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Economic Affairs.99 This shift of policy went unnoticed among the public and the professional 
community. However, this needs further investigation, especially in terms of how such a change 
happened and whether the influence of politics may have outweighed the need for 
professionalism, especially in recruiting experts who have prescribed such a radical change in 
policy. 
 
6.3. Disaster Management Law 2007 
Many agreed, especially among the reformists, that the main reason for the need for reform, 
including establishment of a new disaster management law, is that the power of the old structures 
that had been preserved since 1979 should be reformed. The old structures at all levels, such as 
the National Disaster Management Council (Bakornas) and the Satkorlak (Provincial Council on 
Disaster Management), as well as city/district disaster management councils (Satlak), had been 
extremely ineffective in dealing with not only future disaster risks but also disaster risks in the 
past. These old structures almost always became active when emergencies took place and the 
government was always caught by surprise by natural hazards. Even now, after the reform in 
2007, the government is always caught by surprise.100  
One can argue that, even without the first DRM reform such as the Bakornas system in 1979, the 
response quality might have always been the same because somehow the government would 
always respond (significantly or not) to disaster events and because the vast majority of the 
people still subscribe to the “naïve” or “magical consciousness” and the perception of disasters 
and catastrophes as a form of divine intervention and punishment (See Haynes et. al. 2010, See 
also Annex 5, a baseline survey conducted in 2008), so the government would barely change its 
disaster management strategy in substance, just superficially.  
The Krakatoa eruption in 1883 triggered a 40-meter-high tsunami that killed approximately 
36,000 people on the Java-Sumatra coastlines; there was a generous response from the Dutch 
                                               
99 Based on Instruction of the President Indonesia Republic No 1/2010 on the acceleration of the implementation of 
National Development Priority 2010. 
100 Based on personal observation during the last three years, as disaster emergencies occurred (such as Padang 
earthquake 2009, West Java earthquake 2009, the failure of warning system in the case of Merapi Volcano eruption 
in 2010 that caused more than 160 casualties which in principle should not happened because by definition the 
preparedness have been made available since 2006. Indonesian news paper such as Kompas’ special coverage on 
Merapi (http://lipsus.kompas.com/merapimeletus)  indicate that the national disaster response system and 
preparedness should be substantially corrected as suggested  by recent scientific investigation (such as Sagala 2009) 
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colonial government for relief afterwards, including a 6,000-mile trip by the Dutch king from The 
Hague to Batavia, which served as a model for all ex-post event responses: qualified catastrophic 
events have triggered a generous response accompanied by standard compassion from a 
king/queen or president. For quite a long time, there have been ‘back and forth” visits of 
Indonesian presidents to disaster sites, from Flores in 1992, East Java tsunami in 1994, Aceh in 
2004, and Yogyakarta earthquake in 2006, Padang earthquake 2009, West Java earthquake 2009, 
Papuan flood 2010 and Merapi volcano eruption October 2010. Such kind of visits have been 
normally valued as a perfect symbol of good leadership as recently demonstrated by the 
Chilean’s president Mr. Pinéra.101 However, in Indonesia there is mixed feeling about such kind 
of visits because the visits required an extra budget from the local government to host the 
presidential team – in a recent visit to a district in East Java, civil society and the media raised the 
concerned of a decision from a local district government to shift allocated disaster response funds 
to welcome the President while there were huge demand in the humanitarian emergency needs in 
three disaster regions that occurred almost simultaneous in October 2010.102  
One can rightly claim that the old structure added very little value to reduce disaster risk.  De 
facto, the Bakornas system made very limited efforts in mitigation, risk reduction, and disaster 
management planning in systematic ways.103  
The energy for change was finally adopted by the recent disasters during 2004-2006. Some of the 
visions for disaster risk reduction stipulated in the Hyogo Declaration and Hyogo Framework for 
Action have been borrowed in the Disaster Management Law 24/2007. However, the term 
“Disaster Management”, which has been considered as “old” and often signals a reactive-oriented 
paradigm, is still in use after the reform to encompass the whole aspect of disaster risk reduction 
as stipulated by the HFA. Nonetheless, this was an achievement as some of the drafters and 
negotiators argued that “it was difficult for the legislators to opt for risk reduction-oriented terms, 
as suggested in one of the drafts, so instead they ended up keeping the term “disaster 
management.”104 
                                               
101 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/14/chile  
102”Disaster funds shifted for the visit of Mr. President” – http://infokorupsi.com/id/korupsi.php?ac=7634 (last access 
15 Nov 2010) 
103 This has been clearly stated in the draft academic paper  2005 version that produced by the Indonesian Society for 
Disaster Management.  
104 Recurrent communication with Dr. Eko Paripurno and Mrs. Hening Parlan, some of the key experts behind the 
scenes. Both are part of the Indonesian Disaster Management Society. 
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The disaster risk management reform process in Indonesia is probably not unique in the sense 
that similar efforts have occurred in other Indian Ocean countries, such as Sri Lanka105 in 2005 as 
well as India in 2005.106 One of the driving forces behind the reform and change was a form of 
global disaster risk governance, such as national compliance with the Hyogo Declaration as 
voluntarily endorsed by Indonesia together with 168 countries. As the Hyogo Framework for 
Action suggested (in Chapter 3), disaster legislation is seen as the foundation that provides a 
strong basis for planning and directing of the whole spectrum of disaster risk reduction. In one of 
the BNPB (National Disaster Management Agency) and UNDP joint publications entitled 
“Lessons Learned: Disaster Management Legal Reform – The Indonesian Experience” it was 
admitted that the process of reform is “based on international policy direction” (BNPB-UNDP 
2009a:9).  
UN agencies and INGOs supported civil society advocacy under the lead of MPBI (see also 
BNPB-UNDP 2009:12-13) to carry out “exhaustive” (see Pujiono 2005) consultation processes 
with international partners, politicians, national legislators, and government, especially Bakornas 
and civil society at large. Consultation processes with international actors were known as the 
Convergence Group, which was later supported by UNDP to form a working group for a 
background academic paper for law drafting. The Working Group members were all international 
organizations such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), CARDI107, ECHO, 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and International Federation of the Red Cross 
(IFRC). International aid interests have been successfully accommodated in the law, which was 
later enforced through a specific regulation, namely, Government Regulation 21/2008 on 
International Cooperation in Disaster Management (see BNPB-UNDP 2009:13). 
Some positive outcomes of the international and non-state actors’ involvement in the drafting of 
the law lie in the details of the DM Law document. The law recognizes the government’s 
responsibility: (a) to reduce disaster risks and integrate risk reduction in development programs; 
(b) to protect people from disasters; (c) to guarantee provision of rights of people affected and 
displaced by disasters according to minimum standards; (d) recovery from the impact of 
disasters; (e) allocating budget for disaster management in the country’s Annual Development 
                                               
105 See http://www.srilankanparliamentonnaturaldisasters.org/ [last accessed 30 January 2010]. 
106 Please consult http://www.nidm.gov.in/DM_act2005.pdf [last accessed 15 June 2010]. 
107 Consortium for Assistance and Recovery towards Development in Indonesia. 
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Budget; (f) allocating contingency budget for disaster response, and (g) authentic and credible 
documentation of hazards and impact of disasters. 
 
6.3.1. Disaster Risk Management Structure  
At the surface level, disaster risk management structure in terms of an organigraph does not 
change much. At the national level, the National Disaster Management Agency superseded the 
Bakornas secretariat. At the provincial and district levels, both Satkorlak and Satlak have been 
replaced by Local Disaster Management Agency. Figure 36 is the design of the disaster 
management system in Indonesia after the reform combining actual compliance with the Hyogo 
Framework for Action. At the national level, there is a National DRR platform, which is indeed a 
predecessor of a multi-stakeholder forum formed in 2005 with the purpose of advocacy for the 
drafting of the disaster management law.  
At all levels, the legislative agency should play roles not only for bill drafting and DRR 
budgeting but also for monitoring the implementation of the law. The national legislative body 
used their initiative rights for drafting the disaster management law, it was merely as a response 
to the call from non-state actors to create the law in 2005, and, as many commentators believe, 
such initiative rights have seldom been used by Indonesian legislators. The legislative response to 
the call for reform was indeed conditioned by large-scale disasters, which affected the national 
budget during 2005-2007. It may sound like an exaggeration to expect Indonesian legislators to 
play a critical role in the ruling government because the practice of political opposition is not yet 
fully developed, even though it is possible by law or in the words of experts, opposition practice 
in Indonesia “remains structurally weak and divided.”108 
                                               
108 See Edward Aspinall’s PhD thesis entitled “Political Opposition and the Transition from Authoritarian Rule: The 
Case of Indonesia” at the School of Pacific and Asian Studies of The Australian National University (2000). 
Available at http://dspace.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/46054 (accessed 10 Jan 2010) 
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Figure 36 Indonesia Disaster Management System 
 
Control and monitoring of the quality of disaster risk reduction may come from civil society 
organizations (as recognized in Figure 36 above) and the media. At the local level, especially at 
the provincial level, a similar structure is used. A provincial platform is seen as the key to sustain 
the efforts in risk reduction. The very idea of such a platform is rooted in the Hyogo Framework 
for Action (Priority 1.4) and this is an ideal structure that when it is expected to materialize in 33 
provinces needs a really big policy demand. In fact, the DRR National Platform has not been 
really functioned regulary  as it is supposed to be and in the provinces, the DRR platform can 
only be active where there are either international NGOs or a United Nation agencies in the 
respective provinces.109  
At the district level, a similar structure is utilized without requiring a DRR platform. The disaster 
risk management structure recognized the roles of civil society organizations as well as the need 
for a strong partnership with private organizations.  The next sections will show how such an 
‘ideal’ structure is made operational in the real world. 
                                               
109 As of 10 November 2010, there were only three news reported by the platform as it has been dormant since June 
2009 (please see http://www.planasprb.net). Recent reports regarding the provincial platform for DRR come from 
only a few provinces where international actors are present for post-crisis and post-disaster responses, such as in 
Padang, Yogyakarta, NTT province and West Papua. In Papua, the DRR platform has been made active due to the 
support from the Oxfam – However, it was found that such a platform is not easy to maintain.- see also 
http://www.mpbi.org/content/menguat-dukungan-pembentukan-forum-prb-papua -accessed 15 Nov 2010). 
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The National Disaster Management Agency (or BNPB - see its structure in Annex 2) reports 
directly to the President of Indonesia, but is not (yet) a member of the cabinet. There are also 
discussions whether the agency needs to be part of the cabinet member in order to give greater 
power as Indonesian experiences many more disastrous events occur during the last 6 years.110 
However, there has been no study on whether it should be part of the cabinet to increase its 
legitimacy and power, as is the case in some countries where disaster risks are very high and 
persistent, such as Sri Lanka,111 New Zealand,112 Bangladesh,113 and Uganda114. 
 
6.4. Policy Flashback 1930-2010: Discontinuity and Continuity of Institutions 
Combining the evidence in Section 6.2-6.3 and the result network analysis in Figure 34, which 
gives a simplified diagram showing the chronological order of events (see Figure 37), may 
provide a new understanding of the forms of disaster risk governance in each period. For about 
50 years, since the colonial government at the end of the 1930s till 1979, basically very few 
changes were made in terms of formal stakeholders, as shown by many formal documents.  
Even though civil society organizations have been recognized since 1946, such a recognition had 
been barely implemented for political reasons. This was because Indonesia experienced three 
historical phases of authoritarian regimes: The first was from the colonial period until 1945; the 
second authoritarian period was during 1945-1965, and the third was from 1967-1998. During 
these periods, military power was either superior or considered superior to civil governmental 
organizations, such as disaster management committees in the 1960s-1970s, because disaster may 
have been seen as an agent that could create instability in the territory.  Civil society 
organizations, at least on paper, now enjoys a steering power in the new structure of National 
Disaster Management Office (BNPB), as seen in Figure 35, which was regulated under a 
presidential degree concerning BNPB in 2008. However, de facto, the emerging roles of 
                                               
110 See http://www.tribunnews.com/2010/11/07/komisi-viii-dpr-usulkan-bnpb-jadi-kementerian. (last access 10 Nov 
2010) 
111 Please consult http://www.dmhr.gov.lk/english/index.php [last accessed 15 June 2010]. 
112 Ministry of Defense and Emergency Management at http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/memwebsite.nsf [last 
accessed 15 June 2010]. 
113 Please consult http://www.dmb.gov.bd/ [last accessed on 15 June 2010]. 
114 Uganda has a Minister of State for Relief, Disaster Preparedness, and Refugees. No website to consult.  
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multilateral actors since the 1970s-1990s brought new insights into the practice of disaster 
management in Indonesia. As shown by sources written in Bahasa, little was known regarding 
the roles of United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO)115 during the 1970s. In the 
second half of the 1980s, UNDRO supported “institution building” for disaster management 
systems in Indonesia. Bakornas failed to perform following the eruption of Galungung 
stratovolcano in West Java in 1982. Because of this, UNDRO later joined with UNDP and other 
international agencies, creating the Indonesian Disaster Management Center. Creative investment 
in human resource development on mitigation and preparedness was undertaken. This was 
achieved by investing seriously in human resources for the Ministry of Social Affairs (the host of 
Bakornas secretariat 1979-1990), including for some relevant ministry staff seconded to the 
center, and conducting selected hazard research led by national experts in 1986. The output from 
the multidisciplinary research on disaster mitigation was planned to be integrated with Medium-
Term National Development Plan (also known as Pelita) 1987-1992.116  Such processes took 
place in 1986-1987, the same year in which the IDNDR was formally declared to begin in 1990.  
However, the technically sound approach in capacity building had been disadvantaged by the 
unexpected change in the structure, especially when the president changed the host of Bakornas 
from the Ministry of Social Affairs to the Coordinating Ministry of Social Welfare in 1990. There 
is a lack of information regarding what happened with the trained individuals and their career 
building in the field. Nevertheless, it was clear that a change in policy, even with a very good 
reason to shift from “natural disaster” stipulated in 1979 towards “disaster” in general (to regain 
command over the non-natural ones) in 1990, and to place such a mandate under a coordinating 
minister, in theory, might promote multi-agency efforts. Such a change was mainly a response to 
the IDNRD movement. However, unexpected organizational (or leadership) change from the 
Ministry of Social Affairs to the Coordinating Ministry of Social Affairs had encouraged 
discontinuity of human resources, as the new ministerial host started human resource 
development from scratch, which caused the 1980s “Indonesian Disaster Management Center” to 
become irrelevant. 
                                               
115 In the written reports in Bahasa Indonesia during 1970s-1980s (i.e. the active period of UNDRO - United Nations 
Disaster Relief Coordinator), the national actors often mention UNDP. UNDRO was established in 1965, which 
mainly dealt with relief but also managed to invest in mitigation and preparedness. 
116 Wong Arthur (1986) Strengthening Disaster Preparedness and Disaster Management in Indonesia” First Technical 
Report for Project INS/82/020 Government of Indonesia UNDP/UNDRO - USAID Project. Dated November 1986.  
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Catastrophic events during the 1990s did not bring change to the national disaster management 
system. One example was the first declaration of national disaster status after the Flores tsunami 
in 1992, - which, for the first time (at least based on all accessible formal documents) since the 
formation of the National Coordinating Council in 1979 - did not actually trigger any disaster 
management policy change at either local or national level.   
The reason that the government declared the Flores tsunami in 1992 as a national disaster was 
that the tsunami had caused “suffering, loss of life, and enormous material losses to society. 
Considering the impact of such a disaster and the need for response efforts and recovery, it is 
deemed necessary to establish the national disaster status.” 117 This editorial text was exactly used 
again following the tsunami on 26 December, 2004, with additional text to give a National Day 
of Mourning.118    
 
Figure 37 Trends in Indonesia DRR Stakeholders 
 
 
Nevertheless, it may be a mistake (and almost always a mistake) if one assumes that policy 
makers are fully rational/reflective agents (both the executive and the legislative bodies) in 
Indonesia. The change in the disaster management policy is due to a dual process: the risk context 
where catastrophic events provide legitimacy for the government to change its strategy with some 
                                               
117 See Presidential Decree No 66/1992 on Decision on Status of Flores Natural Disaster as National Disaster. Page 1 
points a and b.  
118 See Government Decision 112/2004 signed on 27 December, 2004, one day after the disaster.  
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sort of “anticipated initiatives” coming from outside government. International processes such as 
the International Decade for Natural Disaster Management in the 1990s and later the International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) era, which started in 2000, have facilitated discursive 
change. For example, in the Asian context, the disaster management policy discourse has been 
formally channeled through the Asian Disaster Reduction Centre (ADRC), which was established 
in 1998 and Indonesia has been a member state together with 28 countries;119 The ADRC’s 
annual conference has served as an regional platform where the member states report their 
progress of disaster risk reduction on annual basis.120 
Disaster management policy reform that started in 2007 was not fully initiated by the formal 
institutions and policymakers. The reform itself has actually been a result of very complex 
processes involving quite diverse actors within civil society and non-stakeholder actors’ 
initiatives to call for the legislative agency to exercise power. The reform arose from a complex 
set of networks that transacted new ideas, information, and knowledge back and forth from local 
to international levels. This is very well documented in many publications. Pujiono (2005) for 
instance documented 39 meetings, many of them at the national level, from only 11 Feb – 16 
June, 2005, which involving international actors, civil society, the media, and individuals from 
non-governmental organizations.121  
 
6.5. More Evidence of Governance and Institutional Change in Disaster Risk Reduction  
The data for the analysis in Figure 38 is taken from “National Action Plan 2006-2009”, which is 
formally endorsed by the Ministry of Development Planning (Bappenas) with the support of the 
UNDP.  The network analysis is possible because there is a long shopping list in the plan with a 
simple format: “who is doing what with whom with the support of whom and where.” There are 
more than 100 actors but only 81 organizations (therefore, 81 nodes/vertices, undirected) have 
been coded for the analysis. The reason for distinguishing other actors was a lack of clarity of 
information and a need to focus on mapping the main actors at the national level. The document 
is important because it was made during 2006-2007, exactly at the transitional period when the 
                                               
119 http://www.adrc.asia/aboutus/index.html  
120 See annual Indonesia reports since 1998: http://www.adrc.asia/disaster/index.html. Accessed on 13 Nov 2010. 
121  See the stories in Parlan, Suratman, and Astuti (2007).  
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culmination of disaster management policy change occurred. Therefore, it is arguably still valid 
to use as a proxy to map the “leaders” in a network (measured by betweenness centrality test) and 
the importance of a node in a network (measured by closeness centrality). 
Only 25 out of 81 nodes (that represent national organizations) during 2006-2008 were ranked 
according to their relative leadership (betweenness centrality, BC) and importance (closeness 
centrality, CC) in a network. It was found that 11 government ministries could be considered as 
“leaders” together with four United Nations organizations, 4 INGOs, two international donors, 
four university/research institutes, and one media outlet. However, their levels of “leadership” 
and “importance” in the network vary considerably. The highest value for BC test is the 
transitional Bakornas (0.35) followed by the leading research institute on disaster mitigation, 
namely, Bandung Institute of Technology (node 1, BC value 0.26), UNESCO (node 17, BC value 
0.21), Ministry of Public Works (node 13, BC value 0.17), and MPBI (the leading national NGO 
on DRR, node 7, BC value 0.15).  
Figure 38 DRR Network in Indonesia 2006-2009 – Betweenness Centrality Test 
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Figure 39 Centrality Test – Selected Top 25 for Betweenness Centrality 
 
Coded data from National Action Plan 2006-2009.122 (N=81) 
 
It is obvious that, when the measure of closeness centrality (CC) is used to determine the level of 
importance of each node (organization), the reader can actually easily see that, for an important 
organization such as the Ministry of Education (CC value 0.36), its leadership is low in the 
network (indicated by a betweenness centrality (BC) value of 0.02). The same conclusion can 
also be drawn for the Ministry of Interior, which got the highest BC value in the previous 
exercise (Figure 38) but, in this network (Figure 39), has a low leadership indicator in contrast to 
its importance (CC value 0.34).  
Figure 39 (left) presents the correlation between the degree centrality (i.e. the number of nodes 
adjacent to a given node or the number of ties connected to a given node) and the betweenness 
centrality. Apparently, the correlation is very high (as 0.949) with significance at 0.000 (two-
tailed). The correlation between betweenness centrality and closeness centrality is also high at 
0.639, with significance at 0.001 (two-tailed). 
There are certain organizations that are more important than others; however, in the network they 
are distinguished by their “leadership” (betweenness centrality test). It is important to note that a 
network analysis like this neither represent the whole society nor the whole DRR networks. 
                                               
122 The analysis is possible because it uses a simple form asking who is doing what with whom with the support of 
whom. There are more than 120 actors but only 81 have been coded for the above analysis. The reason for this was a 
lack of clarity of the information.  
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Rather, it shows how each actor/organization/institution is linked in a certain network; in this 
case, the DRR network in the National Action Plan 2006-2009. It noticeably shows that, among 
all of the national NGOs in the network, MPBI (Indonesian Disaster Management Society) has 
been able to “lead” in view of its values of BC and CC - this means they have obtained their 
leadership status in the network during the period of 2006-2009.  
Figure 40 Visualization of Closeness Centrality Test DRR Network 2006-2009 
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Figure 40 gives an idea of the importance of each node. Sometimes, key donors are not mapped 
out in the network but their actual importance should not be underestimated. This includes some 
local actors that are simply modest nodes in the network, but which have roles that are crucial to 
society because modest nodes can be a funder such as UNDP which have been one of the key 
actors in disaster risk reduction in Indonesia as it supports local governments to do DRR reform. 
The dominant leaders (Figure 38) in the network are the outliers in the scatter plot, such as 
transitional Bakornas (node 12, BC=0.35; CC=0.48) owing to its role as an important hub of the 
national structure, which is formally known as a “coordinating body” for disaster reduction. The 
Disaster Mitigation Center at the Bandung Institute of Technology (PMB-ITB – node 1 in Fig. 
38) and UNESCO (node 17 in Fig. 38) as well as the Ministry of Public Works (node 13 in Fig. 
38) are much more strongly tied in the network. What is interesting is that UNDP, one of the 
prime sponsors behind the reform, has a modest rank.  Out of the top 20, nine are governmental 
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organizations, four are United Nations agencies, three are universities, and one is a national NGO 
(i.e. MPBI, node 7 with BC 0.0.15, CC 0.41 – one of the main initiators behind the reform).  
 
6.6. Discussion  and Conclusion  
In regard to the theoretical notions on how institutions change in relation to disasters, from 
anthropological perspective, Hoffman (1999:304) argues that the variables for change are the size 
(magnitude of disaster, population mass, and amount of damage), time, and the thicknesses of 
structures of cultural institutions (such as norms, customs, traditions).  
Large disasters such as the Flores tsunami in 1992 and the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 could 
be seen by ordinary people, including politicians and policymakers, as events beyond their 
comprehension, which could contradict the notion of Hoffman (1999) because in fact the 
dramatic effects of the events can convey the wrong messages to the people in power, namely, 
that such catastrophic events are simply beyond their imagination and control. The only factors 
that could help them cope with such a situation are the institutions closest to them, such as 
religion and culture. From this assertion, repeated large catastrophic events in fact reinforce the 
belief that disasters arise from God’s punishment because “immorality causes disasters”, as one 
of the Indonesian ministers recently explained to the people of Padang following the devastating 
earthquake there on 30 September, 2009.123 The ministry held a position on the National 
Coordination Body for Disaster Management (Bakornas) in 2005 and 2007 (see Figure 34, 
especially the Minister of Information and Communication). In fact, faith-based civil society 
organizations in Indonesia, mentioned in Section 6.2, did not adequately play roles as agents of 
disaster management policy change, simply because religious discourse may discourage rational 
views and scientific explanations of human-nature relations. 
The historical overview in Section 6.2.1 regarding the first genesis of anti-colonialism in Banten 
following the Krakatoa eruption and its associated tsunami (Winchester 2003:334) was fueled by 
the reasoning about divine punishment to the non-believing (colonial) government. Recent 
national disaster events such as Merapi Volcanic eruption (26 October – 19 November 2010) 
                                               
123 See the English version from the BBC:  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8384827.stm [last accessed 16 
June 2010]. 
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caused more than 200 casualties and more than 350,000 displaced people.124 There have been 
tens of opinions and articles at the national newspapers explaining why such a disaster happened 
and what can be done in the future.125 Cultural explanations from Javanese cosmology have been 
a ‘coping mechanism’ for the local people in Yogyakarta. Dove (2010) presents the local 
communities’ view on the cause of the Yogyakarta earthquake where  157,000 housing unit 
completely destroyed126 by in May 2006 – such as that such the event was “seen as a divine 
judgment on those holding the reins of political power” (Dove 2010:122). Schlehe (2010) also 
noted that the earthquake in 2006 in Yogyakarta have put pressure on the Sultan of Yogyakarta 
and  the President of the Republic, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, because “the leaders were seen 
as lacks blessing and legitimization from divine power” Schlehe (2010:116).  
These explanation on the cause of the disasters reconfirm one of the hypothesis in this research 
that the bigger the scale of an event that went beyond people’s understanding of the natural 
processes, the more difficult for disaster risk reduction reform, especially when the local 
institutions were weak(e.g. endemic corruption). This causes difficulties in encouraging a rational 
and science driven policy measures (Lavigne et. al. 2008) for volcano mitigation and post disaster 
management.  
The legacy of the Dutch colonial government can be traced until the recent past which proved 
that institutions are hard to change. Even if they change, they may change on the surface and not 
in substance, as happened during the period of 1970s-1999. Another explanation could be that the 
DRR discourse during 1970s-1990 simply took place in the context where ICT infrastructures 
were not as advanced as they are today. Neither surface nor substance change occurs in isolation. 
Instead, it occurs as a result of national-international interactions facilitated by the context of 
when and where (the level) such interactions take place. Recent changes in Indonesia in 2007 
disaster management policy were due to discursive changes at the global level coupled with 
large-scale disasters in Indonesia during the last ten years. Therefore, the disaster management 
                                               
124 Source: First Briefing Notes Forum PRB, 18 Nopember 2010 Emergency needs for Emergency response: Merapi 
Volcano Eruption 2010 page 1-2. 
125 Such as Kompas, Tempo and Seputar Indonesia. See for example an opinion from Sindhnata, an expert on 
Javanese philosophy argued that one of the meaning from the Merapi eruption can be that Merapi has been able to 
show its power that should make rational human be humble. This kind of reasoning suggests that Merapi have 
actually punished the people and http://cetak.kompas.com/read/2010/11/19/05042143/gara-gara.mbah.merapi  
126 Not including the 202,000 units that suffered some damage – See http://www.adb.org/documents/reports/damage-
loss/chap2.pdf  (Accessed on 30 March 2010) 
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policy reform in Indonesia has been a result of dual process: the dynamic context where recurrent 
catastrophic events provide opportunities for the (domestic actors inside and outside of) 
government to review its existing policy combined by international processes and platforms such 
as the bilateral and multilateral aid institutions that encourage the government and the non-state 
actors in general to change.  
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Chapter 7 Institutional Vulnerability and Decentralization  
7.1.  Introduction  
Disaster risk management policy reform in Indonesia takes place in the midst of three complex 
processes: First, the unfinished business of political reform at the national and local levels (see 
5.4.8); second, complex decentralization processes at the local level; and third, there is demand 
for reform simultaneously from other sectors such as water sector reform, legal reform, 
environmental policy reform, ongoing economic reform after the financial crisis a decade ago, 
and governance reform, as well as that in many more sectors including disaster risk management 
itself.  
7.2. Volatility in Indonesian Institutions and Governance 
Indonesian political reform has often been praised by foreign media and experts as being 
successful because of the country having conducted three democratic elections since 1999 
without significant complications. At the local level, district and provincial elections have also 
taken place successfully, which has been sustained up to the present. The problem is that, against 
such a successful picture, outcomes in human development are still relatively isolated from these 
achievements in politics.  
Under the Suharto authoritarian regime of 1968-1998, public participation and media freedom 
were suppressed. During the last 10 to 12 years after political reform, Indonesia has enjoyed more 
freedom in terms of participation and media freedom. On a scale of 0 to 1, “voice and 
accountability” has crept up from 0.14 in 1996 to 0.40s in the last three years. Despite some 
progress, the government still needs to substantially improve policies and regulations that are 
conducive to sectoral development, including risk reduction.  
On the basis of the regulatory quality index, Indonesia has been progressing since 2004; 
nevertheless, there is still a negative trend due to its high starting position in 1996 followed by a 
deep plunge in 2000. This is of course bad news for disaster management professionals who 
might have thought that they saw progress of disaster management policy by only looking at the 
enactment of new laws and ancillary regulations. In fact, certain disaster mitigation-related laws 
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such as Building Law 2002 have hardly had any effect on local realities.127   
 
Figure 41 Selected Governance Indicators for Indonesia 1996-2008 
 
 Source: Adapted from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009. ‘Linear’ means trend lines of 
selected variables.  
 
Government effectiveness index128 in Figure 41 illustrates the effectiveness of public services, 
bureaucracy, and the quality of the civil service. On a range of 0 to 1, the index fell threefold 
from 0.6 in 1996 to less than 0.2 in 1998. Indonesia has struggled to be effective in providing 
public services in both normal and pre- or post-disaster situations. Nothing indicates that 
emerging disaster management bureaucracy (at local and national levels) can be effective (and 
efficient/innovative) that is independent from the recent and the past templates of Indonesian 
bureaucracy.  
The World Governance Survey (WGS)129 noted that bureaucracy is a critical issue in regard to 
how a country sets and achieves its societal and economic goals. WGS’s findings imply that 
bureaucracy is the hardest to change; Indonesia’s public affairs still suffer from a low quality, as 
                                               
127 Ministry of Public Works admitted the enforcement was poor. See also table 19. 
128 It measures the quality of public services, bureaucracy, and the quality of the civil service, as well as the degree of 
its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
the government’s commitment to such policies 
129 See Goran Hyden, Julius Court, and Kenneth Mease (2003) World Governance Survey Discussion Paper 7 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3141.pdf.   
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can be seen in Figure 41. However, the trend is good as it has now emerged from the so-called 
“era of confusion” (Hyden et. al. 2003) during 1998-2000, but has hardly reached a point of 
satisfaction today.  
Rule of law index has fluctuated130 and it is the most volatile index of all WGI. However, there is 
a negative trend. This value has hardly improved from the 2000 level (it is still less than 0.3 on a 
scale of 0 to 1). Furthermore, it suffers further from corruption, as indicated by Figure 41, which 
is still rampant. One can still argue about a gap between the public perception and the actual 
progress in the fight against corruption. However, longitudinal study on this issue by Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009, 2010) pointed out that progress occurs very slowly. There is a 
positive trend as the country is enjoying a positive trend in the level of press freedom.  
Figure 41 is very interesting as it suggests widening divergence between press freedom and 
participation (measured by voice and accountability), which is in fact improving (see the trend 
line), whereas rule of law as well as regulatory quality of the country have been decreasing.  
7.3. Decentralization and Its Missing Links and Implications for DRR 
Indonesia rejects federalism because of its unitary state ideology rooted in the 1945 Constitution. 
Take the United States’ decentralization system as an example for comparison: the US’s 
decentralization is at the state-government level (equivalent to provinces in Indonesia). Indonesia 
took a different path by decentralizing central government power directly to cities/districts and 
not at the provincial level, except for the special case of Aceh province. There are some issues 
that cannot be decentralized, such as foreign affairs, defense and security, the judicial system, 
monetary and fiscal affairs, and religion.131 Disaster risk is still seen as a national defense and 
security affair and this is part of the reason why the military and police still have a role as 
steering committee members in the current national disaster management office (BNPB). The 
BNPB is a national body without offices at the local level; it cannot command local governments 
to undertake DRR. The realities of governing DRR are made through local governments as 
required by Law 24/2007 and a series of government regulations regarding local government’s 
specialized organizations. With this comes the hard fact regarding decentralization and DRR 
                                               
130 Rule of law measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
131 The others are: “macro-level planning, fiscal equalization, public administration, economic institutions, natural 
resource utilization, strategic technologies, conservation, and national standardization.” See Para 7.2  Law 22/1999. 
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policy implementation bottlenecks on the ground.  
The “big bang” decentralization process in Indonesia has challenged national and local 
governance dramatically. More than 220 new cities/districts (municipalities/regencies) have been 
created since 1999. In 1998, the total number of cities/districts was 280, and now in 2010 it is 500 
(June 2010, see Figure 42). This means that at least 220 new local governments have just started 
to exercise their power and command over local resources. A recent evaluation (report soon to be 
released) regarding the new city/district administrative affairs showed that they can take three 
years to ten years in transition, as many cities/districts have problems in public service deliveries 
after a transition of ten years.  
The vast majority of new cities/districts still depend on central government funds/grants for their 
annual budget, and a few can fund less than 5% of their annual budget; fiscal autonomy, which is 
one criterion for decentralization, can hardly be found in practice.132 This partly explains the 
puzzle shown in Figure 41 where there is emerging divergence in terms of a positive trend for 
media freedom (at least at the national level, even though it is still limited) and a negative trend in 
rule of law and regulatory quality, while government effectiveness is still poor and thus the 
majority of the people still suffer from poor public services. 
 
Figure 42 Numbers of Regencies/Cities in Indonesia 1950–2008 
 
 Source: Fitriani et al. 2004, Seldado et al. 2009 and Setneg Online Database 2009.  
 
In addition, because almost every sector (such as energy, water, land use, forestry, economy, and 
disaster management) needs reform, local governments (legislative and local executives) are 
                                               
132 A note from Endi Jaweng, a decentralization expert from KPPOD (Regional Autonomy Monitoring and 
Implementation Commission). Personal communication.  
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required to lead the local transformation process. In the case of disaster risk management, at least 
200 new cities/districts hardly utilize the old structure that has gone under revision at least six 
times since 1979. Human capital for even reactive responses must be built from scratch. Local 
institutions are still vulnerable not only to problems coping with disaster risks but also still have 
problems in meeting the increasing demand from various sectoral reforms.  
Indonesia’s decentralization is characterized by multiple hierarchies of structure, function, 
funding, and areas of responsibility; there are inherent structural disadvantages to making DRR a 
local priority – as required by Law 24/2007 as well as HFA – because “missing links” in vertical 
governance may prevail, such as the lack of steering power of provincial governments to enforce 
mitigation measures at the city/district level. Sudarmo and Sudjana 2009 argued that de facto 
power and authority flow from central government to cities/districts, which means that provincial 
governments have no clear functions. Apart from their mandate for monitoring and coordination, 
provinces do not in fact have administrative power over the regencies/cities. This means that 
monitoring and coordination for disaster risk reduction and many more sectors will be difficult to 
implement and not easily enforced.  
In the context of vertical governance, analysis of DRR institutions should involve a focus on the 
existence of multiple hierarchies, such as structural hierarchy, functional hierarchy, sharing and 
division of responsibility, and fiscal hierarchy (Sudarmo and Sudjana 2009:4, 11). 
In terms of structural hierarchy, Figure 43(a) explains the structure according to Local 
Government Law 32/2004, where city/district governments are not linked by any means to 
provincial ones, as they are linked only to the central government; this is contrary to the general 
public understanding of the location of provinces in the hierarchy, they have in fact no or only 
symbolic power between the levels of district and central governments. On the other hand, some 
external interventions on DRR occur through the provinces with naïve (or false) expectations that 
the provinces can command the cities/districts to follow policy prescriptions. There is clearly a 
missing link, which has developed due to political decentralization (see Works 2002 – Section 
2.3.2.) in Indonesia; city/district governments (both legislative and executive) are directly elected 
by the people and therefore held accountable to the people directly (although this not always the 
case) and cities/districts have no direct responsibility to provincial governments. This is the 
opposite of the situation before the reform. Therefore, any new policy innovation from the central 
government simply cannot be channeled through provincial governments because it has been 
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made irrelevant to the district governments as the real power have been granted directly to the 
district governments (Figure 43a).  
 
Figure 43 Multiple Hierarchies of Structure, Function, and Fiscal Affairs 
Source: Adapted from Sudarmo and Sudjana 2009. 
 
The capacity such as human resources and information and knowledge capital is still (and often 
only) available in provinces rather than cities/districts. Having said this, this does not mean that 
provincial governments are already qualified to effectively steer the lower levels of government 
towards higher quality. The absence of steering capital from the provinces is obviously a lost 
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chain in vertical governance. In addition, press and civil society, which often have roles as third 
party monitors of the government, are generally based at the provincial level.  
To solve the issue of a missing link in vertical governance, as there is clearly no link between 
district and province (Fig. 43a), the central government issued a new regulation in 2007 to 
authorize provincial governments to have clear steering roles by granting central government 
representative status, complemented by monitoring and oversight tasks. The model of governing 
shown in Fig. 43b and 43c still generates difficulties of legitimacy for provincial governments. 
Two other complementary models have been offered to solve these pitfalls. The first is to give 
provincial governments some seed capital to deliver to lower levels of government, which is 
generally earmarked as deconcentration funds133; in addition, the central government has also 
provided “assistance tasks funds”, which are optional and complementary. Apparently, as shown 
in Fig. 43d, things turn out to be more complicated as central government also provides 
“assistance tasks funds” directly to village-level governments, which seems to strengthen national 
programs and the central government’s interest, which is often deviated or shifted by local 
government interests when it flows through local governments. Fig. 43d provides a solution for 
the provincial governments to also channel resources directly to the village level in order to 
increase their legitimacy and to safeguard national programs. This is obviously necessary because 
of volatility in local governments in the budgeting of prioritized basic social services, apart from 
malpractice in local budgeting as local governments may cut short program budgets and spend 
more on overhead costs. Central government disburses the main support, namely, General 
Allocation Budget (DAU), complemented by Specific Allocation Budget (DAK), as well as 
grants to the local governments.  
Decentralization also means delegating power to lower levels, that is, the transfer of authority and 
responsibility to cities/districts. Therefore, local governments have been given greater authority 
to regulate local affairs, so long as the regulations being produced do not conflict with national 
                                               
133 Deconcentration funds shall include any fund coming from APBN (national budget) implemented by a governor 
as the government representative, including all revenues and expenditures in order to implement deconcentration, 
excluding any fund allocated for central vertical agency in such a region. See details in 
www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/document.php/document/article/165/150/ [last accessed 9 July 2010]. 
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interests. As of 2009, 1,843 local regulations have been canceled by the central government 
(which equates to about four local regulations produced in every district being cancelled).134 
  
Figure 44 DRR Integration within Development-Related Planning 
 
Note: Interpretation based on Law 24, 26/2007, DRM Plan 2010-2014, NAP DRR 2010-2012. 200x 
denotes different planned starting periods in every province and district in Indonesia. 
 
7.4.  Disaster Risk Reduction Planning After Reform 
The “ideal type” of integration of disaster risk management into development is embedded into 
four types of development-related planning. The first is the long-term planning with a period of a 
20-year cycle divided into two planning regimes, long-term development planning (LTDP) and 
spatial planning. Ideally, spatial planning is made in advance in order to contribute to the LTDP. 
In practice, the institutional setup often makes the uptake of spatial planning into LTDP difficult. 
For instance, recent national LTDP started earlier in 2005 while the spatial planning reform as 
                                               
134 See the data at http://www.kppod.org/ [last  accessed 1 July 2010]. 
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required by the Spatial Planning Law in 2007 was just recently drafted in 2008; this makes it 
impossible for spatial planning to be sufficiently considered in the ongoing LTDP.  
Equally, at the provincial and local levels, similar events take places. Reconciliation of these two 
planning regimes is crucial. There is an impression that the uptake of spatial planning policy into 
LTDP can be made in flexible ways. However, this is easily stated, but almost impossible in 
practice. In addition, both have their own legal status; for instance, the LTDP is formally 
proposed by the executive government and agreed by the legislative body. The LTDP in 2005-
2025, which was drafted soon after the 2004 tsunami, contains limited consideration of disaster 
risks. 
 
Figure 45 Network Analysis of Indonesian DRR Planning System: Degree Centrality Test  
 
Note: Interpretation based on Law 24, 26/2007, DRM Plan 2010-2014, NAP DRR 2010-2012 
  
All medium-term development planning (MTDP) at each level must refer to the LTDP. The 
MTDP that produced later can comply with the spatial planning. Figure 45 below represents the 
concept of Figure 44 using a directed graph to demonstrate that, for all national, provincial, and 
city/district medium-term development planning must legally refer to the spatial planning and 
LTDP. 
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Figure 45 demonstrates the network analysis based on the DRR-development planning structure 
given in Figure 44. The size of the nodes reflects the degree (in social network terms) that 
indicates the number of links with the other nodes. It appears that medium-term development 
planning is the crucial facilitating node for all levels (the biggest in size) as it connects all the 
long-term national planning regimes with the short-term ones as well as with the lower hierarchy 
level. Since medium-term development planning (MTDP) contains the development vision from 
the elected executives (president at the national level and head of region at provincial and district 
levels), most often the MTDP does not comply with the long term planning regimes (such as 
LTDP and Spatial Planning) because the MTDP is the political product of the elected executives.  
Disaster risk management integration into the processes of development is relatively new. The 
first exercise started in 2010 when the government published a Disaster Management Plan 2010-
2014, which was later adopted into the 2010-2014 National MTDP. The National DRM Planning 
2010-2014 document is claimed to have a dual function as a planning document and at the same 
time a guideline for the ministry/national agency to draft their DRR-sensitive five-year strategic 
plan document, DRR National Action Plan, and for regional disaster management agencies. The 
roles of the National DRM Plan document can be found in Box 3. 
To date, there is very limited evidence of both the provinces and the cities/districts also drafting 
their own disaster risk management plans to be incorporated in regional MTDP. Therefore, 
Figures 44 and 45 are the “ideal types” or the traceable vision found in the formal documents. In 
addition, given the fact that the mandated agency for DRM Plan is the national disaster 
management office (BNPB), there is a planning legitimacy issue over whether BNPB has the 
power to plan for a nationwide DRM plan beyond its organizational territory and power. The 
basic problem is that BNPB was given the highest planning authority in DRM, far beyond its 
organizational boundaries and authority. However, the pathways for long-term development 
planning authority have been well placed in the Ministry of National Development Planning and 
Spatial Planning mandate has been placed in the Ministry of Public Works. This create 
complexity in the horizontal coordination between the governmental agencies at the national 
level.  
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Box 3 Principles for Implementation of National DRR Planning 
  
 A reference to the ministries, central government agencies, local governments, private 
organizations/business and communities.  
 The ministries, central government agencies, are obliged to develop strategic planning 
incorporating the DRR perspective according to their mandates and functions with reference 
to the relevant National Planning document.   
 Local governments bear the responsibility to develop local disaster management plans that 
function as guidelines for SKPD (local government working units) strategic planning by 
referring to the national plan for DRR.  
 Ministries, government agencies, must guarantee consistency between the long-term planning 
and their strategic planning related to disaster reduction.   
 Respective local governments should guarantee consistency between the national DM plan 
and the local medium-term development planning  
 In order to improve the effectiveness of implementation of the plan, BNPB and the Ministry 
of National Development Planning are responsible for monitoring of DM planning into 
ministries’ strategic planning, National Action Plan 2010-2012, and Local Disaster 
Management Plan, as well as local medium-term development planning.  
Source: Renas 2010-2014, page 5-6. 
7.5. Recent Progress on DRM-Related Law Enforcement 
Law 24/2007 for disaster management has been enforced by the other lower regulations in at least 
five different stages: regulation from the presidential level down to the level of ministries, such as 
the Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for providing institutional guidance for any new 
law and regulation to become executable at the provincial and district levels. In the provinces, 
there is either legislative or executive governmental process of creating provincial regulation, 
without which, laws and national regulations remain powerless. Given the unique context of 
decentralization in Indonesia’s structural hierarchy, city/district governments are not directly 
responsible to the provincial government; instead, they are directly responsible to the central 
government. Therefore, any created provincial regulation focusing on risk reduction may have no 
impact on the ground because the province may only have a limited steering role, which in many 
cases actually produces a steering deficit due to some failings in institutional capacity (e.g. 
human resources and information). Consequently, in theory, the 500 cities/districts must have 
their own processes of creating local regulation regarding disaster risk reduction.  
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DRM policy reform also finds its way through the Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 and, after the 
Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, the government asserted the need for reform in the nationwide 
coastal management sectors, which was manifested in the Management of Coastal Zones and 
Small Islands Law 27/2007. Meanwhile, reform in mitigation, such as the enactment of the 
National Building Law of 2002, has occurred silently without clear progress in implementation.  
In general, the prime movers behind each of these laws were different and, in effect, as will be 
shown later, the progress of the enforcement at national and local levels of each law resulted in 
very different paths and directions. Discussion on Law 26/2007 will be briefly presented below. 
While Law 27/2007 will not be discussed at all because data on its enforcement is difficult to 
obtain.135 
The processes for the enactment of Disaster Management Law 24/2007 have been claimed as 
deliberative with strong involvement of stakeholders, including non-state actors, especially 
NGOs and UN organizations, political organizations, academia, executive government, and 
legislative agencies, among others (see BNPB-UNDP 2009). Civil society organizations (CSOs) 
have been heavily involved in the whole process of legal drafting, consultation, debates, hearings, 
and campaigning from day one to the production of the final DM Law 24/2007. In the words of 
some CSO activists, tireless efforts despite limited logistical resources have paid off by the 
enactment of the law. The implementation of the law, such as the establishment of the new 
National Disaster Management Agency, was seen as a great success. Some key CSO actors 
claimed the newly established National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) as their “baby” 
that today may not work according to the logic of the “biological parents” (e.g. 
drafters/promoters/campaigners) 136  because it has been inappropriately nurtured by the 
bureaucratic mentality and logic.  
At the national level, enforcement of the laws often occurs at the government level (under the 
president office) as well as at the ministerial level. One of the key transformation points is the 
overhaul of the Interior Ministry, which provides technical guidance on how enforcement at the 
                                               
135 Comprehensive information regarding the enforcement of the Law   27/2007 barely available online. The 
interviewed DRR actors often have no idea regarding this law.  
136 On many occasions, Ms. Hening Parlan, former General Secretary of Indonesian Disaster Management Society 
(MPBI), often called the office her “baby” because it was born in the very minds of key MPBI members. This was 
after several initial multistakeholder workshops in Jakarta in 2005, especially three months after the Indian Ocean 
tsunami in December, 2004. 
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local level should be carried out.  The later stage of enforcement of the law is at the local level 
(provinces and cities/districts), which can be measured by the speed of ratification of the 
respective national laws at the local level.  
Enforcement of the disaster management law, as indicated by provincial ratification, had reached 
85% as of June, 2010 (90% by November 2010), and is likely to occur in all provinces within the 
near future. At the district level, progress has been more difficult as the speed of adoption is 
slower. By November, 2010, 250 out of 500 ((compare with June 2010: 103 out of 250) 
cities/districts had ratified the law. At this rate, it is very likely that, by 2020, almost all districts 
will have adopted it.  
Table 19 DRR-Related Legal Reform and Status of Enforcement  
Name of Law 
Level of Vertical 
Enforcement Horizontal Enforcement at National Level 
Province  City/District  
Spatial Planning Law 
26/2007  
6* 11* Enforced e.g. by GR 26/2008 - 10 Mar 
2008 on Implementation of Spatial 
Planning Law, followed by Ministry of 
Public Works Regulations in 2007  18% 2% 
Disaster Management 
Law 24/2006  
30** 250** Enforced by GR 21-23/2008 - all signed 
on 28 Feb 2008, Presidential Decree 
08/2008 on National Disaster 
Management Office  90% 50% 
Building Law 28/2002 N.A.* N.A* Enforced by GR 36/2005 
*. Data June 2010; ** Data November 2010 estimate 
Enforcement of the Spatial Planning Law137 and the Disaster Management Law as presented in 
Table 19 can be used as evidence that institutional change is often difficult to achieve in a short 
period of time. Since the enactment of Spatial Planning Law 26/2007, only 18% (6 out of 33) of 
provinces have enacted the local Perda (local regulation) of Spatial Planning. At the city/district 
level138, as of June, 2010, only 2% of the cities/districts have enacted the local spatial planning 
regulation. The fact that the vertical enforcement of DM Law 24/2007 is far more faster than 
                                               
137 There are different stories regarding the legislation process for Spatial Planning Law 26/2007. Spatial Planning 
Law 26/2007 is a revision of the 1992 version. In the revised version for 2007, the Spatial Planning Law was 
radically changed and embodied a paradigm shift towards disaster-risk-sensitive spatial planning, which is clear 
throughout the pages of the document. The general impression is that the stakeholder involvement in the last law was 
actually less intense than that of the Disaster Management Law. It involved drafters (academics/professionals) and 
technical government agencies (such as Public Works Ministry, Development Planning Ministry), legislators, and 
limited civil society involvement. Further research on the differences between the two processes is needed.  
138 In this dissertation “cities/districts” are treated as synonyms of municipalities/regencies. 
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Spatial Planning Law (26/2007) begs further questions for future research. But one of the answer 
is probably that because the present scenario from the central government to provide incentives 
(contingency funds) for districts with conditions that districts and cities must have local level 
disaster management agencies. This justified the notion of new institutional economic theory 
works that actors follow the rules because they are motivated by the new incentives. But as far as 
the DRR regulatory quality is concern, ‘rational’ behavior towards incentives are not necessarily 
built on proper, and comprehensive rational vision of DRR.   
In the case of Building Law 28/2002, it remains as a paper without clear reason for three years 
after its promulgation at the national level in 2005; at the ministerial level, it was enforced later in 
2007, while at district level, the ratification of the Building Law has been extremely limited. 
There is no clear data on how many cities/districts have managed to adopt and ratify Law 
28/2002. Figures are highly inaccurate because recent claims have been mixed up with the old 
local regulation on building permits, which often only regulates the administrative affairs of 
building permit taxes without technical provisions on the nitty-gritty of engineering aspects of the 
buildings. Further discussion will be provided in 7.4.1.  
It is clear that inclusive processes in the legislation may provide much driving force for local 
enforcement because CSOs and motivated stakeholders often provide voluntary policy 
monitoring and advocacy.139 Furthermore, there have clearly been international players, such as 
INGOs, United Nations, and donor agencies, directly supporting local governments to start their 
local legislation processes. This has been evidenced in many provinces and districts where 
ratification took place in 2008, such as West Sumatra, Aceh, and NTT.  
This seems to fit the notion that when claims of ownership of the processes in drafting the law are 
                                               
139 One of the Oxfam’s DRR project is called “Preparedness Response Influence of policy a Model for Emergencies” 
shorten as PRIME. The project has been designed for the Indonesian CSOs partners to focus on three aspects: the 
first is to influence of DRR policy that encourages local government’s preparedness; The second is to build the 
capacity of local actors to response to the emergency; And the third, working with the vulnerable communities 
reduce their risks. Participant observation has been used as data collection method as the author had invited to 
participate in the two of the project meetings: The first was during the Mid Term Review of PRIME Projects 28-30 
July 2008 in Yogyakarta, where the author were invited to present a paper entitled “The rise of risk – where is the 
resilience?”. The second was during a civil society meeting (mostly Oxfam Great Britain’s NGO partners from all 
parts of Indonesia) in Denpasar, Bali on 4-6 Feb 2009 where the author also presented a draft paper entitled “The 
DNA Code of Risk: Why Vulnerability Matters! A Civil Society Response to Draft Guidelines for Disaster Risk 
Assessment in Indonesia.” This paper is an international peer reviewed advocacy paper, drafted for Oxfam & 
Indonesian CSOs and already translated in Bahasa. The Summary of the paper was published at the Jakarta Post 
Newspaper and also at the Indonesian Society for Disaster Management. Available at 
http://www.mpbi.org/content/jonatan-lassa-feeling-better-doing-worse (last accessed on 15 Nov 2010) 
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high from many stakeholders, as happened with the drafting of the Disaster Management Law 
during 2005-2007 (BNPB-UNDP (2009a, 2009b, 2009c), national and local level enforcement 
seems to be stronger at an earlier stage, but may not be sustained even though in the planning 
documents such as DRM Plan 2010-2014, significant resource have been allocated to local level 
DRR institution building (See 7.7.3) because based on the past experience, there have been huge 
gaps between planning and implementation (See Figure 54 National Action Plan 2006-2009: 
Actual vs Planning) 
One of the secrets behind the achievement of local endorsement of the DM Law, in comparison 
with the Spatial Planning Law, was that the Spatial Planning Agency hosted by the Ministry of 
Public Works prefers certain forms of local regulation. Local level regulation can take at least 
two forms: the first is the Peraturan Daerah, namely, Perda (local regulation), which is jointly 
endorsed by both legislative (legislators) and executive branches (head of district). Therefore, 
legitimacy is higher and the likelihood of sustained legislative support is higher than those of the 
next form of local regulation, known as Peraturan Kepala Daerah or Perkada (Head of Region 
Regulation – such as Head of City regulation or Head of Province regulation). 
Perda takes a longer time as it requires certain processes, such as the production of academic 
papers including those on its logistical processes, public consultation and debate, negotiation, and 
sometimes conflict. Perkada is the easiest to be issued because it is the concern of the head of the 
regional unit (province or city/district) alone and its drafting process does not have to be 
deliberative. Hence, there is a problem with political legitimacy because of the nature of volatility 
of local budgetary politics. There are limits to Perkada when local political conflict is high (as is 
often the case in many parts of Indonesia after the national reform and the big-boom 
decentralization in Indonesia started in 1999). Perda’s drafting is more deliberative but does not 
always eliminate the political volatility, including that related to local budget politics to support 
certain sectors and programs/projects; however, given its shared-vision nature for both executive 
and legislative branches, Perda does, at least in theory, and in many actual cases, provide more 
sustainability, but of course this is not always the case. 
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Figure 46 Statistics of Perkada versus Perda for Local Disaster Management 
 
[June 2010 – developed from BNPB database June 2010] 
 
Figure 46 shows that certain provinces prefer Perkada over Perda (71% Perkada; 29% Perda). 
At the district level, 60 out of 103 (June 2010) prefer to use Perda while the rest use Perkada. In 
terms of legality, both are equally legal in a given jurisdictional unit. However, regarding 
evidence of local level enforcement towards sustainable investment and practice in disaster risk 
reduction only time can tell. The delays of spatial planning enforcement at the local level can be 
explained by the preference of actors to use Perda instead of Perkada because higher level 
regulations require this. While for DRR, local governments have been given options (by the 
DRM Law) to prefer either Perda or Perkada (See further explanation in the next Section 7.5.1) 
Policymakers should decide based on their heuristic understanding (in other words, make an 
educated guess based on their experience) of the available options of Perda and Perkada. 
However, if the long-term approach and sustainable institutions are the main concerns, Perda is a 
better option even though it takes longer to be drafted.  
7.5.1. Institutional Constraints at National and Local Levels: Recent Findings 
In a facilitated e-discussion by the author regarding local and national institutional problems in 
implementing DRR, 12 outstanding individuals involved in the local disaster risk management 
process voluntarily responded to one open-ended question: “What are the two main institutional 
Perkada, 
20; 
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Perda, 
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Province
Perka
da, 43; 
42%
Perda, 
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58%
City/district
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problems at local and national levels?” 140 Each participant responded by sharing their subjective 
views on the problem at local and national levels. Even though it was well understood that the 
new local disaster management office (or hereinafter BPBD) formation serves as an enabling 
condition for local level DRR implementation, they saw the formation of BPBD in cities/districts 
as a logical consequence of the law or that the formation of local disaster management office has 
‘naturally’ occurred, provided that the law has been in existence rather than as a local response to 
disaster risks. There were barely any complaints regarding the speed of the local legislation 
process.  
  
                                               
140 The e-discussion started on Friday Apr 16 till 30 April 2010. The 12 DRR professional were from different local 
contexts dealing with local disaster management organization from Central Java, NTT, Aceh, Padang, and Papua.. 
All are DRR professionals with professional experience varying from 4 to 15 years. The answers were qualitatively 
recorded and later coded into Figure 47.  
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Figure 47 Perception on the Institutional/Organizational Obstacles 
 
This was based on the answers from the e-discussion - the ranking was done by the author  
 
 
There is a well-known legacy from the old disaster management structure (under Bakornas 
system, see Chapter 6), when in the past non-performing officers and troublemaking bureaucrats 
were often placed in the secretariat of local disaster management offices as one form of 
punishment because the offices were once the least well resourced. After the reform, the offices 
are likely to struggle and to suffer from this organizational legacy. At the local level, human 
resources seem to be more problematic than at the national level. However, most responders 
could not fully answer for the national scale because most of them were based at the local 
level.141  
                                               
141 At the national level, the Steering Committee members of BPNP from outside the government were chosen on the 
basis of merit in view of their knowledge and wisdom, but also it may also because of political proximity of the 
members. The process it self based on fit and proper test according to the politicians at the national House of 
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One DRR facilitator shared views on the constraints of working in partnership with the local 
governments during the last four years in West Sumatra. The main message is clear that 
bureaucracy is one of the serious problems. A recent case was outlined of a few staff from a 
provincial BPBD office (just established in April, 2010) asking for fees and transportation 
allowance when attending a workshop facilitated by a small NGO. “The NGO invited the 
provincial BPBD with a noble purpose to give the agency visibility in the local districts and 
increase their legitimacy. In fact they also come with official transport facility.”142 By all 
accounts, as presented in the beginning of this chapter, government effectiveness in the field of 
disaster management is not isolated from the macro context of bureaucracy in Indonesia.   
Lastly, on the preference of using Perkada to form local disaster management offices, this is seen 
by the responders as an ad hoc approach. This is particularly interesting as this view is not shared 
by the bureaucrats themselves143 because both are legally valid and the only difference is in the 
legitimacy issue. However, the truth is that for any local disaster management office (BPBD) to 
be considered as part of local government working units (a.k.a. SKPD)144 and ready to access a 
regular annual budget, the BPBDs must be based on Perda, that is, local regulation co-produced 
by both legislative and executive branches. Therefore, the speed of BPBD formation as shown in 
Figure 46 indicates future sustainability problems for governability of disaster risk reduction.145  
7.6. Understanding Law Enforcement Using Institutional Network Analysis 
This section demonstrates network analysis of the recent local regulation (Perda) for disaster risk 
management. The purpose of this test still refers to the same research questions but in order to 
determine the quality of the Perda being produced. Since not all documents are available to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Representative. To the surprise of many DRR professionals in Indonesia, the politicians were not able to select Dr. 
Paripurno, the UNISDR Sasakawa Laureate 2009, who was nominated to be one of the Steering Committee members 
to represent NGOs. Dr. Paripurno has been training DRR facilitators in 22 provinces, reaching more than 1,500 local 
community-based DRR facilitators in Indonesia. Please consult http://www.unisdr.org/eng/sasakawa/sasakawa09-
list.html. The nomination of Dr. Paripurno was managed and steered by the author together with the Indonesian 
Society for Disaster Management.  
142 Anon. Email communication on 7/05-2010 
143 Mr. Paulus Liu: a Local Development Planning Officer (Bappeda) and a PhD candidate at the Australian National 
University argues against the view of the responders. Personal communication, 10 May 2010.  
144 SKPD is a local government working unit under regional secretary leadership. It is comparable to sectoral 
departments of local government.  
145 On the basis of GR 41/2007, formation or establishment of organizational instrument at the local government 
must be based on Perda, which is further elaborated at lower level regulation. The same point was also mentioned in 
Permendagri 46/2008, Chapter 2, Article 2, point 2.  
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public and not all BPBDs are formed by specific local regulations, only 12 local regulations are 
analyzed, including those for BPBD Aceh, BPBD Agam, BPBD Bantul, Provincial DM 
Regulation NTT, BPBD NTT, BPBD Bojonegoro, BPBD Sikka, BPBD Gorontalo, and BPBD 
West Java. (See selected list of DRR and DRR related regulations in Annex 7) 
 
Figure 48 Degree Centrality Test of Local Disaster Regulations  (N-87) 
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Both Figure 48 and Figure 49 present centrality analysis, for which the in-built assumptions are 
as follows: a good Perda must have strong ties with other relevant superior regulation at national 
and regional levels. In quantitative terms, the quality will be seen in the value of degree centrality 
test (i.e. how many ties a Perda has in relation to other related local and national laws and 
regulations), and in betweenness centrality (e.g. values that reflect the level of ‘leadership’ 
centrality relative to other regulations in a given network – see Figure 48): the bigger the nodes 
the better the leadership of the regulation.   
Lastly is the closeness centrality test, which will receive less attention in this section. The 
numbers 1-87 reflect the number of 87 laws/regulations from local to national level. Eighty-seven 
is the total number of laws/regulations in the given network, drawn from 12 disaster management 
Perda. 
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Figure 49 Betweenness Centrality Test of Local Disaster Regulations (N-87) 
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Apparently, the vertices (nodes) numbered (1), (2), and (3) are bigger than the rest of the nodes 
because this centrality analysis mainly focuses on the quality of the Perda. The bigger the size of 
a vertex (node), the more important it is in the network. The meaning of Figures 48 and 49 
together can be visualized in the scatter plot in Figure 50. Apparently, node 87 (Local Disaster 
Management Regulation or Perda of West Java), node 86 (West Sumatra Disaster Management 
Perda), and node 83 (BPBD Samarinda City)146 are the top outliers in the two selected regression 
analyses. The reason for this is obvious as they managed to comply with the superior regulations 
as much as both the local legislators and the legal drafters could. Betweenness centrality involves 
mapping the “leaders” in a network and closeness centrality measures the importance of a node in 
a network; they complement each other in explaining relationships. 
                                               
146 The capital city of East Kalimantan Province, Indonesia. 
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Figure 50 Selected Regression of Centrality Analysis 
 
 
The most important national laws are node 2 (Law 32/2004, which regulates the local 
government including the main reference regarding how local institutions of DRR should be 
located in the province and districts – see Figure 50 left), node 4 (Law 33/2004 on fiscal balance 
between cities/districts and the provinces – a very important law because it regulates how 
resources in the development processes should be shared – indeed a DRR incentive structure), 
and node 6 (Law 24/2007 on disaster management). Obviously, it may be that an important 
law/regulation is not considered adequately by the local policymakers, which eventually means 
that a certain crucial law/regulation ends up at the bottom of the left axis for both tests (Figure 50 
left and right). The worst scenario is that an important law/regulation is not considered at all and 
is totally neglected.  
From Figure 50 (left), it appears that Perda disaster management in NTT (node 85), including 
Perda on local disaster management agency or BPBD NTT (node 82) together with BPBD Aceh, 
are closer to the regression line, together with BPBD Sikka. Meanwhile, BPBD Bantul is one of 
the bottom outliers. The further an item falls below the regression line, the less its level of 
leadership within the network. In Figure 50 (right), it appears that most Perda for BPBD fall well 
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below the regression line despite their strong ties to other nodes (measured by their degree 
centrality); node numbers 2, 4, and 6 remain influential leaders.  
Figure 51 Extracted Network Based on Degree Centrality N=50 
 
1 city/district 
regulation on 
BPBD 
2 provincial 
regulation on 
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5 ministerial 
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the president  
 7 national laws 8 International 
instruments 
         
Note: the analysis uses all the accessible data from Perda DRM as of June 30th 2010.147 
DM Law for West Sumatra signed on 27 June, 2007, is an example in terms of how it seeks to 
comply with other laws, including those that are no longer relevant or have expired. It is linked to 
Forestry Law, an expired Environmental Law, Donation Law from 1961, an expired Social 
Welfare Law from 1979, as well as an expired Spatial Planning Law from 1992. This is actually 
bizarre because the drafters including the legislators were not well informed of the enactment of 
Spatial Planning Law 2007. This could happen due to either lack of information regarding Spatial 
Planning Law 2007 (a proxy for lack of deliberation) or simply the local legal drafters and the 
policymakers did not know the vision of DRR. Most of the laws complied with by the West 
Sumatran policymakers were not referenced at all by the rest of the provinces, which was not 
because of different contexts but simply different logics of compliance with superior regulations.  
Certain provinces and cities preferred to use the Anti-Corruption Law 1999 to safeguard their 
disaster management vision as the law is captured in the local regulation. For instance, three 
                                               
147 The data collected from various personal network of the author including the downloadable data from BNPB 
Websites: http://www.bnpb.go.id/. However, not all downloadable PDF files are useful because some of the Perda 
documents can not be analyzed because some of the districts and provinces set up their DRM regulation and BPBD 
offices based on a general Perda and not specific for either DRM or BPBD. 
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Perda (node 82 BPBD NTT, node 84 Sikka, and node 72 Bojonegoro) are connected to node 20 
(Anti-Corruption Law 1999). Clearly, this suggests the main discourse behind the drafting of the 
regulation in the specific local context. One of the most surprising findings is that of all the 12 
Perda analyzed (Figure 48-51), only two Perda consider that the recent Spatial Planning 
regulation is important for local disaster management. 148 
Take DM regulation of West Java as an example. Different logics were used as it refers to the 
Water Resource Management Law, which was probably due to high exposure to floods149, as well 
as referring to Environmental Protection Law 2009, Social Welfare Law 2009, and Law of Road 
Infrastructure 2004. The Perda for BPBD Samarinda City is also an exception as it refers to the 
Social Welfare Law 1974, Law 14/1992 on Road and Traffic (but totally ignores Road Law 
38/2004), Law 34/2004 on National Military, Law 11/1967 on Mining (already expired), Law 
2/2002 on Police, and Law 18/1999 on construction services. Why certain important laws that are 
strongly related to mitigation, such as Building Law, were not complied with at all by the drafters 
and legislators is a particularly interesting topic for future investigation.  
7.6.1. Correlation Test 
Here, descriptive statistical analysis is presented together with correlation tests. For all 
correlation tests, the results are very significant at 0.01 (two-tailed). There is very high 
correlation between betweenness centrality and degree centrality (0.856) as well as between 
closeness centrality and betweenness centrality (0.78) with N = 87 (Table 20).  
On the basis of the result shown in Table 20, it can be concluded that betweenness centrality 
suggests the level of leadership, in contrast to closeness centrality, which suggests the level of 
importance. The means of closeness centrality are always higher than those of betweenness 
centrality in Table 21.  
It is suggested that a deeper analysis can be undertaken in the future when more data on local 
regulation are available. Methodologically, the network analysis above is unexpectedly useful in 
                                               
148 Based on Law 26/2007. Only in West Java Province and Samarinda City was the law considered.  
149 However, it is not considered in Samarinda’s version. 
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bringing new insights to discourse analysis. This exercise suggests that discourse analysis can 
also be carried out with the aid of social network analysis.150  
 
Table 20 Correlation Test Degree, Closeness, and Betweenness Centrality 
Centrality analysis Degree 
centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Betweenne
ss 
centrality 
Degree centrality Pearson correlation test 1 .780** .856** 
Significance (two-
tailed)  
.000 .000 
N 87 87 87 
Closeness centrality Pearson correlation test .780** 1 .644** 
Significance (two-
tailed) 
.000  .000 
N 87 87 87 
Betweenness 
centrality 
Pearson correlation test .856** .644** 1 
Significance (two-
tailed) 
.000 .000  
N 87 87 87 
**. The correlation is significant at 0.01 (two-tailed). 
 
  
Table 21 Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
Centrality test Mean Standard Deviation N 
Degree centrality .0569 .07262 87 
Closeness centrality .3454 .05973 87 
Betweenness 
centrality 
.0234 .05901 87 
 
7.7. HFA Implementation in Indonesia  
7.7.1. Overall Progress  
Besides national reform processes, Indonesia has complied with the Hyogo Framework for 
Action (a.k.a. the international blueprint for disaster risk reduction for 2005–2015) through the 
development of two National Action Plans (NAPs) for 2006-2009 and recently for 2010-2012.  
The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) has served as a soft institution as it originated at the 
World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe, 2005, as an element of global discourse and 
                                               
150 There is also network text analysis. Please see also the http://www.textanalysis.info/ (accessed on 25 Oct 2010); 
Please also see an example from Diesner and Carley 2004 from http://en.scientificcommons.org/43236639.  
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later arrived as an element of national and local discourse in Indonesia, which has driven actors to 
comply with its indicators of progress. The evidence of its arrival and manifestation as a soft 
institution can be found in many spheres.  Since the finalization of its indicators for progress (as 
presented in Chapters 3 and 4), local and international actors took only a few days to translate the 
indicators and spread them all over the DRR network in Indonesia (both professionals and 
academics).  
Since Indonesia formally complies with the Hyogo Declaration and is fully committed to 
progress according to HFA, it sends self-evaluation on the progress of implementation. This was 
first carried out in May, 2009, to contribute to the Global Assessment Report on DRR 2009.  
Apart from the National Disaster Management Office sending the progress report151 in 2009, in 
the country there were also other national actors that initiated measurement of the level of 
progress of HFA implementation, such as the National Platform for DRR 2009, which assessed 
Indonesia’s achievement in reducing risks on the basis of HFA indicators of progress.  
The Views from the Frontline – a global network of civil society organizations (CSOs) for 
disaster reduction - also voluntarily surveys alternative views on the progress of HFA 
implementation.152 One of the findings from the Views from the Frontline is provocatively 
shortened as follows: “The people I work with every day see many clouds - international 
initiatives and plans, but very little rain - actual change at the frontline.”153 The methods for 
measurements have their own difficulties: the analysis involved average values (ranging from 1-
5) for 22 indicators of progress surveyed for local government officials, local NGOs, and selected 
local communities in areas recently affected by disaster.  
Since this is no absolute measurement of institutional progress and arguably objectivity is 
difficult to achieve, the raw data from the Views from the Frontline Indonesia 2009 will be used 
with reservations here.  
In fact, all agree that, overall, on a scale of 1-5, Indonesia can only be awarded a maximum of 3. 
This varies from group to group (see Figure 52). In addition, as demonstrated in Figure 53, expert 
                                               
151 http://www.preventionweb.net/files/7486_Indonesia%5B1%5D.pdf  [last accessed 20 Dec 2009]. 
152 http://www.globalnetwork-dr.org/  [last accessed 20 Nov 2009]. 
153 In Indonesia, the facilitation of the survey was led by an NGO based in Yogyakarta, namely, Yakkum Emergency 
Unit  http://www.yeu.or.id/ with voluntary support from some international partners such as Plan International and 
Humanitarian Forum Indonesia [last accessed 20 Nov 2009]. 
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views (from National Platform for DRR) on progress do not fully reflect the reality of 
implementation. Expert views have been based on a consensus (see Planas 2009). Overall, the 
experts give a higher average value (3 out of 5). National Disaster Management Agency and 
NGOs give similar judgments despite some of the gaps seen in Figure 52. Interestingly, local 
government and local communities seem to question the progress by ranking the achievement 
significantly lower than the rest of the stakeholders, which is surprisingly closer to the reality, as 
the rest of this section will demonstrate. However, overall, Figure 52 presents general views 
regarding the progress of DRR implementation in Indonesia, as it ranges from a minimum value 
of 2.67 (local government group) to a maximum of 3.0 (national platform DRR). 
Symmetry in perception occurred when all the stakeholders agreed on at least four aspects: lack 
of institutional commitments on financial resources, the need to improve transboundary risk 
assessment at regional/national level, the need for stronger policy/technical and institutional 
capacity in DRR, and improvement in disaster risk assessment, which takes into account both 
hazard and vulnerability information. However, perception asymmetry on progress occurred for 
many aspects. It appears that experts (from the National Platform) marked 4 (on a scale of 1-5) 
on “whether information on disasters is available and accessible to all levels/stakeholders.” In 
contrast, the local community marked this very low, between 1 and 2. Governments (local and 
national) as well as NGOs marked this moderately at 3.  
 
Figure 52 Multi-stakeholder Views on Progress (average value) 
 
Source: Developed from BNPB 2009, Planas 2009, Views from the Frontline 2009.  
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Figure 53 Multi-stakeholder Views on Progress 
 
Data source: BNPB 2009, Planas 2009, Views from the Frontline 2009.  
 
The gaps seen in Figure 53 are very interesting, for instance, for the indicator “early warning 
systems are already in place for major hazards, with outreach to communities.” National actors 
(Disaster Management Agency and National Platform for DRR) claimed that “there is substantial 
achievement despite resources and operational capacity.” However, local stakeholders (i.e. 
NGOs, local governments) stated that “the EWS is still relatively small and incomplete.”  
Gaps in the perception of progress of disaster risk reduction in Figure 53 could be explained as 
follows: national actors are more occupied with their ongoing project opportunities, which means 
that the national actors (both government and national platform) considered that both EWS and 
institutional progress have already made substantial achievements, but some deficiencies in 
commitment, financial resources, or operational capacities are recognized. On the other hand, 
local government officials and NGOs viewed EWS as follows: “achievements have been made 
but are relatively small or incomplete, and while improvements are planned, the commitment and 
capacities are limited.”  
As of May, 2009, less than 10% of cities/districts in Indonesia had managed to enact local level 
disaster regulation and the establishment of a local disaster management office. Despite 
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substantial progress at the national level being made, the HFA 1.1 (i.e. indicator of the existence 
of a strong institutional framework and practices at national and local levels) has been judged by 
the experts to be at 4 out of 5, which means “substantial achievement.”  In contrast, the BNPB 
reported to the ISDR that “there is institutional commitment and capacities to achieving DRR but 
progress is not substantial.” NGOs, local communities, and local government officials tended to 
agree with BNPB, while experts tended to be biased as their perception on progress was clearly 
different from the reality.  
 
7.7.2. National Action Plan and Implementation 2007-2009 
Responding to the HFA call, Indonesia developed its national action plan document for disaster 
risk reduction from 2007 (to cover the period of 2006-2009). Despite its shopping list style – 
“who does what where and where with whom” – it is a useful document. The action plan exercise 
started with poor planning as the difference between planning and actual investment is enormous 
(or more than 600% in 2007).  
Figure 54 National Action Plan 2006-2009: Actual vs Planning 
 
Source: Adapted from National Action Plan 2010-2012.  
 
It appears that HFA Priority 5 (Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all 
levels) dominated over the rest of the HFA priorities in 2007, which continues to be the case for 
2008-2009 (see Figure 54). The total sum allocated for HFA Priority 5 was higher than the total 
sum for HFA Priorities 1-4 in 2007-2009. Therefore, in the first three years after the enactment of 
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the Disaster Management Law 2007, DRR investment was still being placed on emergency 
preparedness and post-disaster response. This phenomenon is the polar opposite of the vision of 
DM Law 2007. It is understandable that this has happened, as the period 2007-2009 was the time 
of responses to recent big and small disasters, such as post-tsunami activities in Aceh in 2004, 
Nias in 2005, and the devastating earthquake in Yogyakarta in 2006. Some post-disaster 
interventions, such as those in Aceh and Yogyakarta, have lasted several years. The dilemma is 
still the same as before, as the governments at the end of 2009 and 2010 have been busy with the 
reconstruction of more than 100,000 houses that either collapsed or were severely damaged in 
West Java Province and West Sumatra Province at the end of 2009.  
The action plan itself cannot be called a plan that is intentionally drafted. It simply came to pass 
that there was more investment in HFA Priority 2 (risk assessment, risk information, and early 
warning system).154 In fact, apart from HFA Priority 5, Indonesia apparently invested 
significantly in institution building, including regulations at national and local levels (see actual 
investment in Figure 54).  
7.7.3. National DM Plan 2010-2014  
The highest-order disaster risk reduction planning in Indonesia since the reform in 2007 is the 
national disaster risk management planning (DRM Plan – the formal documents still call it DM 
Plan), a five-year policy document. The present DRM Plan 2010-2014 provides guidance for 
ministerial/national agencies’ five-year strategic planning, the Medium-Term Development 
Planning, as well as the National Action Plan 2010-2012. The document DM Plan 2010-2014 
provides shopping lists of ministries/agencies with a clear budget line. This raises the question of 
how can the agency, namely, the BNPB, have the power to decide how much funds should be 
invested in the sectoral DRR. Therefore, the proper reading should be that the DM Plan 2010-
2014 has been co-produced by the BNPB office with support from ministries/agencies. 
Therefore, the order should be revised as the practice is apparently different from the formal 
document.   
                                               
154 The influence from international agencies can be credited for the greater commitment of Indonesia in building its 
tsunami early warning system (a.k.a. INA TEWS) – please see www.jtic.org. Information on the multi-million euro  
projects can also be seen from the German-Indonesia Tsunami Early Warning System (www.gitews.org).  
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DM Plan 2010-2014, especially its budget planning, is particularly interesting. It suggests figures 
for government spending based on multi-hazard segregated data. From the total of IDR 64,475 
billions (about US$6.5 billion), earthquake and tsunami risk received the highest attention (70%) 
followed by floods (9%) landslides (5%) volcanoes 4%, and drought 3%, with the other hazards 
receiving more or less 1% (Figure 54). This allocation have been based on the past disaster events 
as seen in Figure 55 (Economic loses since 1979 and Recorded death risks since 1970) when 
seismic risks seem to be the highest for two category of risks (i.e. economic and death risks). This 
method can be criticized because the budget allocation should also consider potential disasters in 
the future. Of course there are limits to what policy makers predict the future risks but the recent 
volcanic eruption in October-November 2010 (that displaced at least 350,000, and totally ruined 
thousands of housing/settlements and livelihood assets surrounding Merapi Mount (within the 
distance of 15-20 km)155can be a lesson for future disaster planning to be able to anticipate future 
risks.  
Figure 55 Planning Budget 2010-2014 Vs. Risks 
 
Source: Based on RENAS 2010-2014 and CRED-EMDAT 2010.  
 
When one looks at the allocation pie chart (Figure 56) classified on the basis of HFA Priorities, 
48% of the funds are allocated to HFA Priority 1 (earmarked in the document as institutional and 
regulatory strengthening), 36% for HFA Priority 5 (which has been predicted before on the basis 
of the results for the period 2006-2009), 10% for HFA Priority 4 (earmarked as 
mitigation/prevention), 5% for HFA Priority 3 (community capacity building and research, 
education/training), and the rest for HFA Priority 2 (earmarked as integrated DRR planning and 
                                               
155 First Briefing Notes Forum PRB, 18 Nopember 2010 page 1-2 
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early warning systems). Within the budget for HFA 5, there are the sub-categories of 
preparedness (12%) emergency response (2%), and rehabilitation and reconstruction (23%).  
 
Figure 56  Planning Budget 2010-2014 Based on HFA Priority 
 
Source: Adapted from RENAS 2010-2014 data.  
 
The budgets (Figure 56) do not follow a clear logic or balanced priorities between sectors 
because 84% of spending is allocated to only two HFA Priorities, namely, 1 and 5. On the basis 
of experience during 2007-2009, there is a high likelihood that the actual spending will be shifted 
towards HFA Priority 5 because of recurrent surprise events that arise.  
Figure 57 HFA Priorities 1-5 and NAP 2010-2012 
 
Source: Adapted from NAP 2010-2012.  
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7.7.4. National Action Plan 2010-2012  
At the surface, one may be surprised that, overall, the national actors have now shifted their focus 
to deal with the root causes of disaster risks (i.e. HFA Priority 4), such as investing in better 
housing plans and mitigation, integration of DRR into land use, natural resource management, 
and better social development policy. There is clearly a willingness to do this even though there 
is a big imbalance in the DRR spending As Figure 57 above shows that there is a tendency for all 
actors, including the government, to shift from HFA Priority 5 (emergency preparedness and 
post-disaster response) towards HFA Priority 4.  
 
Figure 58 HFA 4 Priorities in NAP 2010-2012 
 
Source: Author’s data from RAN PRB 2010-2012. 
 
As shown in Figure 57 (right), the government has planned to allocate as much as 84% of 
resources to only two HFA Priorities, 4 and 5. One will be more puzzled by the fact that, on the 
basis of Figure 58 above, 91% of a total of US$4.1 billion will be spent on HFA Priorities 4 and 5 
during 2010-2012.156  However, the hugely disproportional allocation can be explained by the 
fact that, of US$4.1 billion, US$2.9 billion is allocated to HFA Priority 4. Within that sum, 24% 
is the World Bank’s loan allocated for three projects: road construction, so called WINDRIP 
(West Indonesia National Road Improvement Projects), without a clear explanation of what kinds 
of roads should be constructed to contribute to risk reduction but be distinct from the previous 
road construction in the country – as often roads are built without proper drainage facility that 
                                               
156 Total allocation in RAN PRB 2010-2012 from all sources is IDR 41,096 billion or about US$4.1 billion.  
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later create flood problems)157; Jakarta Emergency Dredging Program for flood management; and 
community empowerment for poverty reduction in urban areas, namely, PNPM,158 which is a 
typical poverty reduction program independent from the disaster management reform but 
probably earmarked by the government as part of “risk reduction.” 
Some of the facts are clearly discouraging: physical projects attract the government more than 
other aspects of HFA 4. If the support from the World Bank for projects such as road 
construction is excluded, in total, flood defense funded by the government in tens of districts will 
be about 56% of the total for HFA Priority 4. Adding the other infrastructure facility procurement 
(13%) and some physical project funding earmarked for environmental management and 
vulnerability reduction (24%) to the list, in total there will be more than 90% spending on 
physical aspects (such as physical environmental management; infrastructure and facility 
procurement; emergency dredging initiative, road project (WINRIP); flood defense districts – see 
Figure 58 left). While some of these features may be necessary, looking at the spending on DRR-
sensitive spatial planning (1%), structural mitigation (2%), and building code enforcement (3%), 
there is clearly a big deviation from the overall aspect of HFA Priority 4. Furthermore, it does not 
show how the road construction projects that will be earmarked as HFA 4 activities are different 
from any other road construction projects undertaken elsewhere in Indonesia. This raises more 
questions than answers.  
7.8. Decentralization and HFA Priority 4: A Case Study on Mitigation in Indonesia 
For mitigation in particular, reform partly took place silently in 2002 when the National Building 
Law 28/2002, for which the idea and effort had been made since 1964.159  As shown in Section 
7.7 above, mitigation has been the smallest sector in terms of DRR investment for both overall 
DRR activities and overall HFA Priority 4 (in the case of Indonesia). Indonesia is not alone as the 
GAR 2009 noted that mitigation overall for HFA Priority 4 is the sector with the least progress.  
                                               
157 This is an example of business as usual when development projects are simply coded to be DRR projects. In page 
159-160 of Project and Technical Assistance Proposals 2006 – 2009. Volume I. Project Assistance Proposals. 
Ministry of National Development Planning/ National Development Planning Agency. The Project Code No: P-03-
03300-0408-066201 gave no indication at all regarding mitigation or risk reduction. Please also consult 
http://www.evd.nl/zoeken/showbouwsteen.asp?bstnum=255730&location=&highlight= [last accessed on 15 June 
2010]. 
158 http://www.pnpm-mandiri.org/ [last accessed 20 Nov 2009]. 
159See Budiono, undated http://www.hyogo.uncrd.or.jp/hesi/pdf/expmeeting/budiono.pdf [last accessed 21 Nov 
2009]. 
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Before going to the field findings on mitigation policy in Ende and Sikka districts (see the Map in 
Annex 6), it is important to mention the vulnerability of local government buildings to fire. Data 
are difficult to obtain and even more difficult to update today because the former disaster 
management office160 was totally burned down on 26 December, 2009, which caused all the 
historical disaster data, risk maps, and some early warning instruments lost.161 In fact, the 
government building is located only 100 meters from the local Fire Brigade office. In a recent 
revisit to the district162 two local analysts explained that there are at least possible reasons why 
this accident happened. The first is that it is a pure accident as it happened on holiday when the 
Fire Brigade staff could not help to stop the fire because all the staff joined a ceremony where 
high officials and the head of Sikka district also attended. This leads to the second possibility that 
it was probably not a pure accident as it was a deliberative event because the Fire Brigade should 
available 24/7. It was probably a deliberative one because due to unknown reason163 and it could 
be legal issues such as corruption, the fire can be intendedly treated as a pure accident (a force 
major) where should there be any corruption cases, the legal evidence have been lost forever. The 
analyst also noted the third possibility – pointed to he fact that often the Fire Brigade’s water 
tanks were left without water which is useless based on recent experiences that the analyst could 
not clearly remember. The interviewed analysts tend to believe in the second. While this needs 
further research, it is worth noted that the present BPBD in Sikka should start from zero164 as 
pointed out by one BPBD official. Based on a recent interview with the BPBD165 it was clear that 
90% (or 18 out of 20) of the BPDB institution building activities have been provided by non-
governmental institutions such as local and international NGOs as well as the United Nations 
                                               
160 Known as Satlak Office or Bansos (Social Aid) Office in 2008 
161 Information from the news followed by direct confirmation from one of Satlak staff on 29 December, 2009. See 
the video at  http://www.metrotvnews.com/iwitness/play.php?vid=2756. In Ende, the author failed to obtain disaster 
mitigation-related data from the local office of public works because of a fire that burned all the required documents 
six years ago. 
162 This is based on a personal interview with two key informants in Sikka district. Their identity will be kept 
anonymously because of their personal safety. The author visited the district again on 29-31 October 2010 for a 
personal research on DRR policy and its linkages with climate adaptation.   
163 There is neither civil society organization nor local politician who are willing to push for an investigation at least 
to the best of author’s knowledge. 
164 The author also shared most of the raw data collected during 2008 (such as Sikka Tsunami Risk Map, 1992 
disaster loss data per village etc.) to the new local disaster management agency (BPBD) office where there barely 
any risk maps found in the office and almost no historical documents on DRR left. 
165 Interview with the Head of Prevention Unit, BPBD Sikka on 30th October 2010 
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agencies such as UNESCO and UNDP because, the office has no budget on capacity building but 
a few physical construction project to repair a few bridges recently collapsed.166   
7.8.1. Decentralization and Mitigation in Flores 
Flores tsunami/earthquake in 1992 has been frequently mentioned with regard to the national 
response that it generated in Chapter 6. This section looks at the local response to the event, 
especially in terms of institutional commitment, and what has happened in the 18 years after the 
“National Disaster” status was assigned that helped to “market” the island in the international 
news.167  
Figure 59 Trend of Built Houses - City of Ende 
 
Source: Bappeda Office, Ende District (2004 housing census). 
The 1992 earthquake/tsunami in Flores killed about 2,000 people (nearly half killed by the 
tsunami and the rest killed by houses/buildings that collapsed due to the earthquake). There are 
different data on the loss and damage in the housing sector in Sikka district, in which about 
13,000-18,000 houses either collapsed or heavily damaged. The local government claims that 
15,000 houses collapsed in Sikka district alone (30% of total hosing stocks in the district168based 
on the author’s direct calculation by transferring the 1992 files to an Excel spreadsheet at the 
                                               
166 The money for this reconstruction has been provided by National Disaster Management Office.  
167 The initial design for this work was to study the institutional response in the regions that received “national 
disaster” status, such as Aceh and Flores after tsunami and earthquake. In Aceh, however, apart from the scale and 
logistical issues, it is only very recently that local institutions have started to think about mitigation and risk 
reduction in general. During 2005-2009, Aceh still heavily focused on rehabilitation and reconstruction.  
168 See for example Poling, P. (2005) “Sikka Dalam Kenangan 12 December 1992.” In  Sadikin Eds. “Penerapan 
Hasil Riset Untuk Penanggulangan Bencana Tsunami di Indonesia.” Proceedings of Seminar Tsunami Dalam 
Kerangka Research on Tsunami Hazard and Its Effects on Indonesia Coastal Region 2002, 2003, 2004. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Temporary housing
semi-permanent
Permanent houses
Linear (Temporary housing)
Linear (semi-permanent)
Linear (Permanent houses)
168 
 
former disaster management office169 in June 2008 it was about 13,500.)  
 
In Ende district, fewer casualties occurred (probably about 100 or so)170 and data are even harder 
to determine. The total from four sub-districts accounted for at least 3,900 permanent houses that 
collapsed171 and almost 1,000 that were heavily damaged.172 The data are actually no longer on 
display to the public but the author successfully negotiated with the local statistical office to open 
their old warehouse to look for the reports from sub-districts. One senior staff member in the 
office explained that one or two sub-districts did not send their reports because their offices 
collapsed during the earthquake. 
Most people in Ende City preferred to build temporary houses for obvious reasons: the houses are 
cheap and local material and knowledge is abundantly available (see Figure 59). Starting in the 
late 1970s, when Indonesia’s oil revenue trickled down to Flores Island, especially Ende, people 
started to built “non-engineering houses” (so-called “permanent houses” made from brick in the 
local language, built without formal engineering design or relying on mason’s knowledge and 
experience alone). A similar trend also happened in Sikka; however, detailed data are not 
available.173   
Since there is a lack of accessible detailed building data for Sikka, the epicenter of the earthquake 
in 1992, the data on damage in Ende can be used for the analysis as the two districts share similar 
building cultures. Figure 59 is an example of a growing trend of housing in the city of Ende.174 
The local people in the city prefer either permanent houses or traditional houses (often called 
“temporary” houses) instead of semi-permanent houses. A permanent house means a house made 
of brick or concrete. A “temporary” one refers to the use of local materials such as a combination 
                                               
169 After the enactment of district regulation (Perda) 3/2009, the DRM tasks have been shifted to the new Sikka 
Disaster Management Agency (BPBD).  
170 Direct aggregation from each sub-district’s statistical data show less than 100.  
171 Ende 251 Magapanda 204 Ende slatan  3374 and Ndona 103. 
172 Only three sub-districts reported this house category: Aggregate of Ende, Magapanda, and Ndona is 786. 
173 Nong Susar (2008) also noted the happiness of a group of people who were members of a credit union and who 
started to build 50 new houses in Maumere City in 1971. It was seen as progress when people departed from the 
traditional houses.  
174 This calculation is only for Ndona and South Ende sub-district, calculated from the census of existing houses in 
2004 broken down by the age of the houses. 
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of timber, palm leaves, and bamboo, sometimes with a tiny aluminum roof. A semi-permanent 
house refers to a combination of brick or concrete with temporary house materials.    
The houses were too vulnerable, as evidenced by the fact that almost all permanent houses in 
Ende City collapsed with the earthquake, especially when comparing the data of rusak total 
(totally damaged). Overall, 79% of the permanent houses, 8% of the semi-permanent houses, and 
2% of the temporary houses either collapsed or were heavily damaged. A similar pattern could be 
seen for Sikka. On average, a house was about 45-50 m2 in size,175 using the average housing 
data for Ende (existing houses built during 1919-2004). As of 1990, Ende district was occupied 
by about 37,750 families (218,000 people) (compared with Sikka, 245,000 people/42,500 
families). Only a few spots in Ende were affected by the tsunami, including a small island called 
Pulau Ende. In Sikka, a rough estimate shows that about 20-30% of the houses collapsed due to 
the tsunami, while the rest of the houses for which damage was recorded were affected by the 
earthquake, and, in a few cases, by landslides triggered by the earthquake. Still, in total, collapsed 
and heavily damaged houses in Sikka numbered more or less double that in Ende.   
Figure 60 Damage Pattern According to House Type in Ende District in 1992 Earthquake 
 
Source: Ende Statistical Agency 1993 for Ende, Ndona, Magapanda, and Ende Selatan 
 
In Ende, the formal institutions had barely considered earthquake and tsunami risks. This is not 
an exaggeration because no consideration at all of risks can be found in a Perda document of 
Spatial Planning for Ende 1998-2009 signed in December 2008 to supersede the old one made in 
                                               
175 Calculated from the housing database in Ende 2004. 
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1985.176  
Decentralization requires the local government to increase its income and tax. Therefore, the next 
milestone of building regulation in Sikka was the endorsement of Tax for Building Permit in 
1999.177 On pages 15-17 of the Building Permit regulation of Sikka, there is an explanation 
regarding the cost associated with the permit, proportional to the economic status of the area. One 
unit house costs US$7,000 and the owners have three price options for building permit tax: 
should the house be situated in the city center and in a strategic location, then the price will be 
about US$225. The next two options are US$75 or US$25, depending on where it is situated and 
a few other details. In 2002, Ende government registered a new regulation on Tax for Building 
Permit (Perda 22/2002) as part of the decentralization policy.  
In Sikka, the local government issued local regulation on building permits in 1989 to regulate the 
building administration.178 There is no information on how it was enforced before the 1992 
earthquake. A few arguments regarding disasters in relation to the need for building permits exist 
in the Building Permit Perda of 1989. The local government later decided, in 2007, to cancel the 
old building permit regulation with a new Perda no. 14/2007, 179  but strangely neither any 
argument in regard to earthquakes nor other disaster risks consideration are present in the 1989 
draft.  
If words are the starting point of a concept180, the author cannot find a single example of the word 
“disaster” in the document; this is indeed a setback compared with the regulation in 1989. The 
absence of the word “disaster” and its associated hazards in recent documents triggers curiosity to 
look at other policy documents. Looking the “Master Plan Maumere City” of 1970, there was a 
flood map for Maumere City as reproduced in Metzner (1982). 181  Whereas, Perda Spatial 
                                               
176 Perda No 8/1985 – Ende Master Plan. 
177 Perda No. 2 Tahun 1999 Kabupaten Sikka Tentang Retribusi Ijin Mendirikan Bangunan (Lembaran Daerah Kab. 
Sikka Tahun 1999 no. 11 Seri D no. 2). 
178 Perda 10/1989 Kabupaten Sikka. 
179 Perda No. 14 Tahun 2007 Tentang Mendirikan Bangunan – Lembaran Daerah Kabupaten Sikka Tahun 2007. No. 
14 Seri F No. 11.  
180 See Chopra in Robert Chambers (2004) Ideas for development: reflecting forwards IDS Working Paper 238. 
181 See the map in Metzner (1982:47-48) adopted from Maumere Master Plan 1970, a report produced in 1969 - 
http://oskicat.berkeley.edu/record=b12258470~S55/. Metzner, K. Joachim (1982) “Agriculture and Population 
Presssure in Sikka, Flores: A Contribution to the Study of the Stability of Agricultural Systems in the Wet and Dry 
Tropics” later published in 1982 by Development Studies Centre Monograph 82, The Australian National University. 
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Planning of Maumere City - Sikka’s Capital  in 2005, only one example of the word “disaster” 
appeared, which referred to the danger of coastal hazards (without an explicit name)182 along 
Wuring coast.183 This clearly shows that the adoption of disaster risk reduction into local policy is 
hard to implement, even though some capacity building for local government was made after the 
1992 tsunami/earthquake. There have been discontinuities of efforts and ideas on disaster risks 
from one period to the other period.  
 
Figure 61 Building Permits Issued in Sikka and Ende 1995-2007 
 
Data source: Economic Development Unit in Sikka 2007; Public Works Agency, Ende District,  
 
Interesting insights from the Figure 62 are as follows: as the local economy gets bigger, more 
people get access to buy land and are willing to pay for its legal status (land certificate), which in 
turn means that there is a likelihood that they want to build new houses. However, there is a 
negative trend in seeking building permits for the case of Ende, especially when looking at the 
long-term perspective for 1950-2004.   
                                               
182 See the final draft of Maumere City Spatial Planning by Terasis Erojaya Cabang Kupang Inc. page IV-9. 
183 The place is occupied by an Islamic minority group (in Flores, Islam is a minority religion), which was often 
under pressure from the local government to move from the area owing to its status as high risk designated by 
experts following the tsunami in 1992. In a personal visit to the area, the people clearly explained that they have been 
discriminated against in many ways. In 1992, they were forced to leave the area, but later, the people strove to return 
as they make a livelihood from the fishing sector. The people are descendants of nomadic sea travelers from Bajo, 
who originated in South Sulawesi. According to one aged government staff member, working with a local health 
unit, the displacement was forced by military personnel who burned down the ruined houses struck by the 1992 
tsunami. However, from the community’s perspective, it was an accidental fire, the result of uncontrolled burning of 
tsunami waste. 
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Figure 62 Trend in Permits For Built Houses and Land in Ende 1950-2004 
 
Data source: Database on Houses in Ende 2004. 
 
In Figure 61, in Sikka, the negative trend of people’s willingness to seek a house permit plunged 
in 1999, which is the same year as local regulation on building permit tax was introduced and 
which is still applied today. In Ende, for the same time period, there is missing data because the 
public works office caught fire due to an electricity problem. However, when neglecting the 
missing data from Ende district, the period 1995-2007 shows a positive trend. This positive trend 
is really encouraging even though the long-term perspective is discouraging, as Figure 62 
suggests.  
In Sikka district, as of November 2010, there is still no local building regulation.184 However, 
there is apparently voluntary enforcement of the seismic code. The practice of mitigation within 
the government projects has remained limited. At the community level, progress has come from 
the local masons, as indicated by at least four masons interviewed in Sikka district, all of whom 
were trained by a local Catholic mission, namely SVD, before and after the earthquake in 1992. 
During 1979-1980, the local SVD office decided to send one key person to Petra Christian 
University and Bandung Institute of Technology to attend courses on housing, where seismic 
aspects were included in the training materials, who later came back and trained local masons 
                                               
184 Interview with Head of Prevention Unit 30 Oct 2010. Based on explanation from Mr. Kelen, a contact person for 
a  UNDP DRR project namely SC-DRR (Safer Community for Disaster Risk Reduction) in NTT Province, the local 
regulation on the Local Building Regulation that includes seismic risk has been drafted as supported by the project. 
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during 1980s and early 1990s. After 1992, SVD received more capacity building on the topic and 
the beneficiaries were often the local masons. Today, the capacity building effort is not being 
sustained185 but fortunately, some local building technicians have brought the knowledge with 
them wherever they work in the districts. In Wolodhesa village in Sikka, a local mason shared a 
few behavioral change in their approach to their clients (house owners): the interviewed masons 
often ask whether the house owner needs to consider the seismic factors or not and most often the 
poorer families would not be able to buy additional materials to prevent the houses from seismic 
loads (strengthening of the brick walls against shear force caused by seismic loads or proper 
reinforced concrete for beam-column of the house structures).186 Therefore, changes are taking 
place but the created pathways follow outside the formal system and are barely controlled.  
 
7.9. Discussion and Conclusion  
7.9.1. Discussion  
Evidence on the urgent need for DRR especially mitigation is clear, for instance, in the physical 
vulnerability of the housing sector shown in recent disasters in Indonesia during 2004-2009. A 
recent earthquake in 2006 in Yogyakarta caused collapse of 156,662 houses and severe damage 
to 202,031 houses.187 On 2 September, 2009, an earthquake struck West Java, Indonesia, causing 
a total of 65,000 houses to collapse or suffer heavy damage188. On 30 September, another 
earthquake hit West Sumatra and Jambi Province, producing a total of 114,797 collapsed and 
67,198 severely damaged houses. In total, 32% of total housing stock was either collapsed or 
damaged.189 Dozens of other events like these can be mentioned; the message needs to be 
strongly made that institutions seem to be getting very slow.    
                                               
185 Dr. Budi Klenden, personal communication, 27 July 2009. 
186 Results from a focused groups discussion on 13-14 October 2008 in Wolodhesa village, Sikka district. In 
Blatatatin village, due to a generous hosting from a World Vision’s staff whose family is in the village, the author 
was able to interview the father of the staff (kept anon.) The father has been trained by SVD 15 years ago and till 
today, the father (a building technician) will approach his clients the same ways as the masons in Wolodhesa village. 
187 See Damage and Loss Assessment Report for Yogyakarta and Central Java Earthquake 2006. Coproduced by the 
World Bank and Bappenas 2006.  
188 See Indonesia Earthquake SITREPs 6th 17 Sept 2009, OCHA Partnership for Humanity.  
189 Damage and Loss Assessment Report for West Java and Jambi province 2009. Coproduced by the World Bank 
and Bappenas 2009.  
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Analyzing DRR implementation, especially mitigation at the local level, is like opening a “black 
box”. One “black box” was opened in 2010 when the mayor of Bandung City talked to the press 
about the fact that the city needs an earthquake risk and hazard map, given the rise of earthquake 
activity in the region. The mayor took advantage of the proximity of Bandung Institute of 
Technology (ITB), the oldest knowledge hub on mitigation and geo-risks in Indonesia. 
Responding to this mayor’s comments, one disaster management professor from ITB explained 
that, during 1997-2000, ITB had been in partnership with Bandung City to map earthquake risk 
zones, including the production of standard operational procedures for a Bandung City 
emergency plan, with support from Indonesia Urban Disaster Mitigation Program (IUDMP) and 
RADIUS Project190 under IDNDR initiatives with total funds of US$150,000191. The main 
messages from the professor can be summarized as follows: the change of local regimes every 
five years through direct elections eventually challenges the continuity of certain pressing issues, 
such as DRR, as key bureaucrats often change with newly elected head of cities/districts. As the 
newly elected head of a district or city assumes office, she or he often bring in new key officials 
and drops the old ones. This causes discontinuity of efforts/processes/investments, which can 
severely harm future DRR policy and planning. Continuity of DRR policy at the local level is 
clearly under pressure in the context of political decentralization today as actors tend to try to 
reinvent the wheel every five years.  
The national disaster management office (BNPB) recently identified two main challenges 
regarding the progress of HFA 4.4. The first is weak enforcement of land use to suit the spatial 
plan. The second is a lack of accountability (in broader terms) in infrastructure construction 
projects that obey DRR norms. “Not all hospitals have an adequate waste disposal system. In 
addition, the procedure for evaluating disaster risk impacts in infrastructure building was still 
limited. These challenges were probably caused by constructors' lack of awareness and 
commitment in implementing the DRR.”192 
BNPB’s report to the ISDR 2009 noted the gaps of interests between the central and local 
governments in prioritizing DRR. It suggests one issue that is almost impossible to implement 
                                               
190 Radius is Risk Assessment Tools for Diagnosis of Urban Areas against Seismic Disasters. See 
http://www.unisdr.org/eng/library/Literature/8697.pdf  [last accessed 24 June 2010]. 
191 Noted by Prof. K. S. Pribadi on Tue, Jun 29, 2010 in bencana@googlegroups.com.  
192 BNPB comments in the Progress of HFA Implementation 2009.  
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given the context: “to have better monitoring and law enforcement for the violations of city 
master plan, building codes, and other regulations related to DRR.” BNPB can clearly only make 
suggestions, but the messages will be reflected back to the messenger owing to the institutional 
context under the present decentralization process; while the Ministry of Public Works can only 
regulate technical standards and engineering codes, the national standardization agency can only 
provide the highest seismic codes and building standards. One of the keys for transformation is 
the Interior Ministry, but its role mainly involves steering. Local political processes are needed 
but the rate of progress is far from sufficient.  
The BNPB’s business in the national planning level for DRR is just like building a new path. The 
National DRM Plan 2010-2014 is defined as “a formal document that contains data/information 
on disaster risks in Indonesia during 2010-2014 and a governmental plan to reduce the risks 
through program activities.”193 On the other hand, it is also claimed as part of the “new 
government’s 100-day priority of the 2010-2014 period”, but in fact is not listed at all in the 45 
lists of 100-day priorities of the present cabinet.  The 100-day priorities only contain an initiative 
called “Rapid Emergency Response Task Force.”   
DRR policy is still very new and its derivatives in the governmental planning and annual work 
plan (see Figures 44 and 45) only recently started at the national level. The local development 
planning offices in Indonesia194 are responsible for spatial planning design but the actual spatial 
planning design is implemented by or contracted to private consultants, who in general have had 
little exposure to the knowledge of DRR-sensitive spatial planning.  The present efforts for 
capacity building on DRR-sensitive planning have been limited to addressing the local planning 
officials. While this is necessary, there are missing links as the capacity building of the private 
firms and consultants in the business of spatial planning is more urgent as they are the cutting 
edge of DRR spatial planning designers. 
7.9.2. Conclusion  
Volatility in governance has been presented with longitudinal observation. This method is 
important to demonstrate the concern on the institutional vulnerability assessment. The findings 
                                               
193 National DM Planning Document or Renas (2010-2014, page 2) 
194 This has been admitted by officials in Aceh, West Sumatra, and East Nusa Tenggara Province.  
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regarding the DRR policy reform in Indonesia during the last five years have brought some 
improvement but largely artificial in real practice.  
Given the polycentric nature of HFA (i.e. from legal reform to the risk assessment, knowledge, 
science and technology, the root causes such as poor mitigation policy/planning/implementation) 
there is risk of unbalanced DRR investment. As the institutions and organizations (e.g. formal 
ones such as government and local governments) tend to favor one aspect of HFA more than 
other pressing issues. But the patter of the DRR investment has been clearly shown  in Section 
7.7.4 where the HFA 1 and HFA 5. This means that the old practice is still coming back: it is 
easier to create new formal regulations than to implement it (as shown in the level of enforcement 
of DRR regulations) and consequently the energy including funds have been spent responding to 
emergency.  
A deeper analysis of the HFA 4 shows that combining “disaster mitigation” and “spatial 
planning” budget, the total is only 3%. Physical/engineering solutions (93% of total spending 
plan for HFA 4) dominates the solution to “root causes” of disaster risk – therefore this seems to 
manipulate the concept of “underlying risk causes” as Blaikie et. al. (1994) once argued about the 
problem of political economy and power that shape disaster risks. Such a practice shows the 
domination of engineering/technical solutions has been challenged by Hilhorst (2004) to call for 
inclusive governance of DRR and the need to end the domination of dominant technocratic 
approach and top-down approach in DRR planning.195 The national action plan (RAN) document 
2010-2012 presents the fact that over 624 coded activities planned to be executed in Indonesia: 
46% (or 264) from the governmental agencies, 25% (156) from International Institution such as 
World Bank etc., 17% (104) from NGOs/INGOs, 7% (45) and the rest 6% are hybrid (or mixed 
between either government-international institutions or government-INGOs). 
Local realities from Sikka and Ende districts in Flores, Indonesia also demonstrate why reality on 
the ground do not change as expected even after 18 years of local catastrophe, amid several non-
governmental interventions, including lessons from tens of disasters during the last six years in 
Indonesia. Therefore, it can be concluded that institutions have not changed as required and this 
                                               
195 Data on the organizational network for National Action Plan 2010-2012 is available but could not be presented in 
this dissertation due to time and space limitations. Furthermore, the quality of the data including the format of the 
report is different from the 2006-2009 National Action Plan. Howeer, it is important to analyze the present DRR 
network because the nature of present network may be different from the previous one. 
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can be predicted by the study because apart from the issue of complexity that arises from the 
decentralization, it is still difficult to get the message across because national and local 
institutions do not really change the discourse on how DRR should be done.  
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Chapter 8. Final Discussion, Conclusion, and Recommendations  
8.1. Final Discussion 
8.1.1. Institutional vulnerability disaster risk governance  
 
Two main new disaster risk study concepts have been introduced in this dissertation. The first is 
institutional vulnerability and the second is disaster risk governance. Chapters 4 and 5 
demonstrate the quantitative approach to measuring levels of institutional vulnerability and 
governance. It has been argued and shown that an institutional vulnerability analysis at the global 
scale is possible. Simple scatter plot analyses of the regulatory quality, rule of law, bureaucracy 
(based on government effectiveness), political stability, participation (voice and accountability), 
and corruption control have shown strong correlations with the existence of disaster risk 
reduction policy and disaster risk level. The correlations are significant; the scatter plots in 
Chapter 5 clearly show possibility in developing a prediction model for the prospect of disaster 
risk reduction policy implementation, as far as the selected simple regression exercises can 
demonstrate.  
Chapter 4 shows that having good disaster risk regulation is beneficial as it may help a country to 
move forward and invest more in the diverse field of disaster risk reduction, along the lines as 
suggested by the Hyogo Framework for Action’s list of priorities. However, some cases clearly 
do not support the idea that “where there is investment in disaster risk management laws and 
regulations, institutions should have better disaster risk management implementation.” Chapter 7 
provide the facts that even there is commitment in HFA (such as HFA priority 4), the details of 
the investment should be critically evaluated because it does not necessary address the call for 
“reducing underlying causes of disaster risks.”  
One considerable ‘myth’ in the study of disaster risk and vulnerability assessment is that when 
any country anywhere spends US$1 in risk reduction or mitigation, the country should always 
save US$4.196 Some claim to have cost-benefit ratios, such as 1:2; 1:3, and even 1:7 for spending 
(cost) against avoided losses (benefit) 197. These claims of benefits may originate from countries 
                                               
196 See for instance FEMA http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/01/060123074846.htm (last access on 10 
May 2010)  
197 See Box 11 of DFID Scoping Study: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/disaster-risk-reduction-
scoping.pdf.  
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where institutional quality is stable and governance quality is at the level of many OECD 
countries, Otherwise, it is most likely that the cases may come from micro level project cost-
benefit analysis. Future work should be carried out to prove these claims in countries where 
regulatory quality, overall governance, and institutional quality are low. The results from Chapter 
5 show that, as every country has different institutional arrangements and its own specific 
governance quality, some countries may persist in losses regardless of how much has been spent 
or how good their disaster risk management regulations.  
In terms of terminology, it can be asked why the term “institutional weakness” is not used instead 
of “institutional vulnerability”? It is equally valid to also challenge the established terminology of 
environmental-physical-social-economic vulnerability: why not use the noun “weakness” instead 
of vulnerability? The term institutional vulnerability is used to demonstrate the roles of 
institutions in disaster risk reduction, including the likelihood of institutional uptake of multi-
dimensional vulnerability into disaster risk study and practice. 
The usefulness of institutional plurality and polycentric governance of disaster risk reduction 
have been shown by the broad range of sectoral interventions as stated in the Hyogo Declaration. 
HFA requires diverse approaches and issues: law and regulation, participation, politics of 
budgeting (HFA 1); science, knowledge, and technology, participation and power, the 
requirement to carry out risk assessment, risk information, dissemination, and transboundary risk 
assessment; educational issues, school curriculum, etc. (HFA 3); legality context and practice of 
social-economic-physical-environmental vulnerability reduction (HFA 4); and the old but still 
relevant disaster management activities such as emergency management-related regulation, 
contingency planning, and budgeting (HFA 5).  Therefore, at the policy and practical level it is 
clear disaster risk reduction requires coordination and cross-coordination at the local, national, 
and global scales.  
Local and national coordination as shown in Chapter 7 is not an easy task, nor any easier than 
international coordination. Furthermore, disaster risk reduction and management policy is not a 
standalone policy independent from the overall context of general law enforcement and 
regulatory quality. DRR policy and regulation depends very much on the quality of other 
institutions and governance. In other words, governance and institutional quality clearly shape the 
performance of the DRR/DRM policy and regulation. 
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8.1.2. Institutional vulnerability disaster risk governance in Indonesia 
Disaster risk reduction is not an end in itself as it is one way of achieving multiple goals, 
including sustainable development and human security. In the past, disaster risk reduction was 
seen by the vast majority of people as impossible because established institutions like religion 
have long maintained that disasters are interventions from an angry God (see Garcia-Acosta 
2001, Chester 2005). A historical analysis from Indonesia since the case of the Krakatoa eruption 
in 1883 up until the present in terms of the institutional pattern in dealing with disaster risks is 
presented (Chapter 6).   
The recent DRR policy change in Indonesia has been made possible by the fact that the old 
“reactive response” logic has been intensely challenged externally through many international 
institutions/actors and internally by civil society in Indonesia. However, it is not as Hoffman 
(1999) suggested that institutional change is only due to the magnitude of disasters, population 
mass and amount of damage, time, and the thicknesses of structures of cultural institutions (such 
as norms, customs, traditions, belief system). In Chapter 4, several developing countries are 
shown to have reported their policy changes due to international intervention where disaster risk 
science has been brought into the policymaking process by other countries, donors, or 
international non-state actors. Chapter 6 presents the case of Indonesia, where cooperation with 
the United States and ASEAN mechanisms led to some disaster policy changes in the late 1970s. 
This was affected by the United States’ interest in controlling communist power in Southeast 
Asia. The recent changes in Philippines, through the Disaster Management Act in 2010, as also 
have been noted in the Philippines HFA Progress Report 2009,198 showing that internal change in 
disaster management policy is not independent from the context of international cooperation. 
This kind of externally driven DRR policy change has been the case for Indonesia, the 
Philippines and other African and Asian countries. Interestingly disaster events do not always 
drive policy change but in some cases such as Sri Lanka, India and Indonesia (See Chapter 4), the 
Indian Ocean Tsunami in one way or another serve as legitimate demand for policy change.  
                                               
198 See Philippines HFA Progress Report 2009 at www.preventionweb.net/files/7495_Philippines%5B1%5D.pdf [last 
accessed 30 Aug 2010] 
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Furthermore, the influence of IDNDR to stimulate the establishment of national coordinating 
agencies for disaster management in more than 130 countries provides evidence on the role of 
global governance in disaster risk reduction (van Niekerk 2005). Under the HFA mechanism, 
more than 60 countries have been reported their progress of implementation of disaster reduction. 
Some have clearly credited HFA as one of the driving forces behind the change, as in the case of 
Indonesia (Chapter 7). Such an international approach can drive disaster policy change because 
new policy discourses have been brought together with the international DRR initiatives such as 
HFA.  
In analyzing the pathways of disaster risk management policy in Indonesia, Chapter 7 presents 
two strong messages: firstly, what has been planned in formal disaster planning or the “National 
Action Plan” often shows huge gaps between planning and implementation after disaster policy 
reform in Indonesia. This seems to suggest that the gaps is not simply the problem of planning 
quality as suggested by rational choice theory (Section 2.2.2) but also that different institutional 
logics have been used in both planning and implementation.  
Change of course takes time, but this needs more explanation. The theory of path dependency 
explains change better than rational choice theory because institutions (in the case of Indonesia) 
tend to continue to favor reactive emergency responses, as indicated by the huge proportion of 
disaster risk management budgets used in response rather than for the rest of the HFA priorities. 
In the first three years after the DRR reform, policymakers still largely invested in emergency 
preparedness and post-disaster response. The “historical path dependency” theory (Kaag et al. 
2003) in this context explains that, owing to recurrent hazards on large and small scales, it is 
often difficult for local and national actors and institutions to plan on the basis of strategic 
decisions of disaster reduction in advance.  
The defined strategies in the formal institutions at the local levels in Indonesia (unfold as they 
interact with not only dramatic natural events but also changes in the interaction with national-
international regimes, such as the HFA, especially after disaster intervention, which may create a 
window of opportunity for more ex-ante DRR planning. The sudden increase in emphasis on 
HFA Priority 4 for 2010-2012 (in the case of Indonesia) is good on paper, but the reason why this 
has happened is interesting. Such a sudden change in planning is explained in Chapter 7. The 
HFA 4 accounts for 71% of the overall budget plan for 2010-2012, while mitigation only 
accounts for 1%. Hazard mitigation and land use planning are future-oriented issues as both focus 
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on “anticipating upcoming needs and impacts, rather than responding to yesterday’s events” 
(Berke and Gavin 2009).  A deeper analysis of the budget structure shows that reform is barely 
taking place, as perceived by DRR advocates, despite the major change in formal regulation and 
initiatives embedded in the international and local response to recent disasters. One of the reasons 
is because the discursive change on the need for DRR reform have been superficial and do not 
really transform the way the actors (e.g. governments and non-governmental). In addition, the 
complex reform processes in Indonesia, the horizontal and vertical missing links in the Indonesia 
government have also played a role in neglecting disaster mitigation policy. This confirms 
North’s (1998) disbelief in sudden revolutionary change in institutions, as it takes time with no 
guarantee of better implementation.   
The day-to-day business of mitigation will follow the status quo path created by the 
decentralization processes, where local governments view building permits as a means of taxation 
and not as means of mitigation. In addition, Indonesia still does not have clear political 
opposition in its multiparty system, at both local and national levels; therefore, a “big push” for 
change often relies on efforts from non-governmental organizations, which is not available in all 
cities/districts.  The political ignorance of the issue will weaken DRR reform in Indonesia. 
Chapter 6 shows that many policy documents remain “tiger paper” without enforcement at either 
horizontal or vertical governance levels. 
At the local level, the mitigation of seismic hazards in the building sector, the Local Disaster 
Management Offices (BPBD) should engage building administration, local engineers/drafters, 
house owners and all relevant governmental organizations (both executive and legislative agency. 
However, steering capacity of BPBD remains low (or undeveloped) and thus a future challenge 
for DRR implementation in housing sectors. Even though the vast majority of future buildings are 
screened through building permits, with the expectation that this will ensure construction safety, 
Salmon’s (1999) evaluation on the technical approval of house permits in Sikka district, 
Indonesia, during the late 1990s shows that more than 50% of the structures for which house 
permits are issued fall into the category of “no seismic mitigation feasibility.” Chapter 6 notes 
that large-scale disasters have not really transformed the institutional landscape of disaster risk 
reduction at the national level.  
Chapter 7 presents the negative trend in the issuing of housing permits since 1999, which is 
coincidental with the issue of housing permit tax in 1999 in Sikka. In developing countries the 
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vast majority of houses were built by house owners directly with limited or absent building 
codes, decisions on building earthquake-resistant housing are in the hands of hundreds of 
millions of house owners. In Indonesia, 90% of the total housing stocks have been built directly 
by the house owners or dwellers (Silas 2005). Therefore, the decision making power in housing 
sectors are in the hands of house owners. In fact their compliance with the building regulation 
and ability to pay (especially from the poor house owners) is low. On the other hand, the local 
bureaucracy still have little commitment in risk reduction and disaster mitigation through 
building code enforcement as well as through land use policy enforcement. This shows that 
institutionalization of risk reduction into day-to-day building/housing sector still face real big 
challenges.   For Indonesia, the question on why certain important laws that are strongly relate to 
mitigation, such as building law, were not complied with at all by the house owners, and other 
relevant stakeholders (such as drafters), is considered particularly legitimate for future 
investigation. 
The very idea of the DRM reform in Indonesia was not originated from government offices but 
rather from non-governmental actors. The idea of the need for a national disaster management 
bill had been briefly discussed by disaster management professionals (mainly Indonesians who 
worked in NGOs/INGOs or are UN workers and representatives of non-governmental 
organizations) before the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004. The IO Tsunami 2004 turned out to be the 
loudest signal, but there were not enough ears were there to hear the call for DRM policy reform. 
When the scale of disaster events such as catastrophic tsunami 2004 are too big to be 
comprehended by the public and politicians, including government officials, traditional 
institutions such as religions can reinforce their prevailing belief that disasters are from God. 
Some politicians and the public could not comprehend that such catastrophes can be ex-ante 
managed and their effects reduced, if not prevented. It took several disasters both big and small 
during 2005-2006 (such as a devastating earthquake in Nias 2005, a tsunami in Pangandaran in 
West Java 2006, a catastrophic earthquake in Yogyakarta in 2006) to push the government to 
finally make an official decision to invest in DRR with significant associated costs, which 
included demolishing old structures in hundreds of cities/districts in 33 provinces and creating 
new ones throughout the country. 
 
184 
 
8.2. Conclusion 
8.2.1. Answering the research questions 
How should institutional vulnerability that shapes disaster risks and disaster reduction policy be 
assessed? Chapters 4 and 5 have demonstrated that institutional vulnerability assessment can be 
carried out on a global scale. This automatically answers the sub-question, especially the limit of 
the global scale assessment. Since this is a pioneering work, the challenge remains in the quality 
of data and the new model required to be integrated into the global scale disaster risk assessment, 
including the justification on why the inclusion of institutional vulnerability into global disaster 
risk index country by country is important. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates that the quality of institutions matter to the disaster risk reduction policy 
design and implementation. This has been clearly shown quantitatively in Chapter 5 that the 
implementation of disaster risk reduction policy has strong associations with the level of 
regulatory quality, government effectiveness, participation and political context. Meanwhile, 
Chapters 6 and 7 have shown the importance of the nitty-gritty of institutional quality and the fact 
that disaster reduction policy is not independent of the macro institutional and governance 
context.   
Furthermore, in terms of theory building, there is enough evidence that policy change through 
global governance is more likely to succeed than simply waiting for disaster events to create 
momentum to drive internal policy change at both national and local level. Disaster policy change 
has barely been generated internally, despite recurrent disaster events. What is also seen is that 
disasters open new avenues for international cooperation. The later is a window of opportunity 
for new discourse making on the need for DRR reform in the national and local public policy 
making arena. There is also an increasing trend in the involvement of international non-
governmental actors and international organizations (INGOs/IOs) in post disaster interventions 
with the statistics as follows: 200 INGOs/IOs in Indonesia (2004-2006), more than 500 
INGOs/IOs in regards to Myanmar post Cyclone Nargis 2008 and more than 700 INGOs/IOs for 
post disaster earthquakes Haiti 2010.199 This is a proxy to global governance practice in disaster 
management context, and thus an indication for potential channels for future DRR discourse and 
                                               
199 These statistics are based on the data from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 
presented by David Fisher, in International Risk Forum in Davos, June 2010.  
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resources, however, this depends on institutional contexts (such as steering capacity, rule of law 
or legal context or often termed by IFRC as “legal preparedness” to disasters, etc.).  
Evidence from Indonesia shows that even though decentralization and decentralized governance 
are needed, they do not necessarily bring positive outcomes (such as better basic public services 
etc.) because there are missing links in vertical and horizontal governance in the development 
context general. However, only a limited account on informal institutions and their interplay with 
formal institutions in reducing risks has been provided by the author owing to methodological 
constraints.  
How can vulnerability be reduced when institutions and governance are vulnerable and barely 
change towards more pro-active DRR policy? The answers are clearly not black and white. For 
instance, Iran has shown the highest commitment to DRR policy and regulation among all the 
countries discussed in Chapter 4, despite its low quality of governance and low quality of 
institutional indicators as described in Chapter 5. This raises a new question instead of a 
concluding answer: Is it better to have a weak disaster management policy than nothing at all? 
This could be a future research topic for PhD and Master’s students.  
Can disaster risk governance (DRG) framework offer a better explanation on how to address the 
underlying causes of disaster risks as stipulated by the Hyogo Framework for Action? DRG 
offers higher sensitivity of the institutional and governance issues including why institutions are 
hard to change and how to change.  
This research (especially Chapters 6 and 7) found  that formal disaster risk management 
institutions are indeed a set of networked laws and regulations formed to deal with disaster risks. 
Therefore, DRR institutions emerge more as governance networks. Any singly formal 
laws/regulation is not a standalone regulation but rather tied and connected to other formal 
laws/regulations as demonstrated in Chapter 6 and 7. This finding is accidental and it is partly 
supporting the notion of “intra-government networks” (See Goldsmith and Eggers 2004). 
Furthermore, it was also found that formal DRR institutions consist of a set of networks of DRR 
related institutions. In regards to vertical governance context in Indonesia, network analysis in 
Chapter 7 shows that there is no link between district and province in terms of DRR regulation. 
This strengthens the findings on the vertical missing link in the Indonesian development and 
governance.  
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The network analysis provides new understanding that the materialization of local DRM bills 
occurs through certain pattern. The cities/districts that experience recent disasters tend to have 
DRM regulations not because they are more aware of disaster risk reduction issues but because 
DRR networks are more likely to be formed and maintained there. Right from the beginning, the 
author intended to neither develop a new theoretical framework on “institutions as network of 
institutions” or nor use the network approach to understand institutions (see Ansell 2006) and 
governance. It is found that disaster risk governance emerge as form of networks that govern 
disaster risks. This supports the concept of “network governance” provided in Chapter 2. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that DRR outcomes do not simply arise from the “sum of efforts 
from agents, namely, individuals and organizations/institutions.” (Jones et al. 1997, Stoker 2006, 
and Crawford 2006). In fact, DRR agents (organizations/individuals) and institutions exist and 
co-exist more in the form of networks. The overall demonstration of the social network analysis 
of DRR actors and institutions in Indonesia further strengthen the concept of “polycentric 
governance” of disaster risk reduction. Therefore, institutions are not the sum of laws. Network 
theory provides the notion (Chapter 6 and 7) that institutions are about connection of parts: linked 
(or unlinked) risk regulations/DRR laws/building codes etc. In the past, formal institutions are 
treated as sums of laws/regulations. But in fact how they are connected to (or unconnected to) 
enforce policy implementation is more important to study – as demonstrated by the network 
analysis from Indonesia in Chapter 6 and 7. 
Lessons from Indonesia show that DRR institutional reform occurred because there is complex 
interaction between domestic events (hazard and disaster contexts provide certain rationale for 
the domestic actors such as civil society organization, media and the public at large) in one hand 
and the international challenges (e.g. from international institutions and organizations including 
the Hyogo Framework for Action) on the other hand. However, the national context has provided 
evidence that there is governance volatility. Furthermore, from the global scale analysis in 
Chapter 5 it was also clear that governance volatility often occurs; Furthermore, one interesting 
finding is that the more a country is institutionally vulnerable, the more volatile its governance 
which later affect the quality of disaster risk governance.  
The IVA Framework (Chapters 4 and 5) suggests specific DRR institutions and governance have 
been exercised in the context of existing formal/informal institutions. The later are assumed to be 
deeper and the former are not independent from the context. The IVA Framework can surely be 
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questioned because some social scientists make a distinction between “the deep, normative 
structure of a system or society (treated in this research as the template or formal/informal 
institutional context ) on the one hand and more specific regimes (such as DRR governance) and 
DRR organizations on the other (See Underdal 2006, Choncha, 2006). In this research, it is 
assumed that the later is shaped/influenced by the former. However, Choncha (2006) believes 
that specific regime (or institutions - in this case specific DRR institutions and governance) are 
seen as embedded in the “template” e.g. formal/informal institutions) and therefore it is seen that 
later as reflecting or reproducing the context (or the template) on which they are built (See a brief 
reflection in Underdal 2006) 
 
8.2.2. Reflection on mixed methodology 
The quantitative approach using simple scatter plot analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 has proven to be 
effective to demonstrate the differences between levels of commitment towards disaster reduction 
between countries and the differences in quality of institutions and governance. For 
generalization at the global scale, it is necessary to use the simple statistical methods (Chapters 4 
and 5) and to demonstrate the gaps between relative progress and the desired or required 
conditions. In addition, there is a significant negative correlation between both progress in 
disaster reduction policy and quality of governance on one hand and disaster risk index on the 
other hand. The challenge will be to improve the quality of data given by countries for future 
analysis of institutional vulnerability index in order to be more precise in terms of predicting the 
implementation of DRR policy at global scale. 
In the case of historical analysis of disaster management organizations in Indonesia since 1979, 
social network analysis, especially the tools such as centrality analysis (degree centrality, 
betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality), has proved its strength in mapping dominant 
governmental organizations. With regard to the quality of local regulation of disaster risk 
management that has recently been procured and is presently in use, the centrality analysis has 
been able to demonstrate the strengths and the weaknesses of DRR regulation. The same is also 
seen in the mapping of global-local DRR actors in Indonesia. In practical terms, the strength of 
centrality analysis can clearly identify the “main actors” and the actors in the periphery that must 
be included in practical DRR networks.   
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The method of social network analysis (SNA) is very promising but it has been barely used in 
disaster research. The method can be very effective and this in part can answer the challenge of 
advancing theory and research of disasters presented in Tierney’s (2007) "From the Margins to 
the Mainstream? Disaster Research at the Crossroads.” However,  it has been argued that 
empirical research addressing social networks such as in natural resource governance have 
treated the method as being either present or absent (Bodin and Beatrice 2009: 367) and the same 
can be said for disaster studies. 
It is a very reasonable research project to correct the present vulnerability analysis, by taking 
specific disaster risk reduction institutions and overall governance indicators into vulnerability 
analysis models. However, this requires new innovation in the research methodology and also 
consistency in the production of global dataset regarding DRR implementation such as bi-annual 
HFA progress reports that will be done at least until 2013.  
The use of social network analysis has also been proven effective in demonstrating the linkages 
(e.g. the quality, the intensity of the linkages, the scale etc.) measured by simple SNA methods 
such as centrality analysis. For future analysis, longitudinal analysis using SNA can be used to 
identify changes in DRR governance networks, in the case of both actors and institutions. 
Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate that agents and institutions of disaster reduction exist and co-exist 
more in the form of networks that emerge as one form of risk governance. Interestingly, what is 
called local DRR regulation turns out to be a network of institutions and regulations. This clearly 
supports the introductory note on networked governance in Section 2.3 which tries to 
demonstrate the fact that agents and institutions exist and co-exist more in the form of networks. 
(Jones et al. 1997, Stoker 2006, and Crawford 2006).  
Mixed methodology in the case of disaster reduction may point to the benefits of 
interdisciplinarity as the increase of disaster incidents globally requires an interdisciplinary 
approach because the scale of the problems cannot be tackled through either a single disciplinary 
approach or simply an aggregate of disciplines (i.e. multidisciplinarity) (Mollinga 2008, Klein 
1996). This dissertation can be categorized as applying an interdisciplinary approach. One of the 
reasons is because the author’s upbringing from four disciplinary training e.g. civil engineering, 
development studies, environmental policy and international relations studies, therefore, some 
admixture of these disciplines may have happened. In addition, this dissertation mixes some 
selected concepts and methods such as the use of polycentric governance concepts (McGinnis 
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1999), interdisciplinary “political science” concept to study institutions (Schmidt 2008, 2009), 
the new institutional economics concept (such as North 1998 and Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 2009, 2010) and sociology (the case of SNA).  Combining both the concepts and the 
mixed-methods above to analyze  both institutional vulnerability and DRR governance concepts 
have therefore strengthen the belief that this is an interdisciplinary work. In addition, the interest 
in the SNA method after the field work have triggered the author to make use of national DRR 
network in Indonesia to promote the grass root actors’ work on DRR and the outcome also 
receive an international level success i.e. the recognition of one of the DRR advocates from 
Indonesia to be the UNISDR Sasakawa Laureate 2009 in Geneva.200  
8.3. Recommendations 
8.3.1. Recommendations for Global Actors and Institutions 
The Hyogo Framework for Action is comprehensive but demands high commitment from actors 
and institutions to voluntarily reduce their disaster risks according to the set indicators. Its 
implementation depends very much on institutions and actors/organizations. Since many 
initiatives of disaster risk reduction especially in developing countries often occurred through 
international cooperation and negotiation, it is suggested that international actors/institutions 
should conduct institutional vulnerability assessments. Without understanding institutional 
vulnerability and the institutional context, disaster reduction policy will face serious challenges as 
demonstrated in the case of Indonesia (Chapters 6 and 7).  
Specific disaster risk reduction policy reform also depends on other governance variables such as 
rule of law, regulatory quality, participation, government effectiveness including bureaucracy, 
and control of corruption. Therefore, investment in HFA Priority 1 (i.e. specific DRR 
laws/regulation participation and budgeting) is vital, but awareness of the institutional 
vulnerability context and governance constraints is also crucial to find ways to reduce disaster 
risks within the institutional/governance constraints (e.g. formal/informal institutions and 
different types of governance).  
How the bureaucracy enables or disables governmental disaster management organizations needs 
further research, but the point is that disaster management organizations are not immune to the 
                                               
200 This effort was supported by at least 140 NGOs and individuals from Indonesia. Please see the notification from 
UNISDR http://www.unisdr.org/eng/sasakawa/sasakawa09-about.html [last access on 12 October 2010]. All of the 
process of nomination has been administered from Bonn, Germany. 
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types of bureaucracy such as Parkinsonization, a phenomenon in Southeast Asia including 
Indonesia where state officials tend to increase the number of their subordinates irrespective of 
the tasks they have to perform (Evers 1987:667). Present formation of “disaster management 
bureaucracy” in Indonesia in more than a hundred of districts also need further investigation how 
the DRM bureaucracy can be effective in dealing with high disaster risks. Recent findings in a 
2000 survey among 16 developing countries on merit-based systems for recruitment of civil 
servants ranked Indonesia at a low level as it suffered from “prevalent political patronage and the 
lack of transparency and accountability.”  
Promotion of institutional vulnerability framework for a comprehensive risks and vulnerability 
assessment is needed strongly because is relevant and pertinent to effectiveness and efficiency of 
the present worldwide investment in disaster reduction under the auspices of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action More effective in DRR implementation.  
8.3.2. Recommendations for Indonesian DRR Actors and Institutions  
DRR actors and institutions in Indonesia need to seriously think about how to improve efforts in 
local disaster legislation reform while striving equally to reform local and national disaster 
management bureaucracy. International donors need to have the courage to give long-term 
support locally for the sections of civil society working on disaster management and mitigation 
policy advocacy. Decentralization in Indonesia brings together problems that have affected 
disaster management policy and practice at the local level. Therefore, it is crucial that national 
and international actors be able to understand the disaster risk management challenges under the 
decentralization context.  
At the national level, Indonesia needs a more balanced approach and balanced commitment to 
HFA priorities. The recent trends in disaster risk management budget structure and spending 
indicate the need to reform the structure of disaster reduction budget because the national 
government has been still spending more on ex-post disaster interventions than ex-ante disaster 
risk reduction. Only with a more balanced approach in the investment in the HFA priorities can 
better human resources in DRR be achieved (HFA 3, i.e. DRR education and curriculum), along 
with a significant increase in mitigation to reduce future loss of human life (HFA 4 priorities). At 
the local level, the province and city/district governments need to have a clear DRR budget 
structure which is absent from the present analysis. Given the missing link in vertical governance 
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involving the limitation of the power of provincial governments, civil society, national 
government, and donors/INGOs need to innovate the way that they promote DRR reform at the 
local level (such as clear understanding of local DRR networks) 
8.3.3. Recommendations for Future Research  
 Institutional vulnerability assessment in terms of both quantitative and qualitative approaches 
needs to be improved in the future in order to be more operational for comprehensive 
vulnerability assessment in general and to be better understood by policymakers.  
 Improvement in the models is needed because, in this research, only simple statistical 
analyses including simple regression have been used. For future work, structural equation 
modeling can be used to demonstrate the “causality” especially on the role of institutions and 
governance on DRR policy and disaster risks level. This is because the correlation tests do 
not reflect causality but association of the selected variables (Utts 2005) and regression 
analysis can be only a proxy to predict the “implementability” of DRR policy based on the 
selected governance variables.  
 The social network analysis (SNA) is effective in mapping actors and institutions, including 
their importance and leadership, when using methods/models such as centrality tests. For 
future work, other models and methods of SNA can also be used. The presently used methods 
can also be used to map institutions and governance in other countries or regions.   
 Future research on disaster mitigation policy and institutional dimensions of mitigation in 
developing countries is needed given the disasters in the first decade of the 21st Century.  
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Simple Linear Regression 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Specific DRR Institutional 
Index 
3.1912 .68475 63
Institutional Quality Index 4.6112 2.66651 63
Correlations 
 Specific DRR Institutional Index Institutional Quality Index
Pearson 
Correlation 
Specific DRR Institutional Index 1.000 .596
Institutional Quality Index .596 1.000
Sig. (1-tailed) Specific DRR Institutional Index . .000
Institutional Quality Index .000 .
N Specific DRR Institutional Index 63 63
Institutional Quality Index 63 63
 
Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model 
Variables Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Institutional Quality Indexa 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Specific DRR Institutional Index 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .596a .355 .345 .55431 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Institutional Quality Index 
b. Dependent Variable: Specific DRR Institutional Index 
 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 10.328 1 10.328 33.615 .000a 
Residual 18.743 61 .307   
Total 29.071 62    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Institutional Quality Index 
b. Dependent Variable: Specific DRR Institutional Index 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.485 .140  17.709 .000 
Institutional Quality Index .153 .026 .596 5.798 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Specific DRR Institutional Index 
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Annex 2. BNPB Structure  
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Annex 3. Example of Pajek Analysis on Closeness Centrality Output 
 
 
 
All closeness centrality in N1 (24) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Dimension: 24 
The lowest value:          0.2584270 
The highest value:         0.5111111 
------------------------------------------ 
     Sum                7.9172593 
 
Arithmetic mean:    0.3298858 
Median: 0.3066667 
Standard deviation: 0.0595749 
 
       Vector Values             Frequency       Freq%  CumFreq  CumFreq% 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 (             ........      0.2584]          1      4.1667        1    4.1667 
 (      0.2584 ...      0.3427]         18     75.0000       19   79.1667 
 (      0.3427 ...      0.4269]          2      8.3333       21   87.5000 
 (      0.4269 ...      0.5111]          3     12.5000       24  100.0000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Total                                 24    100.0000 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4. Betweenness centrality in N1 (24) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Dimension: 24 
The lowest value:          0.0000000 
The highest value:         0.6877470 
------------------------------------------ 
     Sum                2.3043478 
Arithmetic mean:    0.0960145 
Median: 0.0000000 
Standard deviation: 0.1998915 
 
       Vector Values             Frequency       Freq%  CumFreq  CumFreq% 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 (             ...           0.0000]         16     66.6667       16   66.6667 
 (      0.0000 ...      0.2293]          4     16.6667       20   83.3333 
 (      0.2293 ...      0.4585]          1      4.1667       21   87.5000 
 (      0.4585 ...      0.6877]          3     12.5000       24  100.0000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Total                                 24    100.0000 
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Annex 4. Institutional Vulnerability Index  
 
Countries 
Institutional 
Quality Index 
Specific DRR 
Institutional Index 
Modeled 
Institutional 
Resilience Index 
Disaster Risk 
Index 
Switzerland 9,72 4,45 3,97 -0,08 
NewZealand 9,6 3,91 3,95 0,28 
Sweden 9,6 3,59 3,95 -0,64 
Norway 9,51 3,64 3,94 -0,2 
Australia 9,16 4,09 3,89 0,28 
Germany 9,03 3,86 3,87 0,19 
UnitedKingdom 8,88 4,27 3,84 0,13 
Singapore 8,56 4,27 3,79  - 
Japan 8,4 4,18 3,77 0,74 
United States 8,32 3,68 3,76 0,71 
France 8,32 4 3,76 0,13 
CzechRepublic 7,65 3,77 3,66 -0,2 
Korea 7,4 3,77 3,62 0,73 
Mauritius 7,33 3,14 3,61 1,15 
Costa Rica 7,09 3,82 3,57 0,59 
Italy 7,11 3,86 3,57 0,24 
Croatia 6,43 3,41 3,47  -     
Bulgaria 6,13 3,55 3,42 0,19 
Panama 5,82 2,77 3,38 0,34 
Ghana 5,7 2,95 3,36 0,34 
Jamaica 5,07 3,55 3,26 0,76 
Turkey 5,09 3,41 3,26 0,77 
El Salvador 4,89 2,41 3,23 0,69 
Madagascar 4,9 3,59 3,23 0,97 
India 4,74 3,55 3,21 0,9 
Macedonia 4,74 3,41 3,21 -0,1 
Argentina 4,43 3,09 3,16 0,51 
DominicanRepublic 4,35 1,73 3,15 0,75 
Senegal 4,28 2,23 3,14 0,51 
Sri Lanka 4,25 2,59 3,13 0,72 
Armenia 4,16 3,14 3,12 0,13 
Tanzania 4,16 3,27 3,12 - 
Colombia 4,11 3,36 3,11 0,52 
Serbia 4,08 2,68 3,11 - 
Peru 4 3,05 3,1 0,66 
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Mozambique 3,98 3,45 3,09 1,23 
BurkinaFaso 3,85 3,23 3,07 0,64 
Zambia 3,7 3,41 3,05 0,64 
Philippines 3,47 2,45 3,02 1,11 
Malawi 3,53 3,14 3,02 1,13 
Egypt 3,33 2,73 3 0,48 
Indonesia 3,14 3 2,97 1 
Kazakhstan 2,92 3,05 2,93 - 
Swaziland 2,91 1,73 2,93 - 
Kenya 2,75 3,36 2,91 0,78 
Bolivia 2,51 2,18 2,87 0,75 
Algeria 2,54 3,05 2,87 0,69 
Nepal 2,04 2,14 2,8 0,86 
Cambodia 1,89 2,32 2,77 0,66 
Sierra Leone 1,84 3,82 2,77 0,22 
Ecuador 1,83 2,41 2,76 0,7 
Lao PDR 1,81 1,95 2,76 0,78 
Kyrgyz Rep. 1,81 2,86 2,76 - 
Pakistan 1,7 3,14 2,75 0,86 
Syrian 1,74 2,86 2,75 -0,77 
Bangladesh 1,64 3,18 2,74 1,01 
Yemen 1,64 2 2,74 0,78 
Iran 1,63 4,59 2,73 0,83 
Tajikistan 1,28 3,18 2,68 0,91 
Venezuela 1,19 2,91 2,67 0,52 
Angola 1,23 2,91 2,67 0,14 
Uzbekistan 1,04 3,95 2,64 - 
Cote d'Ivoire 0,57 2 2,57 0,38 
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Annex 5. Perception on the Cause of Disasters in Sikka: Selected Variables  
 
Notes. This is a work in progress based on a baseline survey from Plan Sikka in 2008 with 521 
respondents from Sikka district (from 10 sub-districts). 361 Males, 156 Females, 4. 87% of the 
respondents are Catholics and 8% Islam. Annex 5 presents only the selected questions.   
 
Question No. 2 (close question) Disasters are events and there is not much we can do 
about them? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly disagree 45 8.6 8.8 8.8
Disagree 108 20.7 21.2 30.0
Dont know 55 10.6 10.8 40.8
Agree 196 37.6 38.4 79.2
Strongly agree 106 20.3 20.8 100.0
Total 510 97.9 100.0
Missing System 11 2.1
Total 521 100.0
 
Question No. 40. What is the reason a disaster occurs? (close questions) 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Natural 204 39.2 41.7 41.7
Human made 49 9.4 10.0 51.7
will of God 41 7.9 8.4 60.1
Natural and human made 88 16.9 18.0 78.1
Natural and will of god 21 4.0 4.3 82.4
All natural human and will 
of god 
86 16.5 17.6 100.0
Total 489 93.9 100.0
Missing System 32 6.1
Total 521 100.0
 
Education of the respondents  
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid no school 11 2.1 2.3 2.3
elementary 279 53.6 57.6 59.9
junior hs 71 13.6 14.7 74.6
senior hs 89 17.1 18.4 93.0
college/university 33 6.3 6.8 99.8
postgrad 1 .2 .2 100.0
Total 484 92.9 100.0
Missing System 37 7.1
Total 521 100.0
 
  
214 
 
Annex 6. Visited Areas in Indonesia  
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Annex 7. Selected List of DRR Regulations Local and National 
1 "Qanun (Perda) 1/2008 on Aceh Finance Management" 
2 "Law 32/2004 on Local Government" 
3 "Law 12/2008 on Local Gevernment" 
4 "Law 33/2004 on Balancing Fiscal Central & L.Govt" 
5 "Law 11/2006 on Aceh Government" 
6 "Law 24/2007 on Disaster Management" 
7 "GR 41/2007 on Local Organisational Instruments" 
8 "GR 21/2008 on DRM Implementation" 
9 "GR 22/2008 on Disaster Finance & Aid Management" 
10 "GR 23/2008 on Participation of Int. institution and INGOs" 
11 "GR 38/2007 on Mandate Sharing between District and Provincial Govt" 
12 "Head of BNPB Regulation 3/2008 on Guides for BPBD" 
13 "Law 43/1999 on Civil Servants (amendment)" 
14 "Law 8/1974 on Civil Servants" 
15 "Permendagri 46/2008 on Guides for (BPBD) and Rules" 
16 "Permendagri 57/2007 on Technical Guide for L.Govt Orgs." 
17 "GR 79/2005 on Guide for Strengthen and Monitor L.Govt" 
18 "Law 10/2004 on Law on how to make Law" 
19 "Presidential Decree 8/2008 on BNPB" 
20 "Law 28 /1999 on Anticorruption in Government" 
21 "Permendagri 15/2006 on Types and Form of Local Laws" 
22 "Permendagri 16/2006 on Drafting Procedures of Local Laws" 
23 "Permendagri 17/2006 on Local Notes and News" 
24 "SMDNRI 061/707/SJ 2009" 
25 "Law 17/2003 State Finance" 
26 "GR 9/2003 on Authority to Recruit/Fire PNS" 
27 "GR 58/2005 on Local Finance Management" 
28 "Law 1/2004 National Treasury" 
29 "Local Regulation on Financial Management" 
30 "Local Regulation on Local Regulation Drafting" 
31 "Local Regulation on Roles of District Executive Government" 
32 "Provincial Regulation on DM" 
33 "GR 55/2005 on Badan Perimbangan" 
34 "Law 11/1967 on Mining" 
35 "Law 14/1992 on Traffic and Road" 
36 "Law 18/199 on Construction service" 
37 "Law 2/2002 on Police" 
38 "Law 23/1992 on Health" 
39 "Law 26/2007 on Spatial Planning" 
40 "Law 34/2004 on TNI" 
41 "Law 39/1999 on Human Rights" 
42 "Law 6/1974 on Social Welfare" 
43 "Constitution 1945" 
44 "Kepmendagri 131/2003 on Guide for DRM and IDPs" 
45 "Permendagri 12/2006 on Community Preparedness" 
46 "Permendagri 27/2007 on Guides on  DP Facility and Infrastructure" 
47 "Permendagri 33/2006 on Disaster Mitigation" 
48 "GR 25/2000 on Power Division of Central and Provincial Government" 
49 "GR 29/1980 on Collection of Donation" 
50 "GR 6/1988 on Vertical Coordination at the Local Level" 
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51 "KepmenESDM 1054.k /12/MPE/2000 on Volcano Mitigation Guide" 
52 "KepmenESDM 1452.K/10/MEM/2000 on TG.-Inv. 
ESDM,GeoMaGR,Landslide" 
53 "Kepmensos 1/HUK/1995 on Donation Collection for Disaster Victims" 
54 "Kepmensos 56/HUK/1996 on Implementation of Donation" 
55 "Law 23/1997 on Environment" 
56 "Law 24/1992 on Spatial Planning" 
57 "Law 41/1999 on Forestry" 
58 "Law 6/1974 on Main Regulation of Social Welfare" 
59 "Law 6/1996 on Indonesian Sea (Perairan)" 
60 "Law 9/1961 on donation funds and goods from communities" 
61 "Presidential Decree 32/1990 on Protected Areas Management" 
62 "GR 26/2008 on National Plan on Spatial Planning" 
63 "GR 34/2006 on Road" 
64 "GR 42/2008 on Water Resource Management" 
65 "Law 11/2009 on Social Welfare" 
66 "Law 32/2009 on Environmental Protection" 
67 "Law 38/2004 on Road" 
68 "Law 7/2004 on Water Resources" 
69 "Local Regulation on Long Term Development Plan (RPJP)" 
70 "Local Regulation on Medium Term Development Plan (RPJM)" 
71 "Local Regulation on Provincial Spatial Planning" 
72 "PD 67/2005 on Coop. govt and Infrastructure Business Org." 
73 "PD 80/2003 on Guides for Goods/Services Provision" 
74 "PermenPU 21/2007 on Guides for Spatial Planning for Volcanic Regions" 
75 "PermenPU 22/2007 on Guides for Spatial Planning for Landslides Areas" 
76 "BNPB Aceh" 
77 "BPBD Agam" 
78 "BPBD Bantul" 
79 "BPBD Bojonegoro" 
80 "BPBD Gorontalo" 
81 "BPBD Jabar" 
82 "BPBD NTT" 
83 "BPBD Samarinda" 
84 "BPBD Sikka" 
85 "Provincial DM Law NTT" 
86 "Provincial DM Law W. Sumatra" 
87 "Provincial DM Law West Java" 
 
